

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 260 837

PS 015 307

AUTHOR Collins, Randall; And Others
TITLE Social Change and Family Policies. Key Papers, Part I. International CFR Seminar (20th, Melbourne, Australia, August 19-24, 1984).
INSTITUTION Institute of Family Studies, Melbourne (Australia).
PUB DATE Jul 84
NOTE 424p.; For related documents, see PS 015 308-311.
AVAILABLE FROM Institute of Family Studies, 766 Elizabeth Street, Melbourne, Victoria, 3000, Australia (no price quoted).
PUB TYPE Collected Works - Conference Proceedings (021) -- Viewpoints (120) -- Reports - Research/Technical (143)
EDRS PRICE MF01/PC17 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS Adolescents; Birth Rate; Competence; Conflict; Demography; Developing Nations; Divorce; *Family (Sociological Unit); *Family Problems; Foreign Countries; Marriage; *Modernization; Moral Values; Parent Attitudes; Personal Autonomy; Policy Formation; Political Issues; *Public Policy; Seminars; Sex Role; *Social Change; *Social Environment; Social Problems; Surveys
IDENTIFIERS Australia; Europe (West); *Family Policy; Social Policy

ABSTRACT

These papers from an International Committee on Family Research (CFR) seminar explore seven themes, four of which are presented in Part 1. The first set of papers approach the question of whether the family is worth supporting and the related issue of pressures, conflicts, and expectations of family life (Theme 1). Randall Collins discusses "Social Conflict and the Place of the Family: Toward a Theory of Moral Politics." Robert A. Lewis describes "Some Changes in Men's Values, Meanings, Roles, and Attitudes Toward Marriage and Family in the USA." Helen Glezer identifies "Antecedents and Correlates of Marriage and Family Attitudes in Young Australian Men and Women." Major demographic trends affecting family policy (Theme 2) are identified by Arland Thornton and Peter McDonald, respectively, in papers on "Modernization and Family Change" and "Implications for Families of Third World Fertility Trends." Three additional papers discuss families with children and social policy approaches to family support and education (Theme 3): "Family Policy as Latter-Day Children's Policy" by Gilbert Steiner; "Divorcees, Children, and the Public" by Jan Trost; and "The Child's Use of Family Resources" by Gay Ochiltree and Paul Amato. The topic of youth policies and the family/work/education relationship (Theme 4) is particularized in Roland Eckert and Helmut Willems' "Youth Conflicts and Public Policy Challenges in Western Europe" and in Don Edgar and Frank Maas' "Adolescent Competence, Leaving Home and Changing Family Patterns." (RH)



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XXth International
CFR Seminar on
**SOCIAL CHANGE
AND FAMILY
POLICIES**

Melbourne, Australia,
19-24 August, 1984.

KEY PAPERS

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PART 1

PART
1

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JULY 1984

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MONDAY, 20 AUGUST 1984

**Is the family worth supporting?
Pressures, conflicts and expectations of
family life**

Social conflict and the place of the family: toward a theory of moral politics

by RANDALL COLLINS

The effectiveness of policy interventions on the family depends upon what causes various family structures. Fundamental sociological theory is important for assessing whether politics is capable of affecting the family at all. Most theoretical approaches, in my opinion, are implicitly pessimistic, or else irrelevant, to this question. Social-psychological theories of family dynamics, for example, do not give us any leverage in explaining family forms and their changes, since they operate within a given structural context which they take for granted. Biological theories of the family, which have made some come-back in recent years, are obviously even less useful for explaining family change. Functionalist theory, similarly, is overly abstract to be useful. It sees the family as a benign institution for the socialization and legitimation of children, for the psychological support of working adults (in the traditional theory, inevitably males), and for the reproduction of the physical population and cultural patterns of society. This interpretation, one is inclined to say, merely stamps hidden value-judgements upon the status quo and endorses whatever is the prevailing ideology about the family.

A somewhat more dynamic set of positions are found in what might be called economic theories of the family. One version of this has been prominent in family sociology from the beginning. That is the evolutionary theory of the family, which correlates family forms with economic stages. A simplistic version of this is usually found in sociology textbooks. It presents the familiar cliché of modern industrial society and its nuclear family, versus premodern, agricultural society and its extended family structure. The specifics of this model have come under severe criticism from historians of at

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least the Western European family, who do not find the "extended" family structure for several centuries into the agrarian past. But on a larger time scale, a rough correspondence is generally asserted in the anthropological and archeological literature between hunting-and-gathering, horticultural, agrarian, and industrial economic bases and various forms of family structure, as in Blumberg and Winch's (1972) inverted U-shaped curve of economic evolution and family complexity. The implication here would seem to be that the family is relatively impervious to the effects of political intervention, since its determinants are ultimately in the very slow-moving fundament of the economy.

Marxian theories imply the long-run view that family structure cannot really move without a corresponding change in the economic substructure, although in this case the emphasis is placed upon capitalism in particular rather than industrialism in general. Nevertheless, Marxian theories have the merit of seeing the family in relation to the system of domination in society, and thus tying it at least implicitly to the dynamics of class conflict. The variant of Marxian theory that meets up with feminism reaches a further critical vantage point, by recognizing that systematic relationships of domination and at least potential conflict exist within the family as well, in the form of sex stratification. Since Marxism remains within the framework of economic explanation, however, it has difficulties in allowing the feminist struggle any autonomy apart from the systematic reproduction of the entire capitalist system. In this sense Marxism might be said to be merely the functionalism of the Left.

An alternative perspective, which I will explore here, sees the family as determined basically by political as well as other

conditions. My theoretical inspiration here comes from Max Weber and from Levi-Strauss.

Moral Politics

I will use the term "moral politics" to refer to a kind of phenomenon that is familiar enough in our own society, but whose connection with the family is even more obvious elsewhere. Lawrence Stone has pointed out that there are three instances in early modern European history when a king was executed: in the English revolutions in 1649 and 1688, and in the French Revolution in 1793. In each case, the legitimacy of the royal family was severely undermined by the reputation of the court for sexual dissoluteness, including not only erotic liaisons among the courtiers but rumours of homosexuality of the King himself. In Chinese history, the connection between the family and the legitimacy of the regime was even raised to a point of doctrine. The ancient Book of History (Shu Ching) repeatedly ascribes the downfall of early dynasties to the drunkenness of kings and their inordinate attentions to their concubines or even their wives instead of to ritual duties. Revolt was legitimized against such a king. Although of course there were also other factors involved in any actual revolts, this doctrine was actually invoked at later times. For example in 755 A.D., the T'ang Emperor Hsuan-tsung was forced to execute his favorite concubine, Lady Yang, during a military revolt in order to regain the confidence of his troops; (she was regarded as having become too powerful, and the preceding reigns had seen the usurpation of the throne by Empresses after their husband's death who had risen from the rank of concubine.)

The symbols of the family can be potent weapons in politics. But what direction do they cut? The European examples are all

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left-wing revolutions; the Chinese more like mere dynastic quarrels, though the doctrine of the ritually proper Emperor was used to bolster the position of conservative Confucians, who upheld a strict patriarchal control throughout the Chinese family system. If we distinguish between the effects of these family "scandals" on politics, and their effects upon the family structure itself, it would seem that they are a kind of ritual reestablishment of tradition, bolstering the conservative family structure against further change. Thus even the "left" revolutions of Europe tended to be followed by a moral authoritarianism and a reassertion of patriarchy. At least, such is Stone's claim. In our own day, "moral politics" tends to have a conservative bent. One can think not only of the sexual overtones of the Chappaquiddick scandal that destroyed the Presidential hopes of the liberal leader Ted Kennedy, but of the current battles over abortion, birth-control assistance, homosexuality, and other family issues of the "New Right" in the United States.

The Case of Rome

Nevertheless, the interconnections of politics and the family are deeper and more complex than this. Let us look more closely into another historical example where moral politics was quite prominent, ancient Rome (Pomeroy, 1975; Carcopino, 1940; Friedlander, 1906-13). Here too, the politics of the family seems largely on the conservative side.

We can distinguish at least three periods of controversy over the family. The most recent was during the reign of Domitian (81-96 A.D.), when Juvenal wrote his scathing satires on the looseness of Roman women, stressing the prevalence of adultery and licentiousness among the rich, and Tacitus compared the Roman wives unfavorably to

the Germans'. This image of moral decay has colored our historical image of Roman society, although as we shall see it is more reasonably attributed to the moral politics of the time.

Earlier, during the reigns (27 B.C.-37 A.D.) of the first Emperor, Augustus, and his successor, Tiberius, there was a determined effort to reestablish what was regarded as the traditional family. Laws were promulgated requiring all men to marry by age 25 and all women by age 20; penalties were set for failure to remarry after widowhood or divorce; incentives in the form of improved legal status were given to women (both slaves and free women) who bore more than three children. Augustus Caesar himself tried to restore the old fashioned virtue of women staying at home spinning wool, by setting the ladies of the imperial household to work and even wearing their homespun clothes (somewhat comparable to U.S. President Jimmy Carter turning out the lights in the White House to save electricity during the oil crisis). Traditional religious cults of the female virtues (chastity, loyalty, fertility) were reestablished, and non-familistic foreign cults like the worship of Isis were suppressed. Moreover, since the principal historians and poetic describers of the earlier period -- Livy and Virgil -- were part of Augustus' propaganda machine, their contrasting picture of the ideal Roman family of early, "non-degenerate" times has covered up the reality of what the ancient family had actually been like.

The third and earliest period of "moral politics" I would like to focus upon took place between the beginning of the great showdown war with Carthage (216-202 B.C.) and the war that broke the Macedonian power and gave Rome effective control of Greece (171-168 B.C.). This period of 45 years has the appearance of a major struggle between the

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sexes inside Rome, at the same time that Roman army went from fighting for its life to clear hegemony of the Mediterranean world. The Roman defeat by Hannibal in 216, the worst ever suffered, actually left Roman women in a temporarily strengthened position. With the loss of so many males, women were emboldened to enter the political arena and entreat the the senate to ransom prisoners (which it refused to do). The slaughter also left many women as heiresses to family property. The Senate reacted by passing the Oppian Laws (215 B.C.), which prohibited the public display of wealth by women, and confiscated much of their property for the war fund. In 195 B.C., after the war had been won, women demonstrated successfully for the repeal of the Oppian Laws, despite the opposition of the famous reactionary misogynist Cato the Elder. But the war of the sexes was not over. Nine years later, thousands of woman (and men as well) were executed for participating in the Bacchic rites imported from Greece. These rites were reportedly orgiastic, but that may have been exaggerated by the propaganda of moral politics. In any case it was an attack on women who dared to join an organization outside of the family and its traditional rites. Two years later, in 184 B.C., Cato, who had been elected Censor, confiscated jewels and other displays of luxury on the part of women. And in 169, during the victorious war with the Macedonians, the Voconian Law was passed which severely restricted the rights of women to inheritance.

All these are clear political efforts to control the shape of the family. One might question, though, whether they were effective. Despite the Oppian and Voconian legislation, women continued to acquire wealth and to display it lavishly; indeed, after the conquest of Greece, upper-class Roman families had become opulent, owning huge

estates and many slaves. Hence one might conclude that these political efforts --- as well as the reactionary romanticism of Augustus and the later criticisms at the time of Domitian --- illustrate more than anything the impotence of the state to affect the drift of the family caused by deeper forces. But this, I would argue, is too simplistic a view of politics. One might say that politics is like a game of billiards. One rarely gets what one is directly aiming at; the outcomes usually happen on the rebound, and more than likely involve ricochets of several forces, combining to produce an unforeseen vector of their own.

Let me illustrate first by certain aspects of the Roman family where the effects of politics are fairly clear. Roman law gave severe control over family members, and especially women, to the pater, the male head of the family, or to some other male guardian. This included the power to kill a wife or daughter for certain offenses, including not only adultery, but also for drinking wine. He also had sole power of divorce, not only over his own wife, but over the wives of his children. This seems to be a case where the family is completely autonomous of the state. But not so. For one thing, it is the state itself that established and upheld this law. In the case of the women condemned for participation in the Bacchic rites in 186 B.C., it was the state which pronounced the condemnation and then handed them over to their families for execution. (The severe prohibition on women drinking wine, incidentally, may perhaps derive from either this incident or a similar cast of moral politics.) Moreover, the state at various times set express limits on what the pater familias could do. Although under early law a wife was the absolute property of such a man, and hence could be sold into slavery, later laws decreed that a

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man who actually did so would himself be executed and his property confiscated. This sounds like a legal contradiction, but it merely indicates political conflict: a different political faction was now intent on breaking the power of the pater familias, and we get some inkling of who they were by the provision that the confiscated property went half to the woman, half to the temple of Ceres, whose guardians happened to be the leading politicians of the plebian faction. Similarly, later political interventions acted to restrict the unilateral power to divorce or punish family members: sometimes in the interest of the wife's family, sometimes of the larger group of kinsmen (gens).

Another example shows the indirect effect of state policies upon the family. The law stated that the pater should decide whether newborn infants should be raised or exposed to die, but it also stipulated that all males should be raised but only the first-born female. In the late Republic, the political policy of maintaining the poorer classes on a dole of bread applied only to males, since females were not voters and their support was not solicited. These policies seem to have produced a decidedly skewed sex ratio, which in turn reinforced a family structure in which all females were married. We might also notice the effect of slavery, a politically-determined institution, on the family. This affected the structure of upper-class, slave-owning families, where strict regulations allowed certain sexual access of males to slaves and set an equally strict prohibition regarding upper-class females. The structural contradiction between the property and status system and the ubiquity of slaves (again, the majority of whom were male) is certainly behind much of the denunciations of women in the moral politics of the Juvenal

type. What types of family structures were possible among the slaves themselves were even more sharply determined by the laws regulating slavery.

The family structure of a society is never static, and it is a myth to speak of "the Roman family" as if there were only a single such entity. Political change alone is enough to determine that the family will have a history. In the case of the Roman family, these changes are intimately connected with the shifting forms of politics. The classic account of this remains that of Emile Durkheim's teacher, Fustel de Coulanges. Fustel's The Ancient City (1864/1980) shows us society emerging initially as a religious cult. On the basis of references in classical texts, he reconstructed the oldest religion of the Greeks and Romans, a religion which he believed was also shared by the Aryan invaders of India in the Vedic period. Its center was a cult centered around the family fire. The hearth was the original altar; the principal ceremony took place as the family assembled for meals, accompanied by sacrifices, prayers, and hymns. This describes all the social ingredients that Durkheim was later to specify for a ritual: the presence of the group face-to-face, a common focus of attention and shared emotion, non-practical actions carried out for symbolic ends. As with Durkheim, the successful ceremony constitutes the group and gives it a moral unity. Each family had its own ritual, and what made someone a member of a family was being admitted to its domestic rites. Outsiders were excluded; thus the ritual marked the boundary sharply between the group and the outside world. And it also constituted domestic authority: the power of the family patriarch was due to the fact that he was the family priest, who alone presided at rituals.

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The city was also based on ritual. Originally the Greek and Latin cities were coalitions among various families. Only the patriarchs were citizens, since they alone represented the family to the outside world. But a coalition could only be formed as itself a cult. Thus each city was organized around a temple, a cult center in honor of a god or goddess (like Athena at Athens) or a heroic ancestor (like Romulus at Rome or Theseus at Thebes). Archeological research has confirmed that the original temples were built in the form of a dwelling with a hearth, the home of the god or alleged ancestral spirit. The citizens at first kept their homes outside the city walls, and only retired there for political and religious assemblies and for military defense.

The first civic officials were priests of the civic cult itself. Ritual was the basis of politics. The early "kings" were actually ceremonial leaders. Later, struggles among social "classes" arose between those who were admitted into the privileges of religious (and therefore political) participation, versus those who were excluded. Only full citizens had legal rights, because they alone could appear before the religious officials who were the judges. Religion was not only the basis of the law, but set the form of legal punishments. The most severe punishment was exile, because this meant exclusion from the cult. The cult alone guaranteed rights of property and physical protection.

It is already implicit in Fustel's account that ritual is a weapon of domination. It provided the basis for the authority of the family head; later in the coalition that made up the city, the civic cult was an organizing device by which the aristocracy could monopolize political power. One might even speak of ritual as the

"means of emotional production," parallel to Marx and Engels' "means of intellectual production" which ensured domination in the realm of ideas. Fustel also provides a useful corrective for the functionalist belief that ritual solidarity eliminates or at least greatly diminishes conflict. For if ritual is a weapon which results in domination, then at the same time it generates a split into a class of dominators and a class of dominated. The first class conflicts, then, are not organized on an economic basis per se, but upon the possession of ritual property: upon control over or exclusion from the means of emotional production.

Fustel speaks of four great revolutions, which altered religious participation and hence the entire social structure. The first revolution took place in the 600s B.C., as the aristocracy of family heads took away the power of the king. Both factions were defined by ritual: the aristocrats were priests of their own household cults, while the king was the priest of the coalition's cult. This revolution, which took place in various cities throughout Greece and Italy, left the king a merely ceremonial position. This was in a sense the rise of the state, since it established a political organ separate from a religious one.

The second revolution pitted the aristocrats against the clients. The latter group consisted of persons who lacked citizenship rights, because they were merely subordinate members within some aristocrat's family cult. These might be members of younger branches of a family, servants, outsiders or retainers who had been adopted into the family worship but only as underlings. The battle to establish full political rights for the clients meant freeing them from obligations to their aristocratic masters, which were tied up

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with their subordinate religious status. Fustel believed that this involved the overthrowing of an original right of primogeniture, although modern evidence indicates that no such practice appears to have existed in early times.

The third revolution (which may not be so clearly distinguished from the second; both took place ca. 600-400 B.C.) involved the battle of the plebian class to enter the city. The plebians were aliens, persons who lacked family cults of their own, who lived outside the city walls. Without a family religion, they had no social honor, no legal rights, and no place in the political assembly of the city. Due especially to shifts in weaponry which made the plebians valuable as troops (a point that Weber also was to stress), the plebians achieved some citizenship rights. The process was not identical everywhere. At Athens a full (male) democracy was established; at Rome, the most conservative of the ancient cities, the plebians acquired only limited concessions. It was the victory of the plebians in Greece that ushered in the classical period of democracy. Only after this political revolution did class stratification based primarily upon wealth arise. It is in this period that we find the plutocracy, denounced by conservatives like Plato and Aristotle, and of course by Cato and a long tradition of Romans.

Fustel describes the fourth revolution as flowing from this situation. The citizens were now divided into rich and poor, classes based on wealth rather than ritual distinctions. There also existed a conservative faction, the old-line aristocrats, who periodically plotted to overthrow democracy and reestablish the traditional oligarchy of limited participation in a civic cult. Amid these shifting political tides, popular tyrants arose, who appealed to the

poor against the reactionary aristocrats and against the new rich. The result was the final destruction of the ancient city-states. They were superseded by kingships, now no longer religious but purely political despotisms. Here again Rome held out longest against the trend, but finally the Republic gave way to an Emperor, rising to power upon demagogic appeals to the poor.

What looks at first glance like a war between the sexes in Roman politics is actually entwined in this factional history. The struggle during and after the Second Punic War (between the ^{from} Opian ^{to the} and Voconian legislation, and including the purges of the Bacchic rites) did not simply pit women against men, but women with the support of a male political faction against the defenders of the old-line family structure, which was in turn an agency of oligarchy among males as well. Women evaded restrictive legislation and gradually acquired property, not because politics was weak against other forces, but because those other forces were themselves political, the rise of a democratic faction.

When the ritual-based family cult was in force, marriage took the form of manus, a ceremony in which the bride was transferred from the religion of her father to that of her husband's family. The political structure build upon this cult, as we have seen, was gradually widened and broken down by successive revolutions, although the conservative faction in Rome clung to it longer than in the more democratic cities of Greece. After the Punic wars, though, the family cult no longer corresponded to any political reality, and was kept alive merely as a kind of ideological self-identification for a faction which actually operated in an entirely different political arena. The new political realities did foster a different type of

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marriage. In place of manus, marriage now came to be arranged by a kind of legal fiction, as if it were a tentative agreement between the families, in which the woman (and her inheritance rights) actually remained in the hands of her father. At the same time, divorces became much easier, and could be initiated from either side.

What was the point of this? Amid the factional politics and civil wars of the late Republic, intermarriages were a principal form of alliance. The household, now swollen by enormous wealth and patronage of the leading politicians, remained the organizational basis of politics. Hence party alliances were necessarily inter-household alliances. Pompey, Sulla, Caesar, Antony, Octavian all were multiply married, since divorces were necessary in order to break up alliances and keep up the rapid flow of political maneuver. This is one reason why the woman's family kept up active ties with her, rather than handing her over exclusively to her husband's family as in the older form. A married woman could actually be ordered by her father to divorce her husband when political alliances shifted.

Amidst these clashing billiard balls of politics, an unintended result was that upper-class Roman woman's status and power rose. The political maneuver gave increasing property rights to the female line, which might vest in a woman herself under certain circumstances (such as male deaths). Some women, such as Antony's first wife Fulvia, took advantage of the shifting alliances to play politics on their own behalf, and became personages of some influence. (They were also fiercely hated by their political opponents, who were the source of much misogynist propaganda.) Women also acquired fame because of their prominence in these family alliances; early in his career, Julius Caesar first made a notable impact by the innovation of

delivering public funeral orations for his female relatives, through whom he was related to the popular general and politician Marius. Later, women of the imperial family became deified, along with their husbands and fathers; again, as part of the political package.

The propagandistic and legal reaction of the early Empire in favor of an idealized traditional family must be seen in the context of the politics that went before. Augustus and Tiberius were attempting to bring to an end the factional politics of the period of the civil wars. They and their propagandists attempted to discourage divorce because divorce had been a major part of the mechanism of factional alliance. In attacking the fluid family structure, they were attacking the main instrument of upper-class politics. The moral politics of Augustus was part of the effort to consolidate the power of Imperial rule. Ostensibly, the policy was aimed at overcoming the moral degeneracy of the age, combatting the bachelorhood which had become quite common, and promoting fertility and hence a manpower for the Roman army. But army manpower can hardly have been the issue in the laws to compel marriage, since in fact this was not a time of military crisis; conversely, such legal expedients had not been resorted to earlier when military demands were much more severe. We are instead in the realm of moral politics, with its symbolic issues designed to stir up emotional legitimacy for a policy whose real object is to undermine the structures that mobilized its enemies.

Later in the Empire, the legal structure of the family shifted again. The law of inheritance changed so that a woman was again more a member of her husband's family than of her father's. Attacks on women's dissoluteness and freedom continued, especially in the reign of Domitian. The reasons for this are not readily apparent, but we can

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see the atmosphere of moral politics of the time from the fact that the Emperor instituted trials of some of the Vestal Virgins for unchastity. These women were daughters of high-ranking families, who officiated at the civic cult of Rome. The cult's origins went back to the early inter-family coalition that founded the city, and it had long since lost its political and religious significance. Thus the ritually-prescribed chastity of the Vestals was for the most part a dead letter, despite the severe penalties (scourging, being buried alive) for violations. Domitian or the political cliques surrounding him, however, found some moral legitimacy to be gained by claiming to revive the old rules and carrying out dramatic punishments. That this was an aspect of the factional politics of the time can be guessed from the fact that earlier such prosecutions (114-13 BC in the period of the "social wars"; 73 BC in the Cataline conspiracy) were selectively directed against alleged lovers of the Vestals who were active in the leading political conflicts of the time. Again in the period 190-220 AD, there was an upsurge of anti-abortion legislation, under the banner of the traditional restoration of the family. What caused this particular upsurge of moral politics can only be guessed at.

General Considerations

This case study is full of implications for a political explanation of the family. The same conclusion emerges from more general considerations. The family itself may be defined as the nexus of sexual and economic relations. This sounds almost like a definition of prostitution, except that the sexual rights involved in any family are not merely private and transient, but are politically legitimated, exclusive, and enforced by all interested parties. Similarly the

economic side of the family, including both its collective economy and its inheritance procedures, are part of its public posture and public liabilities. To put this another way: The family consists of various arrangements of sexual and economic property. Property always implies politics, in that it consists of claims backed up by the organized force of the community. We might note, too, that both sexual and economic relationships, provided that they are publically acknowledged, always carry status connotations. Each becomes ringed about with an emotional and symbolic definition, such as honor, fidelity, love, and appropriate style, so that these become a kind of ideological property. Families simultaneously possess this property, and are thereby tied to a public which judges their status claims. For this reason, the politics of families tends to have the overtone of moral politics.

The family as a system of sexual and economic property is entwined with two kinds of politics. There is an internal politics, an implicit maneuvering over control of this property within each family: usually between women and men, but sometimes also between elders and youths, oldest son and younger siblings, principal wife and subordinate wives and their children, etc. And there is an external politics, in which each family is both an agent in the larger political struggle, and is structurally affected or even constituted by the larger state or (lacking the state) by the interfamilial alliance system.

At the level of stateless tribal societies, as is well known, the family itself is the political unit. Anthropological alliance theory points out that a kinship system is itself the politics of such societies. Levi-Strauss' (1949/69; cf. Collins, 1981) monumental

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theory of the so-called "elementary structures" of kinship politics culminates in a model of how a kinship revolution broke tribal societies apart into alliance-rich and alliance-poor families and thus gave rise to the state. But state societies themselves have to contend with kinship groups of various sorts, as political rivals and political units, at least through the long period of what might be called the "patrimonial" (or "patrimonial/feudal") state. And even the transformation of that state in the face of modern bureaucracy constitutes a political change which determined the form of the modern family.

Weber's Geopolitics of the Family

The most useful guide to these long-term variations is Max Weber's little known theory of the family, stated in the generally-overlooked early chapters of his General Economic History and of Part II of Economy and Society. Weber's approach to the family does not begin in the usual starting places with the nuclear family, matrilineal and patrilineal lineages, and the like. Instead, these are matters to be derived later, from a more basic matrix. Weber holds to a multi-levelled view of the family, with nested larger and smaller structures. Instead of starting with the nuclear family and working outwards, it might be more accurate to say that Weber puts in view the largest political relations, and works inward from there. His perspective on the family might best be labelled geopolitical.

Weber's two main structures are the household and the kin group (which in the translations of Weber is often rendered "sib" or "clan"). Neither is primal; rather they conflict with and modify each other, producing a considerable range of outcomes.

The basic form of the household is a group with common

residence and consumption of the everyday means of subsistence within it, which Weber refers to as "household communism" (Weber, 1922/68: 359). But the household does not necessarily coincide with a family; it can include more than family members (servants, apprentices, slaves, retainers), as well as less (as in the case of tribal societies where husbands and wives take their meals separately in different households). The household, says Weber, does not exist in nomadic hunting societies, since it depends upon settled cultivation of the soil. Even with the development of agriculture, "the household is often secondary with respect to a preceding state which accorded more power to the inclusive kinship and neighborhood group on the one hand, and more freedom to the individual vis-a-vis parents, children, grandchildren, and siblings on the other hand" (Weber, 1922/68: 358). Weber seems to have in mind, for instance, the situation of wandering hunters-and-gatherers, whose campsites fluctuate in membership on a day-to-day basis (Lee and Devore, 1966); there is no authoritarian "head of the household", and political, religious, economic and other powers and cooperation are grouped around larger kinship groups (or around local coalitions, the "neighbourhood group"). The household, then, is not at all a primitive stage from which larger structures developed, but rather itself the result of later developments.

The kin group is just this larger network. It consists of all those who are related by blood in a certain way (e.g. through the male line, up to a certain degree), although as Weber points out, it can also be organized on the basis of fictitious kinship (Weber, 1917-19/52: 11; 1922/68: 366). It can be shattered and rebuilt when a charismatic leader brings together a new coalition, which thereupon becomes transmitted hereditarily, with its members tracing themselves

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back to this heroic "ancestor" (Weber, 1916-7/58: 54). The kin group can act in a number of different ways. It can, for instance, be the main economic unit, as in the cooperative hunting expeditions characteristic of Paleolithic societies (an archeological example unknown to Weber himself; see Edwards, et. al., 1970: 70-121). Weber stresses that the kin group is especially a military and protective unit, responsible for blood revenge for injuries to its members; it may be even more explicitly organized as a military secret society or "men's house" (Weber, 1923/61: 49; 1922/68: 365). Or it can be organized as a totemic clan, with magical and ritualistic rules separating insiders and outsiders, food prohibitions, taboos, and the like. Or again it may be essentially a group of friends, conceiving of themselves as an artificial blood brotherhood.

Again, Weber stresses that none of these is primordial. We have to visualize the local geopolitics of any tribal (or indeed, any other) society. Various political and economic opportunities, threats, and conflicts generate different sorts of coalitions among the people in an area. Sexual and blood relationships are a prime way of forging such coalitions, but since these are not flexible and rapid enough to keep up with events, sheer political expediency together with personal charisma can create ad hoc organizations. Later these tend to be regularized as kinship --- partly fictional, but also increasingly real as hereditary membership and sexual exchange cement the long-standing coalition.

A crucial point is that the larger coalition, the kin group, can have considerable power vis-a-vis the local group (the household, family, or shifting campsite group, whatever it may be). The kin group competes with these local groups in regard to sexual relations and

group loyalty. It may be the kin group, organized as a military men's house, that appropriates women as sexual objects and assigns them to its members; it may be the kin group that arranges marriage exchanges, stakes its members to bride prices, or exacts a kind of "intercourse tax" (my term, not Weber's) when a young member brings in a new woman in marriage. Although Weber does not say so explicitly, one can extend this line of reasoning to conclude that the incest taboo within the nuclear family is enforced by the intrusion of the larger kin group and its political interests. The kin group also maintains an interest in family property, since it holds a residual interest in inheritance if immediate family heirs do not exist.

Furthermore, since the kin group has the all-important activity of blood revenge, it calls forth military loyalty (and hence legitimacy, according to Weber's general conception of politics) that may be emotionally much more compelling than any authority within the local family or household. This is particularly true where different members of the same household belong to different kin groups, as is the case for example where father and children are assigned to different groups. Moreover, the kin group is often counted outwards starting from each ego to a certain number of generations; hence even in the absence of matrilineal complications each generation of a household will have a different, although overlapping, set of members of its kin group. (In China, the patrilineal sib was defined by the degrees of kinship within which an individual was obligated to mourn relatives' deaths). Different members of the same household may be required to participate on opposite sides in case of blood revenge. Weber stresses the point that the kin group provides a countervailing force supporting the individual against the authority of the household

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patrilineal: "the kin group guarantees the security and legal personality of the individual" (Weber, 1922/68: 366). This may be institutionalized in trials and laws organized by the kin group itself, including a veto over the sale of property, the right to participate in selling daughters in marriage, to receive part of the bride price, to provide legal guardians, and (as Weber stresses in the case of ancient Judaism) to interfere in domestic sexual practices (Weber, 1917-19/52: 401-3).

There is no fixed relationship, however, between the power of the local family/household group and the larger kin group. Neither is aboriginal, and hence neither constitutes a stage out of which the other grows. Weber repeatedly attacks evolutionary stage theories, both Marxist and those of earlier family and economic historians (Bachofen, Morgan, List, Hildebrand, Buecher). Aboriginal "motherright" or Matriarchy is a myth; the evidence from which it was inferred (instances of matrilineal residence and descent) really represents a very specific combination of factors bringing about a compromise between the powers of the kin group and the local household (Weber, 1922/68: 357). There is no original isolated nuclear family, gradually coming into contact with other units to form a larger exchange society (as in Buecher's theory); geopolitical linkages are there from the very beginning. The large extended family households with their tendency to self-sufficiency and their household "communism", still found recently among the South Slavs or in the Swiss Gemeinderschaften, do not represent a survival of a stage of "primitive communism", but rather a development of the strength of the household that could occur only when particular economic and political conditions weakened the power of the larger kin group (Weber, 1922/61:

51-2; 1922/60:359-60).

On the other hand, the larger kin group is not primordial either. Weber would not have been sympathetic to Freud's primal "horde", nor did he admit Engels' and Morgan's stage of original undifferentiated promiscuity (Weber, 1922/68: 364). The power of the kin group, too, waxed and waned. The times when it did seem to approximate the sexual and other rights of the "horde" are actually determined by specific military and economic conditions, when the kin group was strongly organized into a military men's house (as in the duk-duk example from the Indonesian archipelago, which Weber frequently cites (Weber, 1922/68: 371; 1923/61:46). Moreover, the kin group may actually be quite amorphous, acting only intermittently and without any formal association (Weber, 1922/68: 365). It may exist only in the claims that certain defined relatives have over vestigial inheritance rights, or merely negatively in prohibitions against marriage within its ranks. These various possible forms of kin group organization seem schematic and perhaps confusing in Weber's typological presentation in Economy and Society; but in his historical treatments (the General Economic History, the studies of the world religions), Weber devotes considerable attention to the conditions that can either reduce the power of the kin group to these vestigial rights, or conversely build it up into a concretely organized and even dominant institution.

It remains only to point out that the household and other local groups on one side, and the larger kin group on the other, are not the only social actors in the arena. Beyond the kin group, there can emerge larger territorial groups: the village community, the tribe (which may be formally organized or exist merely as an ethnic-cultural

homogeneity), and finally the organized state. All of these can interfere with, and cut across, the household and local family. These are, in short, a larger geopolitical arena for the family; again, there is a tendency for causality to work from the outside in. The larger tribe is formed out of shifting coalitions among sibs, and eventually may acquire its own autonomous organization, and its own religious cult focus. The war coalition of the Jewish tribes under its war-god Yahweh is an instance to which Weber gave much attention, in which the larger organization made considerable inroads into the power of the kin group (Weber, 1917-19/52, especially 174-87). And in general the power of the state was hostile to rival organization at the kin group level. Thus different levels of political organization might ally with one another: the state level helping to destroy the kin group level, and thereby give much greater authority to the household. The principles and variations of such dynamics make up the core of a Weberian theory of the family.

Political and Economic Determinants of Family Organization

Weber states that the organization of male and female work influences family structure (Weber, 1923/61: 45-9). Women's work was wild plant gathering, and later horticulture, weaving, pottery, and care of small domesticated animals; men's work was hunting, heavy plow agriculture, care of large animals such as cattle, plus wood and metal working. When horticulture dominates the economy, family organization is frequently centered on the woman's house, where she has control over the work process. Conversely, economies based predominantly on hunting, pastoralism, or plow agriculture have family structures organized around men, upon whom the women are economically dependent.

Thus far Weber is in keeping with the familiar anthropological

picture (e.g. Sanday, 1981). Where Weber differs is in his emphasis upon the military factor. The female-centered household, even in the cases where it is matrilineal as well as matrilocal, is not matriarchy; in fact he describes it as a "traditional bondage and a corresponding patriarchal position within the house" (Weber, 1923/61: 46). The men are always organized in some version of the larger kin group, frequently with a separate men's house. This is a sort of club where men live, make weapons and other metal tools, and organize their military and hunting expeditions. Above all, it is a type of terrorist institution, surrounding itself with fear-inspiring surroundings such as masks and hideous emblems. It maintains strict secrecy against outsiders, especially women, who are forbidden to enter under violent penalties such as gang rape (Murphy, 1959). Weber stresses that its procedures "were specifically invented to intimidate and rob women" (Weber, 1922/68: 371).

The rationale for the secrecy of the men's house is the magic practiced there. In more contemporary terms, one could say that this magic is the ideology of this terrorist group, and that their fearful apparatus represent their monopolization of the means of impression management or of emotional production. Initiation rites for adolescent boys are part of this same use of ritual for terroristic domination, this time for age stratification within the group; such rites include circumcision, which is frequently practiced in tribal military groups as a form of discipline. (For a somewhat different but equally political interpretation of such rituals, see Paige and Paige, 1981).

The men's house was primarily a military barracks; it was found not only in tribal societies, but also among the Spartans --- another society in which men lived under strict discipline, and women

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were relatively independent because the men lived away. Weber gives great emphasis to this form of organization in his theory of the development of the state. Males typically live in a tribal men's house from adolescence through mid-adulthood, after which they are finally "discharged from service", so to speak (my phrase, not Weber's), and go to live with their wives. Thus the men's house is frequently connected with matrilineal kinship, and with the avunculate --- the authority of the oldest brother of a woman over her children.

Modern anthropology has advanced somewhat different interpretations. Murphy's (1957, 1959) theory of sex antagonism, based on the Mundurucu of Brazil, argues that the men's house arises where patrilineality is combined with local exogamy, so that the men stay together while their female siblings go to other villages. But the Mundurucu happen to be unusual in that they combine patrilineality with matrilocality (together with exogamy at the village level, whereas most matrilocal societies have local endogamy). It may well be that the geopolitical situation is the missing element in the explanation; the Brazilian Jungle is notably warfare-prone, with the level of technical organization ruling out permanent conquests and confining war to chronic head-hunting expeditions. Murphy's logic exemplifies the tendency of many current anthropologists to reify residence and lineage rules as an ultimate cultural explanation, instead of seeing these as political arrangements which are themselves to be explained. Murphy's analysis of the sexual antagonism of the men's house situation, however, is congruent with Weber's. Murphy emphasizes the extreme hostility of men towards women, their beliefs that women are polluting, and their use of sex to dominate them, arguing that these are methods of controlling female-based work groups.

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while not living with them. Similarly, Weber refers to the terroristic methods of the men's house as "an attempt by the men who have left the household to strengthen their threatened authority" (Weber, 1922/68: 371).

Weber stresses that the military organization brings sexual domination. Wives may be obtained by group capture (which Weber, perhaps dubiously, believes can result in polyandry), or group members may buy them. He accepts the occasional possibility of group marriage (Weber, 1923/61: 48-9), but denies that it is a normal stage as in the Morgan-Engels theories. More importantly, Weber claimed that women were always under the authority of males, either of their own house community or that of the men who acquired her. "Woman is regarded as labor power, and is bought as an object of value, as a work animal" (Weber, 1923/61: 48). Marriage by purchase (the bride-price) requires some differentiation of wealth. This in turn tends to break up the solidarity of a men's military group. Wealthy men can buy many wives, resulting in polygamy; whereas poor men (usually a group of brothers) may have to pool their resources to buy one to share among themselves (polyandry). More commonly, a poor man may acquire a wife by going to live in her house, temporarily or permanently, paying for her by his services. Unlike contemporary anthropology, with its tendency to explain kinship practices by abstract cultural rules, Weber stresses the force of economic and political realities. Above all, he never loses sight of the possible existence of stratification; both patrilocal and matrilocal institutions may exist in the same place, and indeed within the same household, depending upon whether the men in question are rich or poor (Weber, 1922/68: 368).

In sum, both economic and military factors determine family

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organization. There is no evolutionary sequence, but rather a set of shifting possibilities determined by the particular configuration of factors holding at that time. Although Weber does not use the example, one could illustrate his approach by pointing out that paleolithic societies may have shifted back and forth between more sedentary, quite possibly female-centered, families during periods when gathering predominated, and male-centered organization when there was exclusive dependence upon hunting (such as in the glacial epochs when Cro-Magnon peoples followed the reindeer herds: Maringer and Bandi, 1953).

But these economic factors must always be overlaid with military conditions. The larger kin group/clan is always crucial for fighting (as well as for the collective hunting necessary to kill the larger game animals). This kin group can be organized in different ways; the residential men's house/barracks is a form that it takes when economic organization centers around the women's houses. It can take other forms as well, including those in which there are male-centered families, or in which there is virtually no stable household at all (as in the Australian desert) but only continually shifting campsite groups. Weber describes the totemic group as another variant on the patterns of military organization of the kin group. It is a peace union, organized around magical beliefs and using emblems of a totemic animal or being to symbolize the brotherhood of members who must not kill one another. (Similarly, it is exogamous, because the group wishes to avoid sexual jealousy within its ranks.) Unlike the case of the men's house, the men live with their wives, but come together for totemic festivals and for political discussions and military expeditions.

Whether particular kinds of military coalitions form --- as

men's houses, totemic groups, or merely ad hoc gatherings --- depends, I would suggest, upon geopolitical conditions. The sheer density of settlement and the degree of competition among adjacent tribes would be affected by scarcity or abundance of natural resources, and by the presence or absence of natural barriers to movement. These would affect the incidence of warfare, and consequently the importance and relative institutionalization of military coalitions. A full-fledged theory of this sort remains to be created. But following the logic of Weber's theory of the state, the external military situation sets the stage for internal political maneuvering; and in a tribal society, this internal organization takes the form of family and kinship structure.

Weber does point out the ways in which the family organization depends upon existing weapons technology. The men's house and other forms of collective military operations, mobilizing the entire adult male population, depend on relatively cheap weapons (as well as upon an economy which either uses women for subsistence work, or else a male group intermittently practicing hunting and readily transformable into a military group). With the invention of heavy weapons, especially the chariot and horseback fighting, war becomes monopolized by an elite. These weapons tend to dissolve the clan (especially the men's house), in favor of individuals withdrawing to their own family and property. The clan/men's house may also disintegrate due to demilitarization: either because of ecological dispersion and low competition, or because outside conquest forcibly creates a hierarchic society with an aristocracy ruling over disarmed peasants. In both cases, men return permanently to their families. The result is a tendency to patriarchy, "paternal dominance with paternal

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inheritance." Among the conquerors of land, as well, property is automatically assigned in the male line, and women are excluded from inheritance.

Sexual rights are determined as part of this same complex. Marriage is an institution of sexual appropriation. It is restricted by incest prohibitions, which Weber points out are the obverse of exogamy. Both are due to the avoidance of jealousy among the males of the household (and of the clan, where the kin group is strongly organized, especially in a common men's house) (Weber, 1922/38: 364-5). Exogamous practices are furthered by exchange agreements among allied groups; here Weber anticipates Levi-Strauss. The extent of incest prohibitions, and hence of exogamy, is determined by the political organization of these groups (and, it follows, not by any primal psychological mechanism). Endogamy is similarly a phenomenon of political organization. Where clans become stratified by differences in wealth and power, endogamy appears, setting status bounds upon alliances. Similar considerations lead to hypergamy. The levirate, Weber points out, is not a survival of a stage of group marriage, but part of a situation in which the clan takes it upon itself to provide a husband for widows of its members, so that its property will not fall into alien hands, and its full military ranks will be preserved.

The Kin Group and Its Transformations

We have already seen the major variations on the structure of the kin group. Everywhere, Weber emphasizes, it is a military organization, whether existing loosely and intermittently as a group of men who can call upon one another for blood revenge, or as the peace union of a totemic group, or in the tightly regimented form of the men's house/barracks. In Ancient Judaism, Weber (1917-19/52:

139-40) examines the politics of the kin group (sib) at considerable length, as its coalitions were transcended by a yet larger coalition of tribes, whose cult eventually became autonomously powerful and destroyed the sibs themselves.

Weber stresses that the shape of world history was determined by the differing fates of this military kin group. In the Occident it disappeared, even though it had been instrumental not only in the founding of the Jewish, Moslem, and other Middle Eastern states, but also the Greek and Italian city-states. Originally these latter were coalitions of kin groups, the gens, phratry, and curia of Fustel de Coulanges' account. (Weber did not live to write his planned volume on Mediterranean antiquity for his comparative religion series; but Fustel's model, which we have reviewed above, gives some idea of what he would likely have said.) In the Orient, the kin group was maintained and even strengthened (Weber, 1923/61: 50). The result of this, Weber argued, was crucial for the development of capitalism in the West but not the East.

The causes of this important shift in family organization were essential political, including religious politics. Weber argues that the rise of chariot and horseback warfare and other heavy weapons brought about the end of the men's house, since warriors were now a specialized elite group, residing on their own property. But as we can see from China, this did not necessarily spell the end of the kin group in general. The rise of the bureaucratic state is one factor that broke down the clan; Weber remarks that the state feared the clan as a source of rival political factions, and hence relentlessly destroyed it, as in the New Kingdom of Egypt (Weber, 1923/61: 51). At the same time, Weber has to admit that even though Chinese state was

bureaucratized quite early, it was never able to break the power of the clan. It appears that state bureaucracy may also adjust to the clan, by using it as a convenient unit of local administration, when it is organized into villages jointly responsible for fiscal and other duties.

Weber's other candidate for the clan-destroying force is religious prophecy (Weber, 1923/61: 50). Charismatic religious leaders seek to build up their following without the restrictions of kin groups and their localized cults. This was especially the case with Christianity, to which Weber gives pride of place in destroying this major obstacle to the development of capitalism. But he also notes that Judaism gradually put the clan into the background, though it coexisted with the Yahweh cult down through the period of the exile. After that, it lost its purpose because of the demilitarization of Jewish society. Once again, it appears that one can point to a variety of routes to the same destination. As mentioned, the Greek and Italian clans, although originally strong, were eventually transcended by the new civic structure which became the focus of military and political organization. Even here, for a long time the clans lingered on as the units in which the army was mustered. But these became mere vestiges after a series of political revolutions which widened political membership, connected with the change in military technique to the large-scale phalanx. In northern Europe, again, the clan was the unit for Celtic and Germanic military organization. Here it was broken, partly because of opposition by the Christian Church (a factor especially stressed by Goody, 1983), and especially by the organization of the feudal status system. This grouped men, not by the democracy of clan descent, but by estates differentiated according to

knightly or non-knightly style of life. For this reason, Weber (1917-1952: 5) included the medieval order of estates as one of the half-dozen crucial historical developments of the West.

The Rise and Fall of the Household

We arrive, finally, at the household organization of the family. This comes late in the analysis, because as we have already seen, the household is not primordial, and does not dominate the scene as long as the larger kin group is important. Weber rejects earlier schemes of economic history, in which household production is regarded as the first stage. When the household does become the center of the economy, it is generally in advanced agrarian societies, in which military and political developments have destroyed the importance of the clan. (There are exceptions, in the sense that in India the caste takes its place; and in China, where the clan continues to exist at the village level, alongside the household.)

The main form is what Weber calls the patriarchal household: a despotism of the male head, in whose home all family members reside and from whom all inheritance takes place. The patriarch has the power to assign both his sons and daughters in marriage; traditional exchange rules (cross-cousin marriage and the like) and other forms of kin-group influence over marriage have now shrunk to mere vestiges or disappeared entirely. The kin group ceases to be economically important. The patriarchal household concentrates virtually all property rights, and may operate in the various forms of a farm or manor, an urban capitalist business (such as craft, trade, or banking), or a self-sufficient aristocratic estate.

In any of these forms, the patriarchal household may be very large. Its membership may include a number of wives and concubines

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with their children, as well as servants, slaves, and military retainers. There may also be the practice of sending children of the noble classes to be educated in the households of higher lords while serving as pages or ladies-in-waiting; closely related to this is the practice of taking hostages to ensure military compliance.

The existence of this large-scale household has been challenged by a recent wave of historical scholarship (Laslett, 1965, 1977). But this argument rests upon a conceptual misunderstanding. It has been shown that most households in late medieval Western Europe were not large; due to demographic and other reasons, several generations did not usually live together, and extended kinship ties were not important. It has been claimed that the nuclear family has been the primary form of organization, perhaps perennially (Goody, 1976). This does not touch on the Weberian conception, for two reasons. The first is that the two pictures refer to different ends of the social scale. Laslett and his followers have concentrated on the lower orders, where households have always been small, whereas Weber's patriarchal household is at the center of the political and economic order, in the higher classes. And in fact there is little real argument on this score. Laslett's (1971: 1) own materials show vivid cases such as a prosperous urban bakery consisting of master, wife, children, apprentices and servants, to a total of some 14 persons. In England in particular there was a widespread custom of youths of both sexes leaving home to serve in larger households, until they could afford to marry and form a (usually small) rural household of their own (Laslett, 1977).

The second error is to confuse the kinship system with the household. Weber of course separated them very clearly, and points out

that the rise of the household to economic dominance goes along with the decline of the extended kinship group. To be sure, under certain conditions the multi-generational family does act as a cooperative economic unit. Laslett et. al. describe this as an Eastern European form, and Weber similarly cites the zadruga of the South Slavs, and the Swiss Gemeinschaften as examples of joint family property. Weber, too, carefully points out that this is far from a universal stage (though he is more concerned to combat the idea that it is a vestige of primitive communism), but merely one variant that agrarian household organization may take after the disintegration of the clan confederation.

The crucial point is that the patriarchal household may be large, but it is not intrinsically a form of extended kinship. The joint and stem families are sometimes found, but mainly in politically unimportant rural areas, and below the level of the aristocracy or the bourgeois patriciate. The main characteristic of the large patriarchal household, in fact, is just that it brings together many people who are not kin. It is the servants, slaves, apprentices, military retainers, pages, and hostages that make it an important form of organization (along with the concubines and secondary wives, who are kin but certainly would not be called "extended family"). Thus in fact the patriarchal household is at least halfway on the road to the breakdown of the kin-ship based society; for though it is centered on a family --- that of the despotic household head --- it brings in large numbers of non-family members to act as part of the military, political, and/or economic unit. When such a household becomes politically powerful, it can act as a unit of government or administration, in which case Weber calls it patrimonial domination.

One can see now where the confusion has arisen. Modern sociologists, familiar only with contemporary societies, have usually operated with gross distinctions. On the one hand there has been the nuclear family (and small nuclear household) visible in industrial societies; on the other, there are still-surviving tribal societies, for the most part with complex kinship systems (usually extra-household, though that point has not been much noticed), and a memory of rural societies in which the family seems to have been much larger and more important than it has since come to be. Hence the mythical sequence of extended families in bucolic agricultural times, shifting under the pressure of industrialization to the stripped-down nuclear form. Laslett and his followers, starting from recent historical times and working backwards, examine the extended family and conclude that it was a myth.

But in fact most comparative sociologists have had little idea of what the historical agrarian societies were like, preferring to substitute an horizontal comparison across alleged evolutionary stages in which tribal societies serve as a facsimile for all earlier "extended" forms. They might have saved themselves the trouble by consulting Weber. He shows us that the dominant households of the societies immediately preceding our own were large, but that the kinship was not extended; in fact, they were large precisely because the remoter links of kinship were now forgotten or at least supplemented by relationships that were not based on kinship.

The patriarchal or patrimonial household is thus already a relatively "modern" form. Nevertheless, although it opens the way for the development of the rationalized market economy and for bureaucratic administration by "breaking the bonds of the clan", it

remained in its own way an obstacle to more impersonal developments. It did retain one crucial element of kinship organizations: not that it relied primarily upon family labor or connections (since it was able to transcend these by incorporating non-kin into the household), but that its core was still a family. A nuclear family, to be sure, but nevertheless a kin group in which authority coincided with marital status as head of household, and perhaps further channelled by primogeniture or other inheritance rules. This was not necessarily an obstacle to capitalist industry, since the family enterprise was the rule throughout the early industrial revolution and even later. But it limited the impersonal operation of government, the necessary regulative framework for a market economy. As long as government was patrimonial (whether in the decentralized feudal or the centralized patrimonial-bureaucratic version), private and public property were confounded, and impersonal administration of laws and of public finances was impossible.

Thus a crucial development in the rise of capitalism had to be yet a further transformation of the family structure, in which the patrimonial household was broken down or at least separated from government administration. Here again the change worked from the outside in. Political and especially military factors --- above all the development of professional standing armies, supplied by a continuous and centralized administration --- brought about the strengthening of the power of the state. The state then acted directly to break down the great patrimonial households, by attacking the private armies of retainers who lived at the tables of the feudal lords (Stone, 1963). Of course the Crown itself began as one patrimonial household among others, but the military revolution soon

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made it necessary to create a bureaucracy --- literally, bureaus --- which were not part of its own household, and yet no longer merely delegated authority to subsidiary lords' households (which had been the essence of feudalism).

It is in the political sphere, then, that the crucial separation of work from the household first takes place. One might say that there is a 2-stage decline of the organizational significance of the family. First, kinship itself was severely limited with the rise of the large household; then the patrimonial household was reduced as separate work places appeared. The development had to happen first in the sphere of the state: partly because a more impersonal form of the state was a necessary precondition for the rise of the market economy, and partly because the state itself exerted its force to shape family structure in the rest of society. As usual in Weber's approach, politics continues to be the major determinant of the family.

Once industrial capitalism was under way, to be sure, it further disintegrated the patrimonial household. But even this did not necessarily follow. Weber points out (1922/68: 377-80) that large capitalistic enterprises could be maintained in the form of households, especially where its prime asset was landed or other property, which was most effective economically (and brought the greatest prestige) if kept undivided. Such households might even become bigger, and kin ties remain strong, precisely where the family was most prosperous. Weber also refers to his own dissertation (Weber, 1889) to point out that the laws of joint liability developed in this type of household enterprise were the basis for the later extra-familial business corporation.

Nevertheless, political developments pushed in the other

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direction, away from the household enterprise. With the monopolization of violence by the state and the disarming of the household, the need for armed retainers disappeared, and the individual no longer needed to look to the household and kinship group for protection. The fiscal interest of the state in a more intensive exploitation of the individual tax-payer resulted in legal changes, particularly in the area of inheritance. The separation of household and business accounts for legal purposes, Weber remarks, was the crucial difference between modern Western commercial law and that of classical antiquity; characteristically, the difference first manifests itself in the Middle Ages (Weber, 1922/68: 379).

This brings us to a final aspect of family structures: inheritance. The topic, of course, has been with us implicitly all along, since lineage structure is to a large extent a matter of inheritance. We have already noted that matrilineal and patrilineal structures in stateless societies are determined by the form of production --- whether subsistence is largely male or female work --- overlaid by the form of military organization (with matrilineality reinforced by a man's house form of barracks, patrilineality by self-equipped military aristocracy) (Weber, 1922/68: 370-2). With the decline of the clan, occasioned by the hostility of the centralized state, the patriarchal household becomes predominant, and with it the unlimited power of the patriarch to dispose of property. But as Weber points out (1922/68: 372), the property law of the great empires moves towards steadily weakening patriarchal power. One reason is a political motive, as rulers attempt to reduce the concentration of power in the hands of potential rivals.

Connected with this is another important set of forces, in

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this case involving women. The unlimited patriarchal household is likely to be polygamous (of course restricted to the upper classes, who alone can afford it). The power of the patriarch is maximal when he has numerous wives, and can choose which among his offspring will inherit. In this situation, there is little distinction among wives, concubines, or slaves. Particularly in horticultural societies in which women are economically productive, the possession of many women is itself merely a form of wealth, and it is here that they are most likely to be acquired by paying a brideprice.

However, in agrarian societies, women are no longer primary producers, but (especially in upper-class families) more nearly mere luxuries, and the brideprice disappears. It tends to be replaced by the institution of the dowry, sometimes described as the giving of wealth as an incentive to another family to take the cost of maintaining a woman off one's hands. Along with this shift goes a clear differentiation among women, between primary and secondary wives and concubines; in some cases there is a shift to monogamy.

It has not been generally recognized how much of a puzzle this poses. Bride-price and dowry are formal opposites, to be sure, but the economic motivation in one is not merely the obverse of the other. When women are economically valuable, it makes sense for powerful men to pay for them. On the other hand, when women are no longer valuable, it does not follow that men would pay to give them away. After all, in extremely male-dominated societies, there is no reason why men should wish to incur any expense at all in connection with maintaining women; more logically, they could simply kill them off (through infanticide, which in fact is widely practiced in many such societies), until they are scarce enough so that others will pay for them merely for sexual

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purposes. One cannot invoke "natural" love among parents and children as an inhibition; the notion is anachronistic, and in fact patriarchal agrarian societies have notably harsh and authoritarian emotional relationships within the family (Store, 1979: 81-8).

The dowry, rather, shows something different. On the average, it cannot bring any economic gain; if families tend have the same number of daughters as sons, what they give out in dowries should be received back (de facto if not de jure) when their sons marry. (If sons rather than fathers get control of the dowries through their power as husbands, then it becomes an intergenerational transfer, and a diminution of the resources of the father.) Its significance, rather, appears to be in the realm of status politics. One can see that by comparing it with the brideprice: if a brideprice were offered today, it would be considered scandalous and demeaning to the woman, a form of prostitution. Dowry, the opposite situation, appears to indicate the high status of women. Its vestige today exists in the custom for the bride's father to pay for the wedding ceremony; the more lavish the wedding, the more prestige attaches to the father. This is particularly notable in traditional rural sectors, where the number of guests entertained at a wedding is the primary way of displaying status. The dowry system thus appears as a kind of potlatch, a pure status-competition among the wealthier classes, emulated by those below to the extent that they can afford it.

Weber adds another dimension. For the shift to the dowry system and the concomitant rise in the status of (upper class) women goes along with notable changes in inheritance. We can see this in the differentiation of sexual partners into primary and secondary wives, concubines, and so forth. These status distinctions are primarily

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concerned with property: the primary wife is the one whose offspring are guaranteed inheritance, and so on through various gradations. The distinction becomes strongly made between legitimate and illegitimate children (Weber, 1922/68: 372); contrary to Malinowski-type theories, this is not an historical constant, but varies according to the relative strength of the patriarch vis-a-vis the families of his wives. The differentiation of the surrounding society into strata brings about a status interest in class endogamy, "according to which upper-class clans married their daughters only to equals and demanded that they receive a status superior to that of female slaves" (Weber, 1923/61: 52). The dowry was connected with a situation in which the woman's relatives stipulated in the marriage agreement that she should become head wife and that only her children should succeed as heirs. Weber stresses, in opposition to Engels, that the interest in legitimate heirs does not come from father, who could have secured this in numerous ways, but from outside, from the woman's family. It is out of this claim that pressure was first set up in the direction of monogamy (Weber, 1923/61: 53).

Polygamy, of course, could only be afforded by the wealthy (at least in societies in which male work predominates), and monogamy long existed in the middle and lower classes, but out of economic necessity rather than preference. It became raised to an enforcable ideal first among the Hellenes and especially the Romans (Weber, 1922/68: 373-5). Weber sees it as evolving from the status system of the dowry, pointing out that the Egyptians distinguished legally between higher-status marriages, with dowry, and lower-status marriages, without (Weber, 1923/61: 53). Only the former had full legal protection of inheritance arrangements. Weber comments that

Christianity later raised monogamy to a norm for ascetic reasons. I would suggest that we cannot simply take this for granted, however, as none of the other monotheistic or ascetic religions did so. Instead, we seem to have Christianity adopting and extending a Roman custom. It might be most accurate to say that monogamy developed out of the tendency to set one wife above other sexual partners in the status system of class-stratified and hence class-endogamous societies, the same societies that developed the dowry "potlatch". This status system gave rise to an elaborated law of inheritance, which brought marriages within the provenance of the state and its fiscal interests; thus political as well as status pressures converged on enforcing monogamy.

Women's position was thus sharply raised during the centuries of the agrarian state societies, from being a form of chattel, to an individual of high status (provided her class status was high), even with certain independent economic rights. These did not all develop in the same direction at the same time. In ancient Rome, the woman arrived at the right of divorce and hence to dispose of her own property, but at the same time she had no power over her children, nor protection as a widow (Weber, 1922/68: 373). In Medieval England, the situation was almost the reverse: widows were maintained by a rent upon family property, but had no economic and legal independence of her husband. Later, women's independent property rights (and hence liabilities) were recognized because of the capitalist need to protect creditors. There is no straight linear development from here to the modern legal rights of women, since politics is always fluctuating as the resultant of opposing forces. But it is apparent that a full theory of these variations in gender stratification will have to be a

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heavily political one.

We see then that the family in all epochs has been considerably determined by politics. In tribal societies, the family is politics, although the extent to which military geopolitics --- the external relations among families and tribes --- appears to be a systematic determinant of family forms has not yet been sufficiently explored. The rise of the state, and the struggles over state power, consisted to a large extent in political battles over family structure. This is the case both in feudal, patrimonial and quasi-bureaucratic states, and in the politics of civic coalitions like Rome. Perhaps it is because the formal structure of the Roman state, at least in its democratic period, resembles our own that its moral politics has a familiar ring for ourselves. But it must surely be the case that "moral politics" existed in tribal and other societies as well, although in a form that we find difficult to recognize. Issues of tribal warfare, familial disputes, alliances and other status claims would have taken the form of magical and religious issues and violations of taboos that we would not regard as moral, but which operated as the equivalent "moral politics" of such societies.

The origin point of the Western European family, due to the historical researches of Laslett, Macfarlane, and others, is no longer assumed to be concomitant with industrialization. One promising recent suggestion ties it to the politics of inheritance. Goody (1983) sees the key structural change emerging from prohibitions on marriage with relatives (both close and distant), on widow remarriage, and on concubinage and other multiple marriages. All of these can be interpreted as prohibitions on the strategies used in classical antiquity for ensuring heirs and continuity of family property. Goody

argues that the Christian Church forced these changes in order to receive inheritances for itself. He places the origins of the Western family in the 4th and 5th centuries A.D., although it took more than half a millenium for the full rigor of Church policy to take effect. In general, Goody's emphasis upon the economic politics of the Church seems in keeping with Weber's theoretical themes.

Current and Future Politics of the Family

Do political conditions continue to affect the family today? One could argue that all the above constitutes pre-history, dealing with that long period when the family was indeed crucially implicated in politics. But the last political revolution regarding the family, one might say, was the rise of modern bureaucracy, which excluded the family from political participation and hence left it a private institution. It may continue to be subject to economic forces, but no longer to political ones.

Nevertheless, I would argue that the family continues to be a subject of politics, especially moral politics, and that political determinants, both direct and indirect, do have and will continue to have major impacts upon its structure.

The modern family, for instance, is affected by laws which uphold (or restrict) female property and work rights, as well as by legal controls on abortion and contraception. To the extent that these legal structures allow women to pursue their own careers, the trend is encouraged towards delayed marriage and child-bearing, small families, as well as a high rate of divorce (and sex-differential remarriage). The lack of such legal supports for female careers upholds the more traditional family and demographic pattern. Similarly, public policies on welfare and on illegitimate children have an impact in supporting

the female-headed family found in the poverty sector, especially in the U.S.

One should not overestimate direct political effects, however. After all, the trend towards abortions and illegitimacy was already strong before legislation changed, and the same is true in the case of the trend towards female career participation. One could well argue that it is the economic or other autonomous trends that force the legal shifts, not vice versa. But it would be wiser to view the modern world as a complex field of forces, with politics, economics, and status issues or social movements all affecting each other. If politics is like billiards, in which coalitions and oppositions result in ricocheting patterns of causality, the addition of these other billiard-balls to the table makes for even more indirect resultants.

For example, the inheritance structures that once upheld the unity of the family have now largely dissipated. Family businesses and farms are unimportant in most places (except for the upper class, which for that reason maintains a more traditional family structure than the rest of society). Taxation policies have also contributed to destroying this economic link which held children to their parents --- albeit in a rather unsentimental form. This shift, due to a combination of economical and political causes, has undermined the traditional legitimacy and stability of the family. But there continues to be an underlying politics in all this. The state implicitly uses the family to absorb costs that it would otherwise have to pay. The family is a hidden form of education and welfare (though more abundantly for some social classes than for others). It is, for instance, a hidden form of housing subsidy for unemployed or underemployed young adults, who can live with their parents. Part of

the structural strain on the modern family comes from this set of conditions: children are no longer of any economic or political value to parents, though parents in many respects remain highly important for their offspring. There is thus an implicit, though quite hidden, coalition between the young and the state, at the expense of the parental generation.

I am suggesting that there is a covert politics of the family, as well as the more open "moral politics." Moral politics of course is not confined to family issues. Intense political issues are almost always forms of moral politics such as nationalism, ethnic chauvinism, or religious controversy (such as school prayers in the current right-wing political program in the U.S.). Merely economic issues, though the basis of class politics, are nevertheless in themselves not so energizing, because they appeal more clearly to rational interests. They become political tides when they are wrapped in ideals of honor and justice, which turn them into moral politics. Disapproving commentators have often noted the extent to which the significant bread-and-butter issues tend to be upstaged by political scandals of particular personalities. But this is structurally to be expected. Scandals are important rituals in the Durkheimian sense, violations of emotionally-charged symbols of group status. Moral politics is usually "negative politics," in the sense of "morals charges" and the vice squad.

The family structure is a potent source of emotional appeals. For its underlying reality consists of sexual rights, property, and corresponding connections between the generations, all of which are covered over with idealizations, but full of hidden struggles. They are batteries charged with emotional forces capable of bursting forth,

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and of being shaped to various political ends. We have seen historical examples of how family scandals regarding political leaders have been used both by conservative and revolutionary factions. But even when the scandal redounds to the benefit of the Left, the scandal itself acts to reinforce traditional conceptions of the family, and hence usually to strengthen male and patriarchal domination. The Right may not always be able to use the "moral means of emotional production" for their own benefit, but it appears that moral capital intrinsically favors a conservative family structure. If a moral appeal must invoke some preexisting ideal of solidarity, then it always ends up exalting the emotion-producing formulae taken over from the past.

But let us see. There is currently in many places a pro-family "backlash", reacting to the liberalizing claims both of the feminist movement and the apparent shifts in the family and in sexual practices. Its most potent weapon is the anti-abortion issue. Does this mean that all the moral capital is on the anti-feminist, pro-traditional family side? That would be an exaggeration, since the feminist movement raises its own issues of the right to a career, to control one's own reproduction, etc. as ideals in their own light. But the moral pull seems to be stronger structurally on the other side, because the feminists argue for the rights of individuals, whereas their opponents invoke the image of subordinating oneself to a collective good. And since groups, not individuals, are the prime locus of the moral sense, the collective side seems to have the moral edge. But though this seems to affect, to some extent at least, the debate over abortion, it has less impact in getting the public to favor restrictions on other form of birth control, which are even more central for female careers.

There are some issues in which feminists seem to have greater moral capital on their side: sexual issues regarding pornography, prostitution, and rape. Interestingly enough, these are issues which feminists share with conservatives. The implications of these policies show the ironically bouncing billiard balls of politics. Efforts to eliminate prostitution and pornography indirectly affect the family in that they attempt to confine sex to marriage, and thereby support the traditional family. And since these are issues that feminists share with familistic conservatives, the question arises whether the mobilizing effect of such an issue would "bring out the troops" more for the conservative or the feminist side on related issues. On the other hand the issue of rape, though it shares this political ambiguity, nevertheless has a direct structural effect that seems to favor the feminist tendency in the family. Fear of rape confines women to a more traditional familistic protection; therefore, to the extent that the state itself can control the threat of rape, women can be more independent economically and sexually, thus contributing to the shift away from the traditional family structure.

Politics may be expected to a lively determinant of future family structures. How far can such change proceed? A deliberate policy oriented towards completely replacing the family with some collective form does not seem likely. Evidence on the reestablishment of nuclear family ties within the kibbutz, or the tendency of sexually permissive communes to break up rapidly under the negotiation of sexual property (Zablocki, 1980) seems to show that completely non-proprietary forms are not viable. Nevertheless, there are many other variants of family structure possible besides the ideal Western nuclear family of mid-20th century. We should remind ourselves of all

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the family forms of past history: all of which are equally families, none of them utopian, and together constituting a range of variation that should keep us from believing that we have reached the end of any possible change. Not that we will necessarily repeat earlier family forms. But if we bear in mind that the fundamental ingredients of the family are the nexus of sexual and economic rights, we can have some inkling of the range of possibilities.

What may be the immediate future history of the family? One trend that is apparent is towards a diversity of family types. This is partly because politics is a field of opposing forces, partly because legal opportunities and restrictions on the family operate differently at different social class levels. At the poverty level, as I have mentioned, we see in some places widespread illegitimacy and female-headed households, with a larger kinship or pseudo-kinship network of female relatives. In what I would call the "new upper-middle class," on the other hand, the key form is the two-career family. It is precisely this combining of two professional-level incomes that makes it possible for the couple to live at a level of affluence and social status that neither of them could command alone. This makes marriage a highly preferred form for this group, although the strains of dual careers upon marriages produces a high level of divorce, compensated and complicated by an equally strong tendency to remarriage. Weber had stressed, in discussing tribal societies, that the kin group is not necessarily the same as a household; and in fact the "modern" style of a "nuclear" family identified with a household is the product of the political destruction of the larger kin group. But as a consequence of modern economic and political conditions (dual careers, the ease of divorce), we find an increasing proportion of

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families of remarried persons in which the household once again overlaps the kin group. Children of remarriages may have joint household memberships, and the kinship structure of any one "family" becomes increasingly hard to calculate. In this respect, our modern society and various tribal forms may cast some unexpected light on each other.

Let me close with two somewhat speculative issues, which nevertheless may come to have a realistic impact upon the family. One is the future development of artificial insemination and other technologies for laboratory-controlled childbirth. Artificial insemination has the potential for eliminating fathers entirely as social entities. Whether this would come about is another question, but it is clear enough that artificial insemination could potentially be part of a highly militant, "separatist" feminist strategy. The extent to which this would be allowed, however, would clearly be a matter for political regulation and hence political struggle. The same applies to other childbirth technologies. This will doubtless have an increasing bearing on the abortion issue, since current laws (such as in the U.S.) tend to define abortion as permissible only in that period during which the fetus is not yet "viable." But the period of viability expands downwards virtually to the point of conception with improvements in medical technology. This will be a political, rather than a technological issue, however, because it is on legal grounds that this issue will be fought out.

Finally, what I would consider to be a major political issue yet to be mobilized: public child care facilities. This has as yet not become a large part of the feminist program, and certainly has not entered the realm of public "moral politics." But insofar as the key to

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sexual equality is unimpeded careers for women, the public provision of child care for working women is a crucial desideratum. But this in turn would still further change the family structures: indirectly by making women economically even less dependent upon a traditional marriage, and directly by intruding a public agency into one of the major arenas of the family itself. The potential for a traditionalistic moral politics opposing such a pro-childcare movement is of course considerable. Nevertheless, we ought to keep our eyes open to the likelihood that this will be another major strand in the future politics of the family.

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Some changes in men's values, meanings, roles and attitudes toward marriage and family in the USA

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A recent, controversial book by Barbara Ehrenreich, The Hearts of Men: American Dreams and the Flight from Commitment (1983), raises the generic question which all of the papers are addressing today, i.e., "Is the family worth supporting?" In addition, this book addresses the more narrow question raised by this paper, "WHY SHOULD MEN SUPPORT MARRIAGE AND FAMILIES?"

According to Ms. Ehrenreich, the family is an intrinsically unstable institution, since it rests on the "volution of individual men," i.e. males who accept the breadwinner ethic, the belief that they should get a job, get married, have children, and "move up" in the world. However, as more women are taking on outside employment and as the breadwinner ethnic continues to erode in the U.S. society, more males who are losing the status and pampering that are the rewards of being the sole breadwinner are now rejecting formal marriage and family life. After all, why should contemporary men support marriage and the family? To this, Ehrenreich explains how marriage used to provide males with guaranteed sex, emotional security and laundry service, but now, liberated women are creating men who are impotent, anxious instead of secure, and must do their own laundry. So, why should males get married and help raise children? In other words, why do males value marriage and family today?

MEN'S CHANGING VALUES

Individual men vary greatly in the degree to which they value the institutions of formal marriage and the family. There are, however, at least three value positions which have been well articulated for men in recent times. One of these positions has been voiced by Jessie Bernard to the effect that men value and receive much through marriage and family life. Bernard in some of her writings (Bernard, 1972; 1977) has strongly suggested that men receive more from marriage than do women, i.e., marriage is a better institution for men than women today. Some data seem to support this contention. Married men in the U.S. certainly live longer than do either single or divorced men. Married men tend to be more healthy, both physically and emotionally. Of course, the direction of causation is most difficult to ascertain from the correlational data. For example, marriage may prolong married men's lives, because many of their basic physical and emotional needs are met in marriage. However, a drift theory of sociology might suggest that women tend to marry men who are already more healthy, fit and would live longer anyway. The epidemiological data do not support the direction of this relationship. However, I think that most of us would agree with the popular assumption that one reason men continue to marry at high rates is that formal marriage still provides for many of men's needs for affiliation, love, sex, and companionship, in other words, for their needs for intimacy. Why would so many males continue to marry (one or more times), if marriage and family did not provide still for many of their needs!

A second value position has been strongly voiced by Rita Liljeström, a sociologist from Gothenburg, Sweden, who believes that men do not value marriage and the family very highly, since they do not receive much from it

(Carlsson, 1983). Liljeström has intuited a dominant future pattern of families around the world which will be composed of mother-child dyads without permanently attached males. She predicts this projection of a future family pattern from trend data in Latin America, Scandinavia, especially Greenland, and the Caribbean, where many men are withdrawing from the family unit and where men are reduced to more or less a "sperm donator," i.e., where men come and go, expand and then abandon the mother-child subsystem, and therefore are not an integral, continuing part of family life.

If you were to press Liljeström further on these ideas, she would probably agree with Barbara Ehrenreich who concludes that men do not get much from marriage and family life, because marriage may bind men only temporarily to the mother-child dyad, often not long enough to provide even financially for the growing children. She declares this in her own words: "The woman is the center of every family. She and the man create a sexual relationship, but as a mother she is biologically closer to the child than the man...(Divorce then)...is often an active decision on the part of the woman, because she can get along without the man...(and often elects) to live alone with the children" (Carlsson, 1983:59).

A number of both feminist and non-feminist writers agree with Liljeström's analysis. For example, Peter Wilson in Man: The Promising Primate recently re-examined the evidence for bonding or attachments among human beings as well as other primates. He concludes: "The primary bond of attachment in the human species is that between adult females and infants. There is no biological evidence for such a tie between adult males and infants" (Wilson, 1980:48). Finally, data from Scandinavia, Hungary and some other countries concerning the rising rates of cohabitation and lower rates of marriage can also

be used to argue this value position that men may not receive as much from formal marriage at this time as they may have received in earlier times.¹

Yet a third value position is being heard more frequently on this question of the extent to which males value marriage and the family in the USA. My own conclusion from observing and studying men in the family for nearly ten years now is that some men are receiving even more today from marriage and family life than men have received for several decades. I have been hearing in my research studies how men of all ages are finding more fulfillment in the nurturing of their own children, wives and others. I have been observing men who are role-making, innovating and playing out in their own lives many of the roles which have been forbidden to men in earlier times. For instance, I am documenting changes reported by middle aged and aging men who are learning how sweet is the taste of "generativity," as described by Erik Erickson (1950). These men would be poorer without these new relationships gained within marriage and family life.

Fortunately or unfortunately, the media in the U.S.A. has picked up on some of these changes, drawing considerable public attention to the "new male," i.e., "the sensitive, more domesticated male." For example, Shere Hite has written a popular article on "The new, sensitive male: Is he too good to be true?" (Family Weekly, 1982:4-7) in which she suggests that men are breaking out of their traditional socialization to become more sensitive and loving men.² Much of this media hype seems to have been triggered a few years ago by a popular film, Kramer vs. Kramer, in which Dustin Hoffman was the unwilling (at first) recipient of the sole custody of his young son. This film was followed by another similar and also successful film at the box office, Tootsie, in which Dustin Hoffman learns empathy for how a woman might perceive life by living in the clothes and eventually the personality of a woman on a

television soap opera. Even more recently, a film called Mr. Mom, based on a role-reversal for a father and mother, where the father becomes a house-husband, was so popular among movie-goers in the U.S. that the film grossed \$20.4 million in its first six weeks. Granted, American film-goers do like comedy, but what can explain the fascination which young adults experience in these role-reversal films?

Unfortunately, some of these cases where men are experiencing and experimenting with roles typically played by women are so new that not much empirical study has yet been directed to it. Some research, however, has already shown that more men, especially younger fathers, want to be close to their children, want to be more nurturant and not just a remote breadwinner, and desire more active involvement and more time with their children. For example, data from a U.S. national sample, a Gallup Poll of new mothers, suggests that, whereas only 27 percent of fathers a decade ago were with their wives during childbirth, over 80 percent of fathers are now present in the delivery room. Eighty percent of fathers, according to the same national study, change their baby's diapers; 43 percent give their babies baths, and 25 percent of American fathers expect to be the primary care-giver to their babies when their wives first go back to work.

Comparatively speaking, much research has been done on new fathers. This research suggests that fathers make good caregivers, that young babies don't discriminate between their fathers and mothers, that when fathers spend quality time with babies that the infants benefit significantly, especially on cognitive dimensions, and that infants pick up more quickly on social cues (Sawin and Parke, 1979; Parke and O'Leary, 1976; Lamb, 1976; Levine, 1976; Radin, 1972). Michael Lamb has contributed to and summarized much of this

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this research with the conclusion that fathers can significantly influence their young children in unique and independent ways (Lamb, 1976).

Kyle Pruett, a psychiatrist at the Yale Child Study Center, has reported some interesting data from his case study analysis of 17 New England families where there was a clear role-switching (Pruett, 1983), i.e., mothers worked outside the home and fathers dominated the childcare from birth. Although admittedly a small sample, Pruett reports that all infants did well, that they had achieved above average social skills, were especially interested and were comfortable with the outside external stimulation their fathers provided them. One interesting difference noted by Pruett in the nurturing style of these male care-givers was their more robust style, e.g., where fathers carry around their infants either in a football position or tucked under their buttocks rather than at chest/breast area. These fathers are just as skillful and loving as mothers might be. The only negative comment was that the parents did suffer some from the negative judgments from other adults in their community; that is, the rest of the world may not yet be ready for this kind of role switching.

In the absence of abundant empirical data, what may one conclude about American males' valuing of marriage and family life?³ One recent study of 71 traditional and untraditional men (Nordstrom, 1982) suggests that, contrary to popular myth, most of these men wanted to be married, and that the more traditional men were desirous to marry not only more than the untraditional men but more than their intended wives wished to marry. Certainly this is an area where empirical study is greatly needed. It would seem to me, however, that whereas a growing minority of men are experiencing new highs in nurturing children and experimenting with new roles in families, and whereas

another minority of men are not receiving much from marriage and family life, that most men must receive enough from marriages and families to marry at least once and perhaps have even more than one marriage and one set of children.

CHANGING MEANINGS OF FATHERS AND HUSBAND POSITIONS

Just as men's values toward marriage and family life in the U.S.A. seem to be changing, so also are the meanings attached to being fathers and husbands. One observation which must be made first is that the meanings attached to the father and husband positions are not as clear as they once were. In American society the meaning of being a father, however, is even less clear than being a husband, since being a husband refers to the roles a man plays in reciprocity with his wife's roles. But, what does the position of "father" connote? In more traditional times in the U.S.A., being a father implied that one had sired a child, i.e., provided the sperm which fertilized an egg which developed into a child. This is all that was necessary to be a father in the most narrow sense of the term. If this is all that being a father connotes, then I might agree with Liljeström and Ehrenreich, that most men may not receive much from the institution of the family, since the coldest thing in the world is yesterday's orgasm.

Last year the U.S. Supreme Court made a landmark decision which, surprisingly received little public attention. In a 6-3 ruling our high court declared that a father must be more than a biological parent to assure his right to challenge his child's adoption by someone else; that is, the mere existence of a biological link does not merit the same constitutional protection an unwed father earns by demonstrating a continuing commitment to all the responsibilities of parenthood.

So what is it to be a father? William Hurt, the young American actor who has a child with but is not married to the mother of his child, was quoted

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recently by an interviewer as saying, "I don't know exactly what it means to be a father, but I'm crazy about my 8-month old son." Obviously, for some the position of father is a mystifying and gratifying experience, even though the meaning of fatherhood cannot be captured easily upon paper.

Quotations were given earlier from Peter Wilson's recent book, Man, the Promising Primate. It is he who firmly declares that the basic biological bond for all primate species is that between the adult female and her offspring. (Peter Wilson, by the way, first developed this book as a series of seminars given at the Australian National University.) After tracing the relationships and "roles" (if you will allow the terms) of nonhuman primates, Wilson concludes that the attachment between a nonhuman female primate and her young is determined by the biology of birth and her continuing nurturance of her offspring. In contrast, most primate males are not even able to identify their own offspring (Wilson: 48-49). However, Wilson declares that it is at this very point where evolution is discontinuous, i.e., where human primates differ decidedly from nonhuman primates. In other words, there is no universal, instinctive form for basic human relationships. The options and forms for human relationships are wide open. Unlike other animals, human relationships depend largely upon one's own choosing and volition.

According to this line of thinking, the human father-infant bond therefore is not biologically determined. We may distinguish between the "real mother" and the "adoptive" mother, since being a real mother is invariable. But, the father-child relationship varies more between and within cultures. As Wilson suggests, according to culture, a man may be known as a father, because he is the man a woman is living with at the time the child is born, because the infant resembles him, because the man and child have the same blood group, or as in

some cultures it is believed that the fetus is fed and shaped through continuing sexual intercourse between the man and his pregnant partner. Because of the great variability in the meanings of fatherhood, therefore, Wilson holds that the father-child relationship is a metaphor or analogy to the female/infant bond. As such, it is also the first and basic kinship link in society, as distinct from the biological link between mother and child. As a human invention, "the father-child relationship is free from the constraints of nature, permitting great diversity and therefore more flexibility and adaptation for human survival in changing environments" (Wilson: 166).

In summary, we may note that very few family researchers have turned their thinking and studies to the most simple and yet most profound questions as to what does it mean to be a father and a husband in one's society. Since the referents to fatherhood in even one society are so many and diverse, we ought to be as interested in the variability of meanings as in the median meaning or some other indicator of central tendency.² Even though there has been a groundswell in the U.S.A. of empirical study of fathers, especially new fathers, we still have little in the way of good descriptive studies of what fatherhood means or how these phenomena are changing in different societies.

MEN'S CHANGING ROLES

Although there has been a spate of popular writings in the U.S.A., there is also a scarcity of empirical research on men's changing roles in marriage and the family. Something which is undeniably clear, however, is that more men are now playing atypical roles within families, roles which only a generation ago few men played and even fewer admitted playing. As a personal aside, I can vividly remember washing the windows of our small apartment in the married student housing at the University of Minnesota during our graduate student days in the early 1960's. I remember this so

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well, since I incurred more than once the derision of other graduate student-fathers whose wives did not work outside the home or were not graduate students also, as my wife was. The variation in roles played by young husbands and fathers today in the U.S., however, makes my own role-making experiences pale in comparison.

Most of the more exciting descriptions of men's changing roles are strangely neither empirically derived nor are they particularly related to family life (Boyer, 1981; David and Brannon, 1976; Goldberg, 1979; Pleck, 1981; Pleck and Sawyer, 1974; Solomon and Levy, 1982). As I have described elsewhere with a colleague (Lewis and Pleck, 1979), although male roles have been studied at least implicitly in family studies, men's changing roles in families have only recently been critically and sensitively examined. All too much of our knowledge about men's roles in families still comes from pollsters asking wives what their husbands feel and believe. It was not until 1966 that men's changing roles in families became a focus of national interest. In that year William Smith, Jr., then president of the National Council on Family Relations, published an essay, "The family roles of modern man," (Smith, 1966). It was not until 1975, however, that a national conference allocated any significant time to a programmatic focus on men's changing roles in the U.S.A. This program theme of the Groves Conference at Hot Springs, Arkansas, was more than a decade behind the much earlier study of women's roles which had been nurtured by the feminist movement of recent times. Generally speaking, empirical studies of men's roles lag significantly behind studies of female roles in the U.S.

Nevertheless, there have been empirical studies done in the U.S.A. which give some indications as to how men's roles are changing in American families, for example, in the degree to which men are involved in their family roles, such as child care. The data we do have suggest that men's involvement at home with their children is increasing. This is the conclusion of comparative analyses made of 1967-68 and 1976 time-use data from Syracuse, New York, by Kathryn Walker and her student, Robert Sanuck. If one controls for the number of children in the families, fathers in Syracuse at the latter time spent 30 percent more time than 10 years before in child care and housework. However, as Joe Pleck has asserted when reviewing these data, it depends upon whether you are optimistic or pessimistic as to whether you view the glass either one-third full or two-thirds empty. The fact of any increase in men's involvement in the family is significant.

Another study, a replication of the famous Middletown study of Muncie, Indiana, in 1925, originally done by Robert and Helen Lynd, reveals similar data. This replication by Theodore Caplow and Ruth Chadwick in 1978 of one of the original American community studies found a substantial increase in fathers' time spent with children between 1925 and 1978. Of course, many things have changed for Muncie, Indiana families in over 50 years. One of these significant changes has been in the increasing amount of time which fathers now spend in child care.

With limited time and space it is impossible to summarize here all of the findings related to changes which have occurred in men's family roles. For those interested in assessing this field by themselves, however, one might read some of the special issues of scientific journals which have been focused on men's studies, e.g., the special issues in the Journal of

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Social Issues (Pleck and Brannon, 1978), The Counseling Psychologist

(Skovholt, Gormally, Schauble, and Davis, 1978), The Family Coordinator

(Lewis and Pleck, 1979), and the upcoming special issue on "Men's Changing Roles in the Family" (Lewis and Sussman, 1984) in Marriage and Family Review.

For those interested in specific topical areas within men's studies, one should locate the research bibliographies on male sex roles which have been published by the Men's Studies Collection of the M.I.T. Humanities Library (Ferriero, 1977) and the National Institute of Mental Health (Grady, Brannon and Pleck, 1979). These and other resources are beginning to give documentation to the observations that more and more men in the U.S. are experimenting with as well as seriously playing roles day to day which a few decades ago only females would have played.

Just to whet one's appetite to read more about men's changing roles, the following teasers are suggested:

- 1) Did you know that a national time-use study of employed wives in 1976-77 found that the wives spent only 12 more minutes a day in combined paid work and family work than their husbands spent? (Pleck and Rustad, 1980)
- 2) Did you know that a man's friends seem to be the major impediment to his taking on more responsibilities in the home? (Lein, 1979) and
- 3) Did you know that greater household involvement by males appears to assist men in their successful adaptation to retirement? (Keith and Brubaker, 1979)

We need more and better national studies of what men actually do in their own families. We need data especially about men (and women) in equalitarian or egalitarian marriages to discover how these relationships

function and survive, since a growing number of both American men and women in younger cohorts are expressing interest in having marriages between equals.

MEN'S CHANGING ATTITUDES

This last point brings us to the final focus of this paper, the area of men's changing attitudes toward marriage and family in the United States, a subject to be examined also at this conference in a paper by Helen Glezer on the attitudes of young people toward marriage and family formation in Australia.

In the United States there appear to be several interesting developments in the attitudes of young adults who are nearing the time of family formation or marriage. Only one of these apparent trends, however, is singled out, because of its relevance for the central topic of this day, i.e., the growing support for equalitarian marriages being voiced these days by young adults. A recent poll, a study by the American life and health insurance industries in 1983, discovered in their telephone survey of 1,000 Americans that 76 percent of young adults between the ages of 19 and 37 preferred an equalitarian marriage where both spouses share responsibility for work, homemaking, and child-rearing. It is interesting, however, that 63 percent said that only economic necessity should lead a mother of pre-school children to work outside the home, whereas the majority of pre-school mothers actually do work, at least part-time outside the home. It is also interesting in light of the first question addressed in this paper, the question about values toward marriage and the family, that the great majority of the "baby-boom" children, born between 1946 and 1964, also strongly valued marriage over being single.

Other national studies in the U.S.A. in recent years have documented a trend in the attitudes of young adults toward the valuing of equalitarian

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marriages. The differences between the sexes, however, still are very problematic. In one national study of university freshmen, for instance, nearly the majority (49 percent) of the males professed a preference for an equalitarian marriage, compared to 69 percent of the females. Ten years prior to the more recent study a similar population of university freshmen were questioned nationwide on the same topic. At that earlier time 52 percent of the males and only 31 percent of the women did not want an equalitarian marriage. It is the disparity between the 35 percent of the males and the 19 percent of the females which is a real concern. That is, some 16 percent of females who now expect to work equally outside the home and to have an equalitarian marriage will be married to men who are not supportive of either their working outside or their full equality in marriage.

The movement of young adults' attitudes toward the values of equalitarian marriages in the U.S.A., nevertheless, tells little about how much equality there will actually be in the marital relationships of this baby-boom cohort. Time will tell. The least that can be expected is that there will be more talk about equalitarian marriages than there will be equalitarian marriages, since behavioral changes usually lag behind attitudinal changes.

Something else which we know little about are the role reciprocity and other problems which will be an inherent part of equalitarian marriages. Little empirical research has yet been done on symmetrical marriages and families. For example, there have been very few studies of marriages where husband and wife earn nearly equal incomes and no studies apparently on marriages where wives make more than their husbands, in spite of the fact that the U.S. Census Bureau has just reported that nearly six million

American wives earned more than their husbands. This is 12.1 percent of two parent households in the U.S.

Some data are beginning to trickle down the channels of social research on men. Samuel Osherson at the Harvard Medical School recently published some findings about the problems of equalitarian marriage structures as contrasted to more traditional structures (Osherson, 1983). In this study equalitarian husbands were reported to feel that they had achieved less success at work, according to the norms of our society, than more traditional men whose wives did not work outside the home. The equalitarian husbands, however, did acknowledge greater career flexibility, e.g., being able to pursue more self-development activities rather than just their job-related activities. The most problematic group, however, appears to be the equalitarian husbands who were also childless. They reported the lowest feelings of job success, perhaps because they were not able to draw on other rewarding experiences, such as nurturing children, which might help them buffer the injuries given their self esteem on the job.

Other problems purported by some researchers to be a frequent outcome of equalitarian marriages and the growing equality of work-related opportunities in larger society include men's loss of friendships. Stuart Miller's study of nearly 1,000 contemporary men, reported in the book, Men and Friendships, suggests that the changes in women's legal statuses may be making more men fearful of making mistakes on the job, one outcome of which is that these men are spending most all of their time on either their jobs, especially if they are professionals, or at home. One outcome of this appears to be that men, especially middle-aged men, therefore have less

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time for male friends. In conclusion, while the women's movement in the U.S.A. has given some women more freedom for intimate and intense female friendships, it may be hampering the growth of friendships for men in certain ages and strata of society. Although this line of reasoning is all too glib and impressionistic, this topic is another issue related to men's roles and attitudes, however, which begs for empirical study.

CONCLUSIONS

Definitive conclusions about men's values, meanings, roles and attitudes toward marriage and family life in the United States have not been the goal behind the writing of this paper. Instead, the main purpose of this paper has been to stimulate your curiosity and perhaps some future research which you may be led to conduct on the ways in which contemporary men relate to other persons in their marital and familiar relationships. That which is clear to me at this time is that men's roles in marriage and the family are being challenged and redefined at a rate unlike that in the recent past. That which many husbands, fathers, stepfathers, grandfathers, etc. do within families is changing. As social scientists, more of us should be impelled to study that which nearly one half of the persons in families (i.e., males) value, do and believe about these two institutions in our society. Some men are not only redefining for themselves what it is to be a husband and a father, but are already suffering from some of the things we social scientists of the family write about, especially some of the implications from our research which filter through the media. For example, there have been some observations made that, just as some women in the U.S. have taken on the roles of "super mom," so are some men trying to play out the roles of "super dad." There is danger in such pronouncements to young fathers, for instance, that they can be more involved with their

children and wives, while not giving up on their careers or work outside the home. Michael Lamb, professor of psychology, psychiatry, and pediatrics at the University of Utah, said at a recent "fathering forum," held at Bank Street College: "I think we're seeing more men interested in being involved parents, but we're also hearing from fathers and mothers just how hard that is . . . It's not easy for men, or for women either, who have the responsibility for child care and also for bread-winning outside the home." (New York Times, 1983:B9)

In summary, it is clear to me that we are redefining the roles of many men in marriage and family life. This is a certainty to me especially on days when I read in our very conservative newspaper in our fairly conservative city in Indiana an announcement such as the one which appeared recently:

"Cub scouts and their dads will compete in a cake cook-off at Hershey Elementary School at 6:30 p.m. Nov. 22. No mothers may assist in this project."

Times are a-changing!!!

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FOOTNOTES

¹Although these data argue that formal marriage has lost some popularity with younger men in Scandinavia, it is also true today that more Swedish men, for instance, live together with a spouse than earlier.

²Some of the best empirical work on males' sensitivity, especially toward women have been the descriptive studies of male typologies, such as the "cowboy" and the "playboy" roles played by inexpressive males (Balswick, 1970; Balswick and Peek, 1971). Balswick (1981) has since expanded these basic types to include also the "good ol'boys," "conboys," "locker-room boys," and "parlor-room boys," typologies which describe immature behavior "called forth by role expectations which exist within the social structure of our society." (Balswick, 1981:119).

William Goode, on the other hand, suggests in a fascinating article, "Why Men Resist," that we have taken too seriously the traditional prescriptions of the male role to be active, aggressive and competitive and not nurturant, warm and altruistic. He writes: "We are so accustomed to reading such descriptions that we almost believe them, unless we stop to ask, first, how many men do we actually know who carry out these social prescriptions. . .?" "Second, and this is the test of a social role, do they lose their membership cards in the male fraternity if they fail in these respects? If socialization and social pressures are so all-powerful, where are all the John Wayne types in our society?" (Goode, 1982:1135)

³As in most summaries made in this paper, the writer is not suggesting that any of the changes noted for men will be major trends in the future, i.e., directions or patterns which will be followed by the majority of men in the United States. Significant trends are rarely predicted in the social sciences prior to their emergence anyway. Nevertheless, changes in the attitudes and behavior of minority groups can herald changes for the majority group, especially when there are certain, major social changes underlying and supporting the changes for the minority groups. Changes in that which appears to be only minority groups, therefore, should be important data for social scientists as well as social planners.

⁴One estimate of the amount of time spent by employed fathers in the home was 14.5 hours per week in doing housework and 20 hours per week in childcare (for fathers with children under 18). See Walker and Woods, 1976.

Antecedents and correlates of marriage and family attitudes in young Australian men and women

by HELEN GLEZER

Recent family research literature displays wide acknowledgement that the traditional family values broadly accepted as the norm in the early post-war years have changed. The traditional family has been defined as the:-

"Legal, lifelong sexually exclusive marriage between one man and one woman, with children, where the male is the primary provider and ultimate authority." (Macklin, 1980, p.905)

The movement away from this conception is illustrated in recent demographic trends such as the continuing increase in the divorce rate, the increase in cohabitation, the delay in the age at marriage, the decline in fertility and the increase in extra marital sexual activity.

These shifts have accompanied economic prosperity until the mid-seventies, an increase in educational levels for both men and women, and major technological changes in the area of fertility control, as a result of which sexual behaviour has become increasingly relational rather than procreational. The other major shift is in the increased participation of married women in the workforce which makes women less economically dependent on marriage and changes the balance of power within the marriage relationship. Coinciding with women's greater economic independence has been a resurgence of the women's movement.

Along with these changes has come a wider tolerance of these shifts away from traditional family norms, as evidenced by attitudinal research and opinion polls. In Australia, many of these shifts have been legitimized through legislative changes in areas such as the introduction of no-fault divorce laws; provision of readily accessible contraceptive advice and abortion services; the blurring of the distinction in the law between informal and formal marriage; the payment of increased benefits

to single mothers; the introduction of anti-sexual discrimination legislation; the introduction of equal pay for women and moves towards affirmative action for women in employment. Thus governments have increasingly sanctioned the pluralism which has emerged in family types and lifestyles.

This diversity of attitudes and behaviour regarding family life has arisen in all western advanced industrialized societies. In this study, my focus is on the Australian experience for the post-war generation of young marrieds. Hopefully, this may add to an understanding of changes in other social settings.

The Institute of Family Studies is conducting a longitudinal family formation study (AFFS 1982) of young Australians born between 1948 and 1964 and by examining their attitudes and behaviour, we hope to gain some notion of where Australia is heading with regard to family values, gender role differentiation and family formation patterns.

This paper is part of a larger study of the family and sex role values of young married Australians; previous research has examined the values of two comparable groups of young married women (18 - 34 years). One group was studied in 1971 and the other in 1982. Comparison of the results obtained for the two groups suggested that there had been significant changes in some values over time. Views about sex roles had become more egalitarian and there had been a decline in the importance attached to work. However, the support for marriage as an institution remained unchanged. (Annual Report 1982-83).

The data concerning some sex role values was examined further. In particular views about domestic responsibility, economic responsibility and the importance of motherhood were analysed. A measure of egalitarianism was developed on the basis of these values. A regression analysis was applied to the data in order to ascertain the main factors that accounted for the egalitarianism scores. The most important factor emerging was

the time at which data was collected. That is, when other factors were taken into account, a strong period effect remained, suggesting that there was a general shift towards egalitarianism over time. Variables that significantly contributed to more egalitarian attitudes were:-

- . higher education level
- . participation in the workforce
- . an English speaking country of origin
- . no religious affiliation
- . white collar occupation for husband
- . having no children

The 1982 study also included a sample of young married men. No differences between the sexes were apparent for this survey and it seems reasonable to assume that as for the women, there had been a shift towards sex role egalitarianism in the attitudes of young married men over the decade. However, despite attitudinal changes towards sex role egalitarianism in the area of domestic role sharing, shifts in actual sex role behaviour have lagged behind (Glezer 1984).

It must be borne in mind, however, that the gender differentiation of roles within marriages is only one aspect of norms concerning marriage and family. It would seem likely that the dramatic shifts in regard to sex roles would create and contribute to similar shifts in other aspects of family and marriage such as the salience and permanence of marriage, fidelity in marriage, the importance of children the conflict of interest between self fulfilment and family or marriage relationship needs.

It seems appropriate therefore to document to what extent other attitudes towards family have moved away from traditional notions, in what specific areas, and what groups of the population have adopted less traditional family values. The paper is therefore divided into three parts:

1. development of a family values scale which differentiates between young Australians along a traditional-modern family values continuum.
2. an attempt to establish which groups of the young married population hold traditional family values and which groups hold modern or less-traditional values.
3. an examination of the family values of young married Australians.

The sources of data to be used are:-

1. The Australian Family Formation Study which was conducted by the Institute of Family Studies during 1981-82. The surveyed population consisted of men and women aged 18 - 34 years living in private dwellings throughout Australia. The total number of people in this sample was 2554. However, for the purposes of this paper, only the Australian metropolitan married males and females will be included in the sample. This sample consists of 293 males and 495 females.
2. Family Formation Case Studies. This project which was designed and executed by Helen Glezer and Tamara Kotler was part of the Australian Family Formation Study. Sixty intensive case study interviews were conducted on 30 married males and 30 married females who were included in the 1981-82 Australian Family Formation Study sample. These 60 young marrieds also completed several questionnaires regarding different aspects of marital satisfaction, personality and family roles.

PART 1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE FAMILY VALUES SCALE (FVS)

The first step in the development of a scale of family attitudes along a traditional - non-traditional or liberal continuum was to establish a definition of what is meant by the traditional family in this paper. The definition used here is the one suggested by Macklin (1980) who describes the traditional family as the:-

"Legal, lifelong, sexually exclusive marriage between one man and one woman, with children, where the male is the primary provider and ultimate authority." (Macklin 1980 p.905)

Various dimensions of this definition were incorporated among 54 attitude items included in the AFFS 1982. It should be noted that the FVS is a post-hoc measure of traditional non-traditional family value orientation. A twenty-one item factor-based scale with an Alpha Reliability of .83 was derived using a principal components factor analysis. The items included in the scale all had factor loadings of .30 and above. These items and factor loadings are set out below:-

FAMILY VALUES SCALE - ITEMS AND FACTOR LOADINGS

Item	Factor Loading
Whatever career a woman may have her most important role in life is still that of becoming a mother.	.619
Marriage is for life.	.554
It is all right for a couple to live together without planning to be married.	-.544
A husband provides protection for his wife.	.538

Item	Factor Loading
It is all right for people to have children without being married.	-.489
Married people are happier than those who go through life without getting married.	.482
You need two parents to bring up a child.	.472
The most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.	.466
People should consider the needs of their spouse and children as more important than their own.	.451
Important decisions should be made by the husband.	.438
A woman is only really fulfilled when she becomes a mother.	.435
Divorce is too easy to get these days.	.435
I would be frightened to be single at 40.	.400
If my spouse mentioned divorce I'd be devastated.	.399
Wives who don't have to work should not do so.	.390
A wife should go where her husband wants her to go for his job.	.388

Item	Factor Loading
People can have a satisfying relationship without children.	-.365
One's really important relationships are within one's home.	.359
My partner should not expect me to be always faithful.	-.358
People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually end up causing trouble.	.340
I would not expect my partner to be always faithful.	-.304

Inspection of the items along with their factor loadings confirms that the underlying dimension of this scale is a traditional - modernity continuum. Items are consistent with various dimensions of the definition of the traditional family model suggested by Macklin 1980; the positive end of the scale, the traditional values end, indicates:-

Marriage - Strong support for the institution of marriage and a disapproval of living together without planning to marry. Married people are regarded as being happier than those who go through life being single. Marriage is for life and a fear exists of remaining single through life. There is support for the notion that one's important relationships are within one's home.

Individualism and Marriage - The traditional view is that you should put the interests of your spouse and children above your own.

Children - The traditional view supports a strong belief in the importance of children. Motherhood is regarded as a woman's most important role in life. A satisfying relationship requires children. There is a disapproval of having children outside of marriage and a belief that you need two parents to bring up a child.

Divorce - Traditionalists believe divorce is too easy to get and would be devastated if their spouse mentioned divorce.

Fidelity in Marriage - Traditionalists also expect fidelity in marriage.

Sex Roles - The traditional view is towards non-egalitarian sex roles - husbands should protect their wives and make the important decisions. Wives should only work out of economic necessity, and a wife should go where her husband wants her to go for his job.

Conservatism - The traditional view is that the most important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to parents, and people who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually end up causing trouble.

The non-traditional end of the scale (negative end) indicates:-

Marriage - The non-traditionalist does not necessarily agree marriage is for life or that married people are happier than those who remain single, or that one's really important relationships are within one's home. Non-traditionalists support the idea of living together without intending to marry and would not be frightened to be single at forty.

Individualism and Marriage The non-traditionalist view does not support the item that you should put the interests of your spouse and children above your own.

Children - The non-traditionalist view rejects the idea that motherhood is a woman's most important role in life, supports the notion that people can have satisfying relationships without children, accept that it's all right to have children outside of marriage and do not believe you necessarily need two parents to bring up a child.

Divorce - Non-traditionalists do not agree they would be devastated if their spouse mentioned divorce and do not believe divorce is too easy to get.

Fidelity - Non-traditionalists agree that marital partners should not expect each other to be faithful.

Sex Roles - The non-traditional view supports egalitarian sex roles. Husbands should not make important decisions and it is not their role to protect their wives. They disagree that wives should only work if they have to and that a wife should go where her husband wants her to go for his job.

Conservatism The non-traditionals disagree that questioning the old and accepted ways of doing things causes trouble and that the most important thing to teach children is obedience.

Scoring - In the FVS, items are scored on a five-point scale from strongly agree through to strongly disagree with don't know as the mid-point. Negative items are reversed for computing the family values score for each individual. This score is the sum of the scores on the twenty-one items.

Reliability - Using SPSS the Alpha Reliability of this twenty-one item scale was computed. Standardised Item Alpha = .83.

The range of scores on the FVS for metropolitan marrieds was 30 - 101, the possible range being 21 - 105. The mean was 66.90, standard deviation 11.37. Kurtosis -.006, Skewness -.04,

indicating that the scale has a normal distribution amongst the young metropolitan married sample being studied.

Respondents in the lower quartile of the FVS distribution (those who score 58 and below are designated non-traditional, whilst respondents with scores in the top quartile (those who scores 73 and above) are labelled traditionalists. The remaining 50 per cent of respondents who are clustered around the mean of the distribution (scores 59 - 72) being named moderates.

In Part II of this paper in multiple regression analyses to determine antecedents and correlates of FVS amongst married men and married women FVS scores will be used. In Part III, when examining that actual attitudes towards aspects of family values the three category classification of non-traditional, moderate and traditional will be used.

Throughout this paper men and women will be looked at separately, as the meaning of family experiences differ for men and women, and one of the major upheavals at the present time is concerned with women's push for equality and the renegotiations between the sexes that this entails.

PART 11 THE ANTECEDENTS AND CORRELATES OF FAMILY VALUE
ORIENTATION IN YOUNG MARRIED MEN AND WOMEN IN
AUSTRALIA (AGED 18 - 34 YEARS).

Research into sex role egalitarianism and family values has consistently found relationships between these two dependent variables and certain demographic and social status characteristics. The variables associated with non-traditional family values and egalitarian sex role attitudes are: a higher education, no religious affiliation, being young, coming from a higher socio-economic status background, and for married women, participation in the workforce has also been found to be related to sex role egalitarianism. (Scanzoni 1983, Mason, Czajka, and Arber 1976, Cherlin and Walters 1981, Antill, Cotton and Tindale 1983, Morgan 1983, Thornton and Freedman 1979, Thornton, Alwin and Camburn 1982, Heiss 1978, Yankelovich 1981)

Previous work on this sample of young married Australians has been confined to sex role attitudes and sex role behaviour. This study moves on to investigate a more general measure of family attitudes which incorporates sex role attitudes, and more general family related issues such as marriage, divorce, fidelity, individualism, areas included in the family value scale discussed previously.

Heiss (1978) conducted a similar study in America, although his was a more general sample not restricted in age and marital status. The conceptual framework for his study was derived from the work of Schooler (1972) who identified a constellation of personality traits which Heiss labels the "liberal personality".

The characteristics of this personality type include a pragmatic morality, an intellectual flexibility, a receptiveness towards innovation and change, non-conformity, and a sense of efficacy or competence and control over one's life.

According to Schooler (1972) and Kohn (1977) differential socialization processes and experiences during childhood associated with different social status backgrounds effect adult personality. Higher socio-economic status and higher education of parents encourage such "liberal personalities." Conversely, lower socio-economic status, lower education and high religiosity in parents tend to inculcate values of conformity, respect for authority and obedience.

As research has consistently demonstrated education and socio-economic status are correlated with family values and sex role attitudes, and since these same variables are highly correlated with parental socio-economic status and education levels, it also appears likely that family values and sex role ideology are partially a product of the same socialization process that Kohn (1977) and Schooler (1972) have identified. This suggests that those who have more "liberal personality" characteristics as described above will be inclined to have non-traditional family attitudes.

Heiss (1978) found no differences between men and women in relation to "family modernity" and education, age and religiosity had the strongest effects, with father's education having an indirect causal effect.

In looking for some of the antecedents and correlates of family value orientation along a traditional - non-traditional continuum the intention here is to look at the effects of

1. family background characteristics
2. social status characteristics of the respondent
3. personal values of respondent.

1. Family background variables

Following on the work of Schooler (1972) and Heiss (1978) father's education level and father's occupation will be included in the regression analysis in order to determine the influence of parental socio-economic status on family value orientation. Country of birth will also be included, as previous work in Australia on family formation (Ruzicka and Caldwell 1977, Storer 1984, Khoo 1984), has consistently demonstrated that migrants in Australia have more traditional family values and behaviour than those who are Australian born.

It seems likely that in addition to these demographic variables that other aspects of family background or perceptions of family dynamics could play a part in formulating attitudes towards family.

One of the characteristics attributed to the post-war generation has been its rejection of social norms regarding sexual mores, staying at home until marriage, living together prior to marriage (McDonald 1984, Carmichael 1984, Young 1984). These are all trends which had existed and had been increasing but became more openly acknowledged amongst the youth of the late 1960's and 1970's.

It seems likely that coming from a family of origin which discouraged the idea of leaving home prior to marriage in order to have an autonomous independent life as a single adult, is likely to be associated with traditional family values, whereas a family of origin which appeared to encourage autonomy and independence is likely to be associated with a non-traditional family value orientation. Therefore, a traditional socialization scale was developed. This is a three-item scale (Alpha Reliability .59). The items relate to expectations from parents to stay home until marriage and restrictions on sexual behaviour prior to leaving home (See Appendix 1 for details of scale).

Following on from the argument presented above, major societal changes in the values and behaviour of young people occurred during the sixties and seventies. Christabel Young (1984) who has studied the leaving home patterns in the AFFS82 sample found that those who were unhappy at home with their family of origin tended to leave home earlier and were more likely to leave for reasons of independence and conflict, whereas those who were close to parents were more likely to stay until marriage.

Intuitively, it seems likely that individuals who perceived their family of origin environment as low in tension, accepting, and happy are more likely to share their parents' family values. Therefore low "intergenerational tension" may be more typical of respondents who hold traditional family values, while high "intergenerational tension" may be relatively more typical of respondents who hold "liberal" family values.

A family atmosphere scale which looks at perceived tension in family of origin was developed for inclusion in regression analyses. This scale is a 6-item scale (Alpha Reliability .83) (See appendix 1 for details of this scale).

Social Status Characteristics

The influence of education on family values and behaviour and sex role attitudes and behaviour is widely known. The economic prosperity and the increase in the availability of tertiary education for the post-war baby boom generation appears to be one of the major contributing factors to the changes within the family and women's roles that western societies have been experiencing over the past twenty years.

The parents of our respondents who grew up during the depression of the 1930's and lived through the second world war married and raised their children during the 1950's in a time of economic prosperity and were able to give their children the things they themselves had missed.

As Hargrove (1983) has pointed out

"The full brunt of change is probably felt most strongly by families most successful in achieving upward mobility ... Whilst it is not always apparent to older generations who value the consequences of a good education for the success of their children, such training is likely to produce a world view at variance with that of the family, and a social base for identity that can replace the family in this important function. The very value commitments of the family may undermine its importance and authority for younger generations." (P.33)

Thus having a higher education is likely to be strongly related to less traditional family value orientation. We would also expect having a higher socio-economic status to be related to a more liberal family value orientation.

Having a wife in the workforce for men or, for women, being in the workforce, changes the balance of power within the marriage, as women have some degree of economic independence. It seems likely that sharing economic responsibility in the marriage will lead to/or be indicative of less traditional family values. Past research into sex role egalitarianism has found that women who are in the workforce hold more egalitarian views and there is considerable debate concerning the direction of the relationship (Waite 1979, Molm 1978, Thornton et al 1982).

We would also expect that having a religious affiliation and religiosity in an increasingly secular society would be associated with a traditional family value orientation.

Several personality measures will be included in order to explain family value orientation.

A sense of power or competence in one's life as suggested by Schooler (1972) and Heiss (1978) enables one to be less

conformist and more flexible in one's approach to life. Therefore a sense of power scale will be included in our regression analyses. This is a four item scale (Alpha .52). Individuals with a high sense of self esteem and personal efficacy are likely to hold more individualistic values and be more flexible and tolerant of non-conformity and will therefore tend to adhere to less traditional, more liberal family values. (See Appendix 1)

There are two paths of upward social mobility available for individuals: acquiring wealth and material possessions and/or via the acquisition of expertise and skills through education which opens up professional career paths. Prior to the ready availability of tertiary education, this second path had been restricted to a relatively small proportion of the population, however educational opportunities though still limited have expanded considerably since the early 1960's in Australia.

But, for young people coming from lower socio-economic status backgrounds and some migrant backgrounds and for those with limited academic skills, upward social mobility is achieved through ambition and hard work. It seems likely therefore that young people who have aspirations of upward mobility will hold to their parents' generation's values on the importance of work achievement and self denial, and this in turn will be associated with a conformity to traditional family values. An ambition-achievement work value scale has been developed for inclusion in the regression analyses. This is a 2-item scale (Alpha Reliability .47) (See Appendix 1). The items are related to wanting promotion in the workplace and women choosing ambitious husbands when marrying. (See Appendix 1) (For description of variables see Appendix 2)

General Predictions.

1. Family background characteristics - both objective demographic social status variables and subjective perceptions of family of origin environment will influence

family value orientation.

2. Social Status Characteristics - the respondent's current social status will be related to family value orientation.
3. Aspects of personal values namely
 - (a) Sense of power
 - (b) Ambition-Achievement work orientation will be related to family value orientation.
4. There will be no difference between men and women in terms of the antecedents and correlates of family value orientation.

Expectations

To elaborate on the above the following relationships are expected:-

A less traditional family role orientation will be endorsed by the following groups of young marrieds:-

1. Family Background Variables

- those whose father had a higher education
- those whose father had a white collar occupation
- those who were born in an English speaking country
- those coming from a home which did not have traditional socialisation patterns for young adults. In other words respondents who were encouraged to be autonomous and independent in that they felt free to leave home and perceived no restrictions from parents regarding pre-marital sexual behaviour.

- those who came from families which they perceived as having high inter-generational tension.

2. Social Status Characteristics

- those who have a higher education level
- those who have no religious affiliation
- those with low religiosity
- those who have higher Socio-economic status (husband's occupation white collar)
- those who are in marriages where the wife is employed.

Although a less traditional family value orientation has been linked with being younger, no relationship between age and family value orientation is predicted given the narrow age range of the sample (18 - 34 years).

Personal Values

- those who have a high sense of power
- those who do not have a high ambitious-achievement work ethic.

RESULTS

(Insert Tables 1 and 2)

TABLE 3: Variance accounted for in Regressions

	Table 3 Men	Table 4 Women
Family Background characteristics	22.5%	16.8%
Social Status characteristics	13.1%	11.8%
Sense of Power	1.9%	1.8%
Ambition-Achievement work values	3.3%	3.3%
TOTAL VARIANCE EXPLAINED	40.8%	33.7%

In general, our research predictions are confirmed. Family background variables, social status characteristics and personal values namely sense of power and ambition-achievement work values, are related to family values orientation, as Table 3 illustrates. The regression analysis for men accounted for 40.8 per cent of the variance and the regression analysis for married women accounted for 33.7 per cent of the variance.

Examining the results of the regression on the sample of married men first in more detail shows:

Family Background Variables

Traditional socialization made the strongest contribution (Beta .235). This relationship was in the predicted direction; that is, where the family of origin encouraged autonomy and independence, as defined, in terms of allowing young adults to leave home when they wanted and engage in pre-marital sexual behaviour, this was associated with a less traditional family value orientation. Conversely coming from a family which discouraged children from leaving home and attempted to prohibit pre-marital sexual behaviour was associated with more traditional values.

A family of origin in which there appeared to be high "inter-generational tension" was significantly related to a low traditional family value orientation. (It should perhaps be noted that whilst this variable is significant in the regression the discrepancy between the beta weight .135 and the zero-order correlation .058 suggests the relationship is very much dependent upon the other variables within the regression equation).

Turning to the demographic variables - coming from an English speaking country of origin as predicted was related to less traditional family values.

Contrary to expectations father's education and father's occupation were not directly related to family value orientation despite the zero order correlations of .137 for father's education and .213 for father's occupation. The strong correlations between education of respondent and father's occupation .349 and father's education .256 partially explain why these two variables, though related to family value orientation in the predicted direction, were not significant in the regression.

Social Status Characteristics

As predicted education level, religion and religious observance made strong contributions to family value orientation. The betas obtained indicate that a less traditional family value orientation was more typical of men who had higher education levels, of those who indicated no religious affiliation and low religiosity. Conversely men with lower education, those who nominated a religion and who had greater religiosity were more likely to hold traditional family values. Contrary to expectations, socio-economic status as measured by respondent's occupation was not directly related to family value orientation.

For men, having a wife in the paid workforce or sharing economic responsibility was not independently related to a less traditional family value orientation. However, Table 3 shows that as predicted, for women being in the workforce and contributing economically to the family was associated with less traditional family values. This suggests that women who work out of economic necessity may become more liberal in their family values and egalitarian in their outlook towards sex roles, whereas this does not lead to any shift in husband's attitudes.

Unexpectedly, age was found to make a significant independent contribution to family value orientation. Younger men are more traditional in their family value orientation than older married men (and it will be noted the same applies for women as shown in Table 3). Considering the narrow age range of the sample this is surprising. There are several possible explanations. Firstly, that this relationship is related to length of marriage. However, the correlation between length of marriage and family value orientation is only .04 so length of marriage seems an unlikely explanation. Secondly, that result may be related to age at marriage. The correlation between age at marriage and conservatism in family values for men is $-.127$ ($p.015$) which suggests that this is a partial explanation. Nevertheless, considering the birth cohorts in the sample range from 1948 to

1964, it is tempting to suggest a slight cohort effect. The upper half of the age range were part of the youth of the 1960's generation which produced the social movements of the period: student unrest, the anti-war movement, counter culture values and the beginnings of the women's movement. The younger half of the sample have lived with the results of the cultural changes brought about by that period of change.

The significance of age combined with inter-generational tension may be related to age at marriage or be specific to the post-war generation and the clash of values which occurred between youth and the wider society during the sixties and seventies. This may have heightened the tension usually experienced between adolescents and parents in the process of separating from family of origin. Affluence and education enabled the young to afford to be independent, and their greater level of education undermined parental authority and traditional family values.

Family atmosphere, therefore, as an influence is difficult to interpret, since it is not possible to separate inter-generational strains due to the time period we are studying, from the individual personality clashes due to other family dynamics.

Personal Values

Having a high sense of power or efficacy over one's life as predicted is independently related to less traditional values. Conversely having a low sense of power and low feelings of efficacy or control over one's life is associated with a traditional family value system.

The strong independent relationship between ambition-achievement work values and family value orientation (beta .175) whilst in the predicted direction is higher than anticipated. This two item scale correlates with coming from a migrant background,

lower education, having a blue collar occupation, and having a low sense of power in married men, which suggests it is strongly related to desires for upward social mobility through acquiring wealth rather than education, as discussed earlier. The relationship between an ambitious-achievement work ethic and traditional family values is consistent with other American research which has found a decline in the achievement work ethic, and a reevaluation of competitiveness amongst sections of the younger, well educated groups in the community (Veroff 1982, Yankelovitch 1981). However, a better measure of values and priorities regarding work, family and social status is necessary to understand the changes occurring in these areas and how they interrelate.

Results concerning Table 3 - the regression analysis on the sample of married women. The results for men and women are very similar, so they will not be discussed in detail. This similarity indicates that our general prediction that there would be no differences between men and women in the antecedents and correlates of family values orientation was borne out with two exceptions, (father's education, women's work force participation)

This finding is consistent with our earlier findings that there were no significant differences in sex role orientation amongst married men and women (Glezer 1984), and also the findings of Heiss (1978).

The only two variables which were independently related to family values orientation for young married women but not men were:-

1. Father's education: As predicted this was associated with less traditional family values. This trend is consistent with the results of Thornton et al (1982) who found father's education was a predictor of sex role egalitarianism. It

would appear that having a well educated father leads to growing up in a household with more egalitarian sex role values and probably higher aspirations educationally for young women who will adopt less traditional family values (Correlation between father's education and respondent's education .265 (p.000).

2. Being in the workforce: This variable, whilst not being significant for men was independently related to less traditional values in married women as discussed previously.

SUMMARY

The following groups of young married Australians showed a significantly less traditional family value orientation in their attitudes:-

Family Background Variables

- . those who perceived their family of origin atmosphere as having high inter-generational tension
- . those who perceived their family of origin as encouraging them to be autonomous and independent in that they could leave home when they wished and there was no prohibiting of pre-marital sexual behaviour

- . those who came from an English speaking country of origin

and for women, but not men:-

- . those whose father had a higher education.

Social Status Characteristics

- . those who belong to birth cohorts born earlier in the post-war period
- . those who have no religious affiliation
- . those who have low religiosity
- . those who have higher levels of education

and for females

- . those who are employed in the workforce.

Personal Values

- . those who have a high sense of power or competence and efficacy over their lives
- . those who do not admit to valuing ambition and achievement in work.

Conversely, traditional family values are held by the following groups of young Australian marrieds:-

Family Background Variables

- . those who came from a family of origin with low inter-generational tensions where they felt happy and accepted
- . those whose family emphasized traditional values regarding family formation patterns - staying at home until marriage, not engaging in pre-marital sexual behaviour
- . those who came from a non-English speaking country of origin
- . for women, those whose father did not have a higher education.

Social Status Characteristics

- . those who are younger, born later in the post-war period
- . those who have a religious affiliation
- . those who are higher in religiosity

- . those who have lower education levels
- . for women, those who are "housewives", not in the paid workforce.

Personal Values

- . those who have a lower sense of power or control over their lives
- . those who have a high achievement work ethic.

PART 111

THE FAMILY ATTITUDES OF YOUNG MARRIED
AUSTRALIAN MEN AND WOMEN

Having established some of the antecedents and correlates of family value orientation the next step is to determine the extent to which non-traditional family attitudes have been adopted by young married Australians.

According to the FVS young Australians differ significantly in their attitudes towards family in the following areas:-

- the importance and meaning of marriage
- tolerance towards living together and being single
- the importance of children and motherhood
- individualism in marriage
- sex roles
- tolerance of divorce
- authoritarianism-conservatism
- fidelity in marriage.

- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE -

Table 4 contains the 21 items which make up the FVS, plus some additional attitude items related to the area of family values this paper is considering.

Discussion will focus on the agreement levels for the total sample of married men and married women, although for interest

the table contains cross-tabulations according to whether respondents are traditional, moderate and non-traditional as defined in Part I of this paper. In addition relevant case study material relating to the content of the attitude items will be included to help elucidate and clarify the issues being considered. This is done through a selection of some of the case study interviews which illustrate differences in traditional and non-traditional respondents. The selection has been made on the basis of the FVS scores in the larger study. The selected non-traditional respondents have scores in the bottom quartile of the FVS distribution whilst the traditional respondents have scores in the top quartile of the FVS distribution, in other words they represent the extreme ends of the scale. The remaining fifty per cent of the respondents who are clustered around the mean of the distribution are designated moderates.

It should be noted that the only items where there were no significant differences between either extreme on the FVS and the other attitude items discussed in this paper were that "marriage provides love warmth and happiness", but also the item that "people take one another for granted after they marry". It is widely approved by young marrieds irrespective of family value orientation that "husbands should help with the housework". Divorce for couples when they both really want it is also agreed to by the majority of young married Australians.

The meaning and importance of marriage

For young Australian married couples marriage means love, warmth and happiness (Men 93 per cent, Women 89 per cent). They appear to have very traditional views towards the institution of marriage believing that one's really important relationships are in one's own home (Men 88 per cent, Women 85 per cent). It would appear that for a large proportion of young marrieds, marriage still provides "a haven in a heartless world" (Lasch 1979). This is indicated in quotations from case studies on marriage from

respondents who range from being very traditional in their family values to those who are non-traditional.

"Our marriage has always been strong and I think for that reason we both turn back into it at times of stress. It's an island of peace and calm in the day to day world. Somethng you can retire to and where you can leave everything behind. That is if you pick the right person and I did. It's a non-threatening situation completely removed from what you do outside the house". (Non-Traditional Male)

"Marriage is about companionship, acceptance on an unvarying basis, a reliable acceptance, sex, affection, close sharing of minds and interests - it is very important to develop interests together. You need common beliefs and value systems, complete openness and trust, something that is stable and constant in a world of constant upheavals". (Traditional Male)

"Marriage - it's a total commitment I've made for as long as I live or he lives. I don't care what anyone else says about marriage, as far as I'm concerned it's the be all and end all, that's it, there's no easy way out, you make your bed and you lie in it whether you like it or not. You make it work". (Traditional Female)

"Marriage, its just two people working together for what they both want, at least what they think they want. Trying to make something of our all too short a time on earth I suppose, without each other we'd probably get along just as happily and as well but perhaps not quite so enriched for not knowing the other person". (Non-Traditional Female)

"We are actually mates, husband and wife and mates as well. I think that is what has cemented our marriage. The fact that we can joke together and stir each other up". (Moderate Male).

"Security, companionship, contentment perhaps with a little bit of happiness thrown in that's about all". (Moderate Female)

Just over three-quarters of married men and women agree that marriage is for life, which leaves the remaining one quarter of respondents (who tend to be non-traditional) either dubious about marriage meaning "till death do us part" or realistic in their recognition that one in four marriages in Australia end in divorce and the projected rate of marital breakdown of current marriages is around forty per cent (McDonald, 1984).

Most young marrieds - 8 out of 10 - believe marriage develops a sense of responsibility they wouldn't otherwise have, which indicates marriage is still seen as a rite de passage. McDonald (1984) pointed out that the meaning of marriage has changed in that it no longer signifies for the current generation a leaving of their family of origin, a beginning of sexual relationships or the beginning of living together with their partner. However, it seems to have retained a symbolic meaning in terms of commitment, maturity and taking on responsibilities.

"Marriage is about responsibility in lots of ways and I suppose you could say tolerance. The world doesn't revolve around yourself, you have to bend. You have to sacrifice a lot to your marriage. You have to give up a lot of things you don't want to give up". (Non-Traditional Male)

"Marriage is about responsibility in lots of ways - moneywise, financially, family wise. The responsibility of having a child and caring for it and really learning that you have to put other people before you. Normally before you marry it's only what you want and what you feel, whereas once you've married it's what your husband wants and what your child needs". (Traditional Female)

Whilst there is strong support for the ideal of marriage only just over half the men and around 39 per cent of women believe that married people are happier than those who go through life without getting married. It appears men feel more positive about marriage than women do, which supports Jessie Bernard's thesis that men gain more from marriage than women do (Bernard 1972). This is borne out in the case study material where there are significant differences in marital satisfaction between men and women. However, this seems very much dependent upon family life cycle stage; there are no significant differences between men and women on marital satisfaction prior to having children (Kotler 1984).

There is evidence of disillusionment and accommodation and adaptation to that disillusionment, an acceptance of reality:-

"Marriage is two people rubbing along well most of the time but flaring up now and then". (Moderate Female)

"Life wasn't meant to be easy! It's a very hard road to take marriage. It's very easy to get married but to make a marriage work is very difficult". (Non-Traditional Male)

"I don't think it's probably a very brilliant relationship in the way we relate to each other, but I think it's probably a lot better than a lot of other people's". (Non-Traditional Female)

"It's a close loving marriage. I never look elsewhere to see if I could do better. I haven't any real grievances, there are things I'd like to change but I accept him". (Traditional Female)

It should be noted that whilst women may not believe that married people are happier than those who are single, half the men and women in the survey sample would be frightened to be single at forty. Respondents with traditional values are more likely to be

negative about being single than those with non-traditional views, perhaps indicating a greater need for the emotional security provided by marriage. As one traditional male expressed it:-

"I wouldn't like to face life without my wife and kids - life would be meaningless".

Considering some of the correlates of traditional family values, such as lower education, low sense of power, it can be seen how family is a source of pride, identity and accomplishment.

Three out of four young marrieds agreed that it is acceptable for couples to live together without planning to marry. However, 47 per cent of the young married men and 64 per cent of the young married women believe there is a lack of personal security when you live together. It would appear that there exists a greater tolerance of accepting non-traditional life styles for others and some ambivalence when the experience is related to one's own personal life, especially for women.

Children and marriage

Seventy-seven per cent of men believe children are an attraction of marriage but fewer women agree with this statement (71 per cent). Over 8 out of 10 married men and women believe you can have a satisfying relationship without children. These findings give support to Aries' (1980) suggestion that there is a decline in the value of children, for many young marrieds the marital dyad taking precedence. This is consistent with the demographic trends towards fertility decline, delaying childbearing and the high utilization of sterilization procedures amongst young married Australians (Caldwell 1982).

The importance of children in marriage varies on whether the respondent is traditional or non-traditional in family value orientation. Those with strong traditional views place far greater emphasis on the importance of children.

"I can't see life without marriage. It is my whole life and the children are part of it. I can always work, I can always get another job but marriage and family comes before everything. Its happy, hopeful, fruitful and satisfying".
(Traditional Male)

"Our marriage ... it's got better and better. Having the children made the difference. Just by having our own children and that we made them, it's something that is part of her and me. Yes and I was there when she had them and that all helps and everything". (Traditional Male)

"Marriage is vital to me mainly because of the children. Binds it together even further so the necessity of marriage is absolutely vital. The companionship we have exceeds the sexual life of our marriage. It all goes hand in hand - children, companionship and building towards the future. The children are probably the most important thing in our marriage ... but it is not a matter of being reliant upon the children to make the marriage work. We still enjoy life together and brought into the world two beautiful children and are bringing them up into a good home life and working towards giving them a good future". (Traditional Male)

Those with non-traditional views are more likely to express doubts about having children and those with liberal views who are parents speak nostalgically about their relationship prior to children.

Some quotes from non-traditional respondents:-

"My wife at the moment is being confronted by some issues

which are really fundamental to her being a woman ... the issue whether or not to have children". (Non-Traditional Male) "We have been fortunate we have had seven years without children so if you don't know each other after seven years you never will. Tension is creeping in because she is starting to think she'd like to start a family and I am thinking crumbs I'm too old so I try to avoid it ... as life goes on you think why the disruption". (Non-Traditional Male)

"Children are not what we got married for. We didn't get married with the intention of having children - well some people want children, we didn't". (Non-Traditional Female)

"Children are more important than you realise before you have them. The marriage tends to be children and it seems to get built around them. It works the opposite to what you think. You could have a marriage without them that would be different". (Non-Traditional Female)

"Say for instance if we had been brought up as Catholics we would have accepted the children in a different light, reacted differently to them". (Non-Traditional Female)

"Before we decided to have children we were extremely close. We really felt we had reached the time in our life where we wanted to do something with the relationship. It was a selfish sort of one, no longer a self-fulfilling sort of relationship, we wanted to add to it with children". (Non-Traditional Female)

In attempting to explain the current fertility decline Aries (1980) suggested that:

"Couples and individuals no longer plan life in terms of the child and his personal future... This does not mean that the child has disappeared from such plans; but that he fits into them as one of the various components that make it possible for adults to blossom as individuals. His existence therefore is related to plans for a future in which he is no longer the essential variable". (Aries 1980 p.650)

This quote seems particularly applicable to those with non-traditional values, the affluent, well educated young couples where both husbands and wives have career options. However, as the case study material illustrates, those with lower socio-economic status and high aspirations of upward social mobility for themselves and their children place great emphasis on "working towards giving them a good future".

For most couples the following quote probably summarizes how children are viewed by parents:-

"Marriage - I think that by having children you strengthen it to a degree. You've got something to strive for, if you didn't have children I think marriage would be a little shallow at times, but having children sort of binds you together". (Moderate Female)

Oral contraception was introduced into Australia in 1961. The generation we are studying have grown up with the availability of effective fertility control and until the mid-seventies economic prosperity.

The choice to have or not have a child is a pragmatic one, not the serendipitous choice it often was for previous generations. Availability of effective contraception, the increase in the proportion of married women in the workforce and acceptance of women working, plus the recent economic recession, which makes it often essential for women to contribute financially to the

marriage, have led to a reevaluation of motherhood:-

"It was better when she was working, there were two wages coming in, now with one we are struggling just keeping our head above water". (Traditional Male)

Less than half the young marrieds agreed that motherhood is a woman's most important role in life and only a third believed that women achieve fulfillment through motherhood. As previous IFS research has shown the importance of motherhood has significantly declined for young married Australians between 1971 and 1982. Both husbands and wives recognize that women need a broader definition of themselves than biological functioning.

However, whilst there is no idealization of motherhood in young Australian couples, a high proportion (80 per cent men 73 per cent women) still believe you need two parents to bring up a child and men are more tolerant of having children outside of marriage than women (55 per cent men 46 per cent women).

Sex Roles

As mentioned earlier there have been significant shifts towards egalitarian sex role attitudes in the areas of domestic role sharing and sharing economic responsibility between 1971 and 1982 in young married women. There is little difference between the views of married men and women in 1982. However, case study material shows that actual behavioural shifts in terms of sharing household tasks appear to lag behind the attitudinal shifts (Glezer 1984). This is similar to the findings of other researchers, as mentioned by Robert Lewis earlier this morning. (Lewis 1984)

One area which has remained highly traditional concerns the husband's role as "protector". Eighty-five per cent of men and 83 per cent of women agreed with the statement that "A husband should provide protection for his wife".

In the area of economic responsibility, or work and marriage, males are less likely than females to feel that a wife should go where her husband wants her to go for his job, implying that this should be a joint decision - there was an illustration of this within case study material:

"For example if my work were to take us somewhere we would both consider where we would get work. He wouldn't expect me to follow him interstate just because he was going there, he wouldn't want the sort of person who could just agree to do it". (Non-Traditional Women)

Husbands however, were more likely to support the notion that "wives should only work if they have to" which seems to indicate that husbands consider that they should be the primary breadwinner. The high support from women for the notion that "Marriage gives you economic security" (Men 55 per cent women 70 per cent) seems to give credence to the idea that there is an acceptance of a modified traditional view of male-female roles concerning economic responsibility, with women sharing responsibility but playing a secondary role. Case study material seems to support this view. Considerable tension over the area of work, marriage and children emerges in these interviews. There is evidence that some men find the loss of their primacy in this role difficult, but at the same time, there appears to be an expectation that women will help financially as the economic situation demands it:-

"I think a woman's income should be a source of extra money... a while back we were having a bit of a problem with finances, instead of my wife's earnings being the source of extra income it was a necessity, and then of course you get

used to the money. Now she doesn't have to work but she wants to. God didn't say bloody women have got to work. There were a few years when she didn't work and that was great I was coming home from work to find someone there". (Moderate Male) "I think that she might like to work and leave me home doing the housework and looking after the kids. Wouldn't every women like to do that with their husband"? (Moderate Male)

"I think he finds it very hard to accept my working. I'm bringing in a good income and the fact that I enjoy my work... He would rather be the sole breadwinner. I think that it is just part of his make up and male pride". (Non-Traditional Female)

"I would like her to maybe work part-time to spend more time at home and have more time to sit with me in the evening and just talk, watch TV, play records, whatever as long as we were together. We'll never get to that stage while she's under pressure at work". (Non-Traditional Male)

"I think that part of our relationship is that we do things together. I couldn't envisage a marriage lasting in my lifestyle with a woman who went off to work. I don't think it could be sustained". (Traditional Male)

"I think in another few years when the kids are older. I would expect her to probably go out and do something constructive and hopefully bring in a bit of income into the home. If she sat around and played tennis and went to tea parties every day I'd get cranky". (Traditional Male)

The importance of economic independence and work as a source of identity and self-esteem for women is recognized by both husbands and wives:-

"I work part-time and I think I'm a better mother because of that. Because I have a break from her, whereas I see a lot of my girlfriends, who are mothers full-time they lose their sense of individuality because they're just always home with the child. My job gives me a sense of freedom. It means I can afford to spend that little bit more on say myself or my daughter". (Traditional Female) "She misses work, working, she gets a bit bored at times staying home and that. I reckon she misses her work and having a life of her own. She's tied down more than me". (Traditional Male)

She has expressed a desire to work part-time. I think the main thing with her is being housebound. She feels she loses contact with the outside world and she has said that she has a fear of not being able to carry on a conversation other than about children and motherhood and things like that". (Moderate Male)

"I think not working she feels dependent. I'm the breadwinner and I don't like the term, it's not my money coming to the house even though I've earned. It's ours". (Non-Traditional Male)

"Since giving up work the one thing I resent is that I don't have my own money. I feel it is what he has given me which is a silly attitude because he is not tight-fisted in anything. He is the opposite". (Non-Traditional Female)

"I must admit I'm thankful that I've got a job and that extra income, because I like my own little bit of security". (Non-Traditional Female)

In the area of domestic responsibility there is little support for men making the important decisions and strong support for men helping with housework. From the point of view of attitudinal

support it would appear that the notion of domestic role sharing is accepted but as previous research has demonstrated the gap between attitudes and behaviour is often great. Men support the idea of sharing domestic responsibilities but in practice often do little.

Looking at case study material this is well demonstrated. However, the overriding influence of family life cycle stage must be acknowledged. Couples share domestic responsibilities with the wife doing most of the organization, when they are both in the workforce prior to having children. This situation changes once the husband becomes the sole breadwinner then he tends to help when asked or when the wife "needs a hand".

Individualism and Marriage

Turning now to an often raised area of concern - the problem of individualism and marriage. "You should put the interests of your spouse and children above your own" was one of the attitude items included in the family values scale, and it was the item that discriminated most between men and women, with women being less likely to agree. Seventy-seven per cent of men agreed whereas only just over half the wives agreed (54 per cent). This particular item was also included in the General Social Survey - Australian Families (1975). This survey indicated 74 per cent agreement to this statement by men aged 18 - 29 years in 1975, and 70 per cent agreement by women aged 18 - 29 years. It appears between 1975 and 1982 a significant shift has occurred in the views of young women concerning self assertion. Traditionally the wife's role in marriage was to submerge her own needs, interests and ambitions and obtain vicarious gratification through the success and happiness of her husband and children. Her role was that of an angel of consolation as one traditional woman expressed it:-

"I build him up all the time, because really out there in the business world, and with the children its the same, out in the world, they are battered a lot. You know, they are not told they are terrific and that they are great. He once went through a hard time at work and he was just really battered, his self-esteem was low and so forth, so I always made a fuss of him... The type of help he needs is usually for me to listen to him or to shield him from things that happen with the children". (Traditional Woman)

The rhetoric of the women's movement, the expanded opportunities educationally, occupationally and economically for women, seem to have combined and changed women's consciousness about their desire for autonomy and equality or increased their willingness to admit their personal needs and these views are expressed in case study material far more by women than by men, usually but not always by non-traditional women. These women voice their dissatisfaction and concern over their individual needs for career versus motherhood or just a longing for less responsibility and more freedom:-

"I've decided that I'm an individual too, and I sort of push for my side more than I used to. Now the kids are at school I can see that I sort of have got a life to live as well". (Non-Traditional Female)

"I suppose I resent a lot being tied to children. Terrible thing to say, but I think I find that my greatest adjustment to make. The children seem to be my responsibility and I can't go ahead with the type of life, working and everything else. I've got to consider the children before I do anything and the male member of the household can go ahead with his life and not have to worry too much". (Non-Traditional Female)

"Sometimes I wish I could be free of all encumbrances, have no needs at all, just be me and go and live... in fact of course I'd have to take the kids I suppose... but I would like to be free of their needs, but I don't think I am a strong enough person for that". (Non-Traditional Female)

"I'm mostly a fairly happy sort of person. I get frustrated at times but mainly because of my role as professional versus mother. I find that a real problem. Guilt about my leaving the baby and wanting to get back to work. I'm unsettled at the moment - it's this ambivalence about working and not working and mothering and not mothering. My husband's very supportive of my going back to work but I'm feeling a certain amount of guilt about it". (Non-Traditional Female)

Whilst much has been written about the "me generation", the narcissism and individualism of the post-war generation, (Lasch 1979, Yankelovitch 1981) these results seem to suggest that men are becoming more family centred and women are asserting their own self interest, or expressing their conflicts over their personal individual needs versus the traditional woman's role.

Divorce

Macklin's (1980) definition of the traditional family includes the words "legal lifelong marriage" (p.905) and three-quarters of these young marrieds would be devastated if their spouse mentioned divorce. They do however agree that "A couple should be able to get a divorce if they both want to" (85 per cent men 93 per cent women). However, whilst there is support for the idea of divorce being readily available if both parties want it, 58 per cent of women and 48 per cent of men believe divorce is too easy to get. There appears to be an insecurity among young marrieds about the ease and accessibility of the current no fault divorce laws.

Case study material indicates that respondents are aware of the fact that marriage has become a rather tenuous relationship, and divorce is an issue they think about:-

Sometimes I think well blow it, I'd be better off on my own doing things that I wanted to rather than being tied down here then I sort of think - well I can't do that... there's no way... for the kids' sake more than anything. I would prefer to stick it out security wise for the kids because I know from girlfriends trying to survive financially is rather difficult". (Non-Traditional Female)

"We are both family orientated and both grew up in broken homes. I think you tend to definitely learn through seeing other people's mistakes. (Traditional Male)

"One of my views is that marriage is for having children and if you are going to take on the responsibility you don't just shrug it off at the first bump you come across and desert the children and your wife. My wife and I fully expect to have problems, who knows she might fall in love with Joe the milkman and I might fall in love with a little lady from work. For that we have to be on guard, against that, it does happen and if it does then we've got to look very carefully, at what the effect will be on our children as well as our own lives". (Non-Traditional Male)

"At times you might think of opting out, but it's not that serious that you would, because of course its going to affect the children, even if you are fighting the whole time, you say it's going to be better for the children staying together, but certainly our fighting is not at that stage". (Non-Traditional Female)

"I work in an industry where marriages can go like the wind. I am not like that. I need the stability. I need to have a home and she does too so I think that more than anything else

will keep us together. The fact we have achieved a substantial home, assets and an emotional base".
(Traditional Male)

Fidelity in Marriage

Most young Australian couples believe in fidelity in marriage - only twenty per cent of men and fifteen per cent of women believe that they should not always expect their partner to be faithful and vice versa.

Conservatism/Authoritarianism

A third of our sample believe that "People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually end up causing trouble" (Men 34 per cent, women 30 per cent). Approximately forty per cent of young marrieds believe in the importance of teaching children absolute obedience to their parents.

Whilst acknowledging there is a growing pluralism in lifestyles and family types, this study has focussed on those who have maintained a commitment to the institution of marriage. The majority of young Australians between 20 - 34 marry. Therefore this is the sector of the population whose family value orientation will play a major part in influencing the values of the next generation.

It is worth stressing as Taubin & Mudd 1983 (p.266) argue that "To seek to categorize families into traditional and non-traditional is far too simplistic and fosters an undesirable and unrealistic polarity". As we have seen, people's attitudes fall along a continuum from those who have a fixed conventional view of family and society to those with a pluralistic "progressive" "process-oriented" value system (Scanzoni 1983). A person's position on the continuum is dependent upon their family's socio-economic background and values, religious affiliations, an individual's education level and the sense of power or control a person feels over his/her life.

As Scanzoni (1983) and others (Yankelovitch 1981, Heiss 1978, D'Antonio 1983) have noted, there has been a movement away from conventional or traditional values concerning the family. Most people are now in the "unaligned majority" (Scanzoni 1983) or make up "the middle ground" (Berger & Berger 1983). In some ways by studying those who have married, this study focusses on "the middle ground" or the group Taubin & Mudd (1983) refer to as the "contemporary traditionals". Research has indicated that most of those with very traditional views are in the minority, just as those with more liberal individualistic "progressive" views are in the minority. The "drift" from traditional values occurs "at a differing pace for different aspects of family life" (Heiss 1978) and also at a differing pace for men and women, and different sections of the population.

Regarding the differences between men and women of the post-war generation, we may note that there are relatively few divergences between young husbands and wives. Basically women are less traditional in areas which have the effect of increasing their autonomy and equality, which is consistent with structural changes in workforce participation and the ideology of the women's movement. At the same time, however, they are more traditional than men in areas that might threaten their security. Women accept the idea of couples living together without planning to marry, but believe that one lacks emotional security when living together. They believe people should be able to divorce if both parties of the marriage want to, but feel divorce is too easy to get. On items to do with sex role egalitarianism, and putting one's interests above those of spouse and children they are in agreement, but at the same time women marry for economic security and want a husband to "protect" them.

Men are adapting to the changes in sex role attitudes in their spouses and agree that women need a broader definition of themselves. There appears to be some tension, not only evident in attitudinal data but in case study material, about the decline in men's status as breadwinner. However, men are accepting sharing the breadwinning role, albeit reluctantly in some cases. The motives for this acceptance are probably due to the economic reality of surviving on one income for some, and for others reaping the benefits of higher living standards brought about by two incomes.

In summary it may be helpful to outline the following generalized portraits of the young marrieds at opposite ends of our continuum. A portrait of the more "progressive" less traditional young married Australian would reveal someone from a middle class background, brought up in a non-religious home, perhaps a home with "liberal" values or a home where there were clashes between peer and parental values during adolescence. He/She is well educated, has high self-esteem and a sense of power or control over life (except for periods for the wives when feeling

housebound with young children). Having done well there is no need to feel particularly ambitious about work achievement.

In the progressive marriage the marital relationship seems to take precedence over the parent-child relationships. Partners acknowledge the need for "personal space" and "growth". They are tolerant and flexible in their attitudes concerning alternate life styles and have a pluralistic view of family including such arrangements as having children outside marriage and not expecting fidelity in marriage. Whether this tolerance is indicative of a predisposition to behave in non-traditional ways however remains to be seen.

When attempting to describe those who adhere to traditional views of family, taking into consideration case study material two distinct pictures emerge:-

Firstly, the young husband or wife, who has come from a working class background, has less than average education, may be religious, has a low sense of self-esteem and is struggling financially. For the husband marriage and family give him a definition of himself and pride in his status of being a parent and a "good provider" and for his wife her belief in herself comes from "keeping a good home and being a good mum". Life is about doing your best "to give the kids a chance".

The other hypothetical portrait of the traditional marriage is one where both are from a lower middle class background, possibly religious, sometimes from a migrant background, without tertiary education, but both husband and wife have a strong ambition to achieve and progress materially, make a success out of life, and see their children get ahead.

For both these groups of traditional young marrieds marriage is seen as providing security and children are an essential aspect of marriage. The family comes before one's own interests, except for those traditional men who are doing well and succeeding

"business wise" when "for the family's sake" work tends to take priority. Wives are expected to help out financially as the children get older, and men expect to give a hand with the housework.

SUMMARY

The overall view of marriage and family that emerges is that there is a strong support for marriage but a realistic appreciation of how difficult it is to live up to one's ideal notion of marriage. Marriage is seen as developing a sense of maturity and responsibility, a commitment to others, not lightly set aside.

Children are important, but not essential aspects of marriage. These findings coincide with Aries' (1980) view that as there is opportunity for self development, the importance of living for the future through children has declined.

The relationship between the sexes has shifted to a more egalitarian shared basis, biology is no longer destiny, both husbands and wives accept that women need a broader definition of themselves.

Economic responsibility is no longer solely seen as a male role, although there is little evidence to suggest that marriage is seen as an equal partnership (Scanzoni, 1983) in this area. The wife tends to work for additional required income and/or self fulfillment and identity.

There are high expectations of sharing domestic responsibilities within marriage but the male role of protecting his wife and children remains largely unchallenged. Although as indicated in prior research (Glezer 1984) the domestic responsibility falls on the wife's shoulders. What is in fact emerging is a modified traditional conception of family with more interchangeability of roles.

There is a trend towards accepting informal marriage and a single life style, and acceptance of those who have children outside marriage. In other words, an acceptance of the structural

changes that have been emerging within the society in recent times. There is a move towards a more pluralistic view of families.

Amongst young wives there has been a dramatic drop in support for the idea that "People should consider the needs of their spouse as more important than their own" which suggests that the ideology of the women's movement has made women better able to identify and articulate their personal, individual needs.

TABLE 1: Multiple Regression Analysis for Married Males.

Independent Variables	Beta	Correlation	Significance
<u>Family Background Variables</u>			
Father's education (High)	.015	.137	N.S.
Father's occupation (White Collar)	.080	.213	N.S.
Country of birth (Non-English speaking)	.130	.331	.021
Home atmosphere (High tension)	.135	.058	.01
Traditional socialization (non-traditional)	.235	.356	.001
			r ² =.224
<u>Social Status Characteristics</u>			
Age (Older)	.123	.225	.026
Religion (No religion)	.141	.309	.018
Religious observance (Low)	.141	.278	.028
Education (High)	.142	.325	.03
Socio-economic status (Respondent's Occupation) (White Collar)	.059	.213	N.S.
Wife in workforce (Wife working)	.097	.131	N.S.
			r ² =.131
<u>Aspects of Personality</u>			
Sense of power (High)	.114	.259	.045
Work achievement orientation (Low)	.175	.279	.0005
			r ² =.052
TOTAL r ² = .407			
ADJ. r ² = .373			

In reporting of all multiple regression analyses, signs have been omitted from beta weights and correlation coefficients and the direction of influence indicated in parenthesis beside the variable name, because arbitrary numerical coding is not in itself informative.

TABLE 2: Multiple Regression Analysis for Married Females

Independent Variables	Beta	Correlation	Significance
<u>Family Background Variables</u>			
Father's Education (High)	.107	.195	.021
Father's Occupation (White collar)	.069	.180	N.S
Country of Birth (English speaking)	.127	.254	.005
Home Atmosphere (High tension)	.126	.099	.004
Traditional Socialization (Non-traditional)	.162	.236	.0003
			r ² = .168
<u>Social Status Characteristics</u>			
Age (Older)	.130	.123	.003
Religion (No religion)	.141	.281	.002
Religious Observance (Low)	.113	.205	.01
Education (High)	.144	.284	.002
Socio-economic status (Husbands occupation) (White collar)	.027	.214	N.S
Respondent in workforce (Woman working)	.087	.117	.04
			r ² = .118
<u>Aspects of Personality</u>			
Sense of power (High)	.103	.302	.03
Work Achievement Orientation (Low)	.183	.287	.0001
			r ² = .050
TOTAL r ² = .336			
ADJ. r ² = .313			

In the reporting of all multiple regression analyses, signs have been omitted from beta weights and correlation coefficients and the direction of influence indicated in parenthesis beside the variable name, because arbitrary numerical coding is not in itself informative.

TABLE 4: Agreement levels of married men and women (18-34 years) to attitude items relating to marriage and family.
(Items expressed in percentage agree/disagree)

Item	Non Trad.		Moderate		Traditional		Total	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<u>Marriage</u>								
Marriage provides love, warmth & happiness.	85	78	92	90	99	95	93	89
Marriage is for life.*	47	43	79	79	98	99	78	77
Married people are happier than those who go through life without getting married.*	14	11	52	33	85	71	54	39
Marriage gives you economic security.	38	54	55	66	68	88	55	70
Marriage develops a sense of responsibility in you that you wouldn't have otherwise.	60	55	88	83	95	92	84	79
People take one another for granted after they marry.	44	37	49	41	44	41	46	40
Having children is an attraction of marriage.	65	55	71	73	94	80	77	71
One's really important relationships are within one's home.*	72	64	90	87	98	99	88	85

.../2.

Item	Non Trad.		Moderate		Traditional		Total	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$	\$
<u>Individualism</u>								
People should consider the needs of their spouse & children as more important than their own.*	43	21	83	52	94	84	7700	5400
<u>Children & Motherhood</u>								
People can have a satisfying relationship without children.*	99	98	94	92	66	70	8600	8700
You need two parents to bring up a child.*	43	50	87	72	96	95	8000	7300
It is alright for people to have children without being married.*	94	73	58	51	23	18	5500	4600
Whatever career a woman may have her most important role in life is still that of becoming a mother.*	7	10	42	43	86	83	4800	4700
A woman is only really fulfilled when she becomes a mother.*	5	6	23	27	57	57	3000	3100
<u>Divorce</u>								
Divorce is too easy to get these days.*	15	27	43	58	77	81	4800	5800

.../3

Item	Non-Trad.		Moderate		Traditional		Total	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
A couple should be able to get a divorce if they both really want to.	93	97	90	94	80	88	87	93
If my spouse mentioned divorce I would be devastated.*	40	52	73	83	93	95	7200	7900
<u>Fidelity</u>								
My partner should not expect me to be always faithful.*	38	35	18	11	11	5	2000	1500
I would not expect my partner to be always faithful.*	38	29	16	13	12	8	2000	1500
<u>Living together & Singlehood</u>								
I would be frightened to be single at 40.*	10	25	52	47	78	84	5100	5300
It is lonely being single.	31	30	38	44	65	59	4500	4500
You miss having close relationships when single.	27	27	34	40	63	53	4300	4100
You miss having children when single.	32	26	48	40	61	61	4700	4300
It is alright for a couple to live together without planning to get married.*	100	96	87	83	48	41	7700	7300

.../4.

Item	Non-Trad.		Moderate		Traditional		Total	
	Women	Men	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
There is a lack of personal security when you live together.	22	50	50	62	60	79	47##	64##
If you live together there is a lot of social disapproval.	18	32	32	44	60	65	37##	47##
<u>Sex Roles in Marriage</u>								
Important decisions should be made by the husband.*	6	3	22	12	53	35	29##	17##
Husbands should regularly help with the housework.	93	84	80	78	79	67	83	76
A husband provides protection for his wife.*	65	55	94	87	98	97	88##	83##
Wives should not work unless they have to.*	24	18	58	42	82	76	58##	46##
A wife should go where husband wants her to go for his job.*	29	39	64	72	77	80	60##	67##
<u>Conservatism-Authoritarianism</u>								
The important thing to teach children is absolute obedience to their parents.*	12	7	40	35	58	71	39##	39##
People who question the old and accepted ways of doing things usually end up causing trouble.*	10	12	31	25	56	54	34##	30##

* included in family values scale.

p= .0001

Scales used in this paper:

1. Home Atmosphere Scale.

Items:

It was pleasant living with my parents and family.

Generally speaking there was nothing good about living at home.*

I felt uncomfortable at home.*

I could always discuss things that were really important to me.

I felt accepted at home.

There were too many arguments when living at home.*

6-item scale:

Scoring: Likert scale from 1 - 5 (Strongly agree through to strongly disagree with don't know as the mid-point, *items reversed).

Reliability: Alpha reliability = .827

Low score = positive attitudes towards home atmosphere and feeling accepted.

2. Traditional family socialization.

Items:

My parents expected me to stay at home until I married.

My parents didn't want me to have sexual relations until I left home.

I felt I could leave home whenever I wanted.

3-item scale:

Scoring: Likert scale from 1 - 5 (Strongly agree through to strongly disagree with don't know as the mid-point, *items reversed).

Reliability: Alpha reliability = .586

Low score = positive attitudes towards staying home until marriage and restriction of autonomy and independence.

3. Sense of Power

Items:

Good luck is more important than hard work for success.

People like me don't have much of a chance to be successful in life.

Every time I try to get ahead, something or somebody stops me.

Failure really breaks you.

4-item scale.

Scoring: Likert scale from 1 - 5 (Strongly agree through to strongly disagree with don't know as the mid-point)

Reliability: Alpha reliability = .52

Low score = low sense of power or control over one's life.

4. Ambition-achievement work ethic scale

Items:

In choosing a husband a woman will do well to put ambition to the top of her list of desirable qualities.

People who don't want promotion in their jobs are weak.

2-item scale:

Scoring: Likert scale from 1 - 5 (Strongly agree through to strongly disagree with don't know as the mid-point).

Reliability: Alpha reliability = .47

Low score = high achievement work ethic.

APPENDIX 2

Description of Independent and Dependent Variables for Multiple Regression Analyses.

Independent Variables

1. Family Background Variables

(i) Demographic Variables

Father's Education

No higher education

Higher education

Father's Occupation

Blue Collar Occupation

White Collar Occupation

Country of birth

English speaking

Non-english speaking

(ii) Perceptions of family of origin

In addition to the demographic variables listed above, two scales measuring attitudes concerning the home atmosphere of the respondents when they growing up were developed - these scales are:

Home atmosphere scale - a 6-item scale with an Alpha reliability of .827. This scale relates to perception of life at home when the respondent was growing up and contains items relating to tension levels, being happy at home and feeling accepted and able to discuss things. High score indicating negative attitude towards family of origin.

Traditional Socialization scale - a 3-item scale with an Alpha reliability of .586. This scale concerns pressures to stay at home until marriage, restrictions on sexual behaviour and feeling

2. Social Status Characteristics

Age	Age in years 18 - 34 years.
Religion	Religious Affiliation No Religious Affiliation
Religious observance	None 1 - 2 times per year 3 - 12 times per year 13 - 52 times per year Over 52 times per year
Wife's workforce participation	Both husband and wife working Wife not working
Education	4th year secondary or less 5th - 6th year secondary Tertiary diploma or degree
Socio-economic status (Husband's occupation)	Blue collar White collar

3. Personal Values Measures(i) Sense of power scale

A 4-item scale with an Alpha Reliability of .52. This scale relates to having a sense of power or control over one's life. High score equals low score of power.

(ii) Ambitions - Achievement work ethic

A 2-item scale with an Alpha Reliability of .48. This scale relates to people wanting promotions at work and women marrying

ambitious husbands. High score equals high ambitions.

4. Dependent Variable

Family Value Scale (Scores range from 30 - 121)

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Major demographic trends affecting family policy

Modernization and family change

by ARLAND THORNTON

This paper is motivated by an interest in one of the most central issues in the social sciences: how modernization influences family structure and relationships. Over the last century a substantial number of propositions have been advanced about the impact of industrialization, urbanization, demographic change, and long-term economic growth on the family. These issues are important both because they are at the center of many social science debates and because modernization and economic development are policy goals of most countries in the world today. A number of countries have been successful in implementing their development goals, and the pace of modernization has been rapid. If the observations of several generations of social scientists are even remotely correct, rapid economic and social development will have important implications for family life.

Many of the propositions developed over the last century concerning the impact of modernization on family life have become part of the accepted wisdom of the general public. Recent research, however, has shown that while some of this accepted wisdom is accurate, much of it is simplistic or misleading. Analyses of historical data bases around the world and recent large-scale surveys in currently developing countries have led to revision of many of these propositions and better specification of the actual processes of change accompanying modernization.

This paper identifies some of the influences of modernization on the family and specifies processes that translate societal level change into the modification of family structure and relationships. To keep

the paper within reasonable bounds it will not consider the entire range of familial subjects but will focus only on interrelationships between parents and children during the transition to adulthood. Specifically, the paper considers the involvement of children in the family economy, the living arrangements of young adults, decisions about marriage, and the autonomy of young people in making important life course decisions.

This paper examines the influence of modernization on the family using a comparative perspective--evaluating and comparing the influence of modernization in Taiwan with its influence in Western European populations, including the overseas European migrant populations. The paper identifies some aspects of family life where the influence of modernization has been remarkably similar in the two cultural areas and other aspects of families where the impact of modernization within the two areas has been quite different. In addition, data from other areas of the world are considered to see if the generalizations drawn from Chinese and Western European settings may be applicable elsewhere.

Conceptual and Methodological Considerations

Important methodological and conceptual issues should be considered before launching into a comparative evaluation of the influence of modernization on family change (Gusfield, 1967). Although many of these considerations are elementary, failure to take them into account has led to the acceptance of unfounded propositions. These issues are spelled out here in order to minimize such errors in the current paper.

Variability Across Traditional Societies

Although social scientists have recognized the importance of societal differences in family structure, appreciation for how long these differences have existed is recent. Research has now demonstrated

that many of the fundamental differences between European and Asian families are long-standing--existing for centuries before any of these societies were transformed by modernization (Hajnal, 1982; Coale et al., 1979). Important differences between Western and Eastern Europe predate the transformations of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (Hajnal, 1965; Wrigley, 1981), and there were long-standing differences between England, the United States, and other Western European countries (MacFarlane, 1979; Furstenberg, 1966). Similarly, important differences exist among the family structures of the major societies of Asia (McDonald, forthcoming; Smith, 1980; Smith et al., 1983). As more detailed research is conducted it is likely that the importance of societal differences among countries and among subgroups within countries will become increasingly apparent.

Because of important differences between traditional (premodern) societies, invoking modernization as an explanation of cross-sectional differences between currently developed and developing societies can be seriously misleading. This can be particularly problematic when comparisons are made between developed European populations and developing Asian populations where the traditional patterns were so dissimilar. For this reason, the examination of actual social change within the same population is likely to be a more useful approach to inferences about social change than cross-sectional comparisons of societies. Also, because of important differences among traditional societies, the trajectory of changes associated with modernization should not be expected to be identical across societies even if the development processes are similar (Goode, 1982; Nimkoff, 1965). Therefore, understanding of the influences of modernization is enhanced

by comparisons of the change process across populations. Further, it is probably a mistake to assume that important preexisting family differences will be obliterated by the forces of modernization. Instead, it is likely that there will continue to be important differences among countries.

Traditional Societies Were Not Necessarily Static

Historical research has documented significant family fluctuations in traditional societies, including important swings in marriage and fertility (Wrigley and Schofield, 1981; Goode, 1982), which were caused by factors independent of modernization. Therefore, it is easy to misinterpret family changes occurring during the early years of modernization as being the result of modernization when their causes are actually located in an earlier period. Consequently, studies documenting familial patterns over an extensive period before modernization are very useful as benchmarks for interpreting subsequent trends.

The experience of Western populations after World War II demonstrates that family patterns in highly developed societies also are not static. During that period there were important--though still not clearly understood--forces causing these populations to experience substantial swings in marriage and childbearing (Roussel and Pesty, 1979; Thornton and Freedman, 1983). It is unsatisfactory to use family patterns existing at any one time point as representing "modern" patterns in a particular society.

Cause and Effect

Understanding the interrelationships between modernization and family change requires consideration of the issue of cause and effect.

Recent research has shown that many Western family patterns that were thought to be the result of modernization actually preceded it (Laslett and Wall, 1972; Furstenberg, 1966; Lantz et al., 1977), and it is quite likely that these traditional family patterns were instrumental to the economic development and modernization that occurred in the West (Goode, 1970, 1982; MacFarlane, 1979; Thadani, 1978). Therefore, it is important to study the interrelationships between modernization and family structure with an approach that explicitly considers the possibility of reciprocal causation. While this approach has explicitly guided the current paper, discussion of the impact of family structure and change on other social and economic developments is beyond the scope of this paper.

Specifying the Processes

Goode (1970, 1982) has stressed that the concepts of industrialization and urbanization are often used as "a kind of grab bag, containing dozens of very different kinds of forces or processes." These general concepts, however, have little usefulness until more specific forces and processes believed to produce changes in traditional family structures are identified. Explanation requires a description of essential characteristics of traditional family patterns, the identification of forces associated with modernization, and the delineation of how these forces impact upon specific aspects of family life.

One goal of this paper is the identification of dimensions of the modernization process that are of importance to changes in intergenerational relationships, the involvement of children in the family economy, and entrance into marriage. Another objective is the

explication of how certain aspects of modernization modify these specific dimensions of family life. The primary factors considered here are shifts in the structure of production, the expansion of education, the increase in income, and urbanization. These aspects of development are singled out for examination here because several studies have shown their importance, and data are available to investigate their influence (Goode, 1982; Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1955; Shorter, 1975; Michael et al., 1980). A more complete understanding of changes in family life should include other structural shifts such as the decline in mortality and the introduction of specific innovations such as radio, television, and contraception, but these will not be considered in detail here.

Adaptation of Traditional Patterns

Modernization does not carry with it an explicit script telling individuals and families how to behave as development proceeds. Instead families and individuals initially respond in the only way they can--in terms of the patterns of behavior and relationships already familiar to them (Kung, 1978; Hareven, 1982). In many instances the traditional forms of behavior are very consistent with the changing environment, and there is little need or pressure to modify them (Gusfield, 1967). In other cases, however, social and economic changes may directly modify traditional family patterns or permit the adoption of innovations and the modification of existing structures. Often, however, these modifications occur slowly because of the complex of beliefs, norms, and power relationships supporting traditional structures and behavior, resulting in considerable time lags (Ogburn and Nimkoff, 1976). In addition, since modernization is not evenly spread across the population, the rapidity of family change often varies by stratum or

Traditional Families

In traditional China and Europe the family was the primary organizational unit for many of the central activities of society, including production, consumption, reproduction, and socialization (Cohen, 1970, 1976; Gallin, 1966; Greenhalgh, 1982; Demos, 1970; Laslett, 1965; Lesthaeghe, 1980; Tilly and Scott, 1978). In the traditional family economy the household organized, directed, and managed its internal sources of labor to produce its means of existence. The family organization of economic production was also evident in most other traditional societies including those of Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Indonesia (Adepoju, 1977; Caldwell, 1982; Hull and Hull, 1977; Ware, 1977). At the same time however, in some societies there was a significant number of laborers who maintained their own households but worked for others (Anderson, 1971; Tilly and Scott, 1978).

Economic scarcity in traditional societies required that all members of most families, including men, women, and children, be engaged in the productive activities of the household. Economic activities were generally allocated along gender and age lines, although the exact allocation of tasks varied across societies. Children were often involved in family production from a very early age, and in many societies the contributions of older children to the household were substantial (Anderson, 1971; Tilly and Scott, 1978; Adepoju, 1977; Ware, 1977; Caldwell, 1982; Tienda, 1979). Traditionally, in both China and the West the older generation maintained control over the family economy as long as they were able to organize and direct its operation (Berkner, 1972; Gallin, 1966; Taeuber, 1970; Tang, 1978). Consequently, the

younger generation in both societies could not become truly economically independent until the father passed the family economic organization on to them or they obtained the financial ability to acquire another economic unit. This type of family structure and a scarcity of numerous economic alternatives outside the family greatly limited the independence of young people (Katz and Davey, 1978; Kett, 1977; Modell et al., 1976; Tilly and Scott, 1978; Cohen, 1976; Gallin, 1966).

Because of the disparity in the status, wealth, and power between parents and children, the transferral of the economic unit from parents to children was a crucial stage in the traditional life course. For many children it marked the transition to independence and full adulthood and for the parents it demarcated retirement. Consequently, the transition was sometimes marked with tension and disagreement as the younger generation often desired an earlier transition than preferred by the parents (Berkner, 1972).

Educational institutions were not an important part of traditional societies. School attendance was not widespread and was subservient to the needs of the family's economic endeavors. Consequently, the educational attainments of children were limited--certainly by the standards of today.

Disease and death were omnipresent in the past and had crucial implications for family life. Many children died in infancy, many mothers died in childbirth, families with small children were often disrupted by the death of one of the parents, and many persons did not live to see their grandchildren (Uhlenberg, 1980; Sullivan, 1983).

High mortality requires high fertility to ensure the replacement of the population. Children were also highly valued by many traditional

families, and it appears that birth control was not known or not acceptable to the majority of people. Consequently, the number of children born to families was fairly large (Knodel, 1977; van de Walle and Knodel, 1980; Caldwell, 1977; 1982; Freedman, 1979; Chang et al., 1981; Coale and Zelnik; 1963).

Although family units were important basic units in both Western European and Chinese society, the size, structure, and composition of Chinese households have differed both ideally and actually from what existed in the West (Hajnal, 1982). The Western model has been primarily a nuclear one; the typical Western household can be characterized as having only one married couple at any give time (Laslett, 1965; MacFarlane, 1979; Shorter, 1975). While there was some extension vertically (with the extent varying across both place and time) with some married couples living with their parents, there was almost no lateral extension to include multiple couples of the same generation living within the household (Zerkner, 1972; Laslett and Wall, 1972).

Unmarried children in the West often did not live with their own parents, but resided in the homes of other, families where they lived and worked as servants (Anderson, 1971; Tilly and Scott, 1978; McIntosh, 1984; Gillis, 1974; Laslett, 1965; Demos, 1970). These arrangements were often temporary with transitions back to the natal family and to other families being quite common. Although the arrangements of servants varied, many received some cash remuneration for their work in addition to their lodging and food. Many of these servants tried to save at least some of their cash payments to help finance their marriages and the establishment of independent households (Hufton, 1981;

Anderson, 1971; Smith, 1981).¹ Although these young people lived apart from their parents, their independence and autonomy was not complete since they resided and worked in households headed by others.

The Chinese family, at least ideally and often actually, was extended vertically to include parents of a young married couple and sometimes extended laterally to include multiple married brothers (Gallin, 1966; Cohen, 1976). The Western custom of children leaving their parental homes to live with others as servants was not typical of Chinese society.² However, in China many children were adopted permanently into other homes as family members (Taeuber, 1970; Gallin, 1966)—a practice that has also been reported for Thailand (Knodel et al., 1982).³

The nature of the dependence of young people was different in China and the West. In Western societies, the nuclear nature of the family dictated that young people could not marry until they had the resources to create and sustain a new economic unit. Since a common way to obtain an economic unit was from one's father and fathers were usually unwilling to give up control early in their own lives, marriage occurred

¹The practice of children living apart from their parents also is common in many African societies. It appears that a large majority of such children in Africa lived with other relatives, while living and working in the households of nonfamily members was very common in Western European populations (Caldwell, 1982; Ware, 1977).

²Children leaving the parental home to live and work in the households of others was also uncommon in India (Hajnal, 1982; Caldwell et al., 1984).

³The number of societies with a mechanism to reallocate children from their parental family to other households and the variety of mechanisms used to accomplish this reallocation suggest that the reproductive process has not been a totally efficient means of allocating children to families. More systematic study of these reallocation processes and the way they are interrelated with other familial processes and structures is needed.

fairly late (on average in the middle to late twenties). In addition, between a tenth and quarter of Western populations did not marry at all (Grevén, 1970; Hajnal, 1965; van de Walle and Knodel, 1980; Laslett, 1965; Uhlenberg, 1969). In China, on the other hand, the extended nature of the family allowed children to marry before they were economically independent. Consequently, the age at which people married and the percentage who never married were substantially lower than in the West (Barclay, et al., 1976; Casterline, 1980). The pattern of early and nearly universal marriage is also characteristic of many other populations, including those of Eastern Europe and South Asia (Caldwell et al., 1982; Czap, 1982; Mitterauer and Kagan, 1982; Hajnal, 1965, 1982).

Relationships between parents and children were probably different in Western European and Chinese societies, at least partially because of differences in age at marriage, residential patterns of married couples, and residential and employment patterns of unmarried adults. It is likely that greater residential separation both before and after marriage and higher ages at marriage in the West than in China provided Western children both more opportunity for autonomy and independence and more necessity for exerting self reliance. This pattern may also have contributed to less control of Western parents over the mate selection process. Further, while this comparison has primarily involved China and the West, young people in the West may have had more residential and decisionmaking independence from parents than most young people in other areas of the world (Caldwell, 1982; Caldwell et al., 1982; Ware, 1977). There may have been even more opportunities for independence for young people in migrant European populations in the United States and

elsewhere because of the greater availability of land to establish new economic units (Furstenberg, 1966; Lantz et al., 1968, 1977).

Modernization Processes

Because of the centrality of the traditional family and the close linkages between the family and the larger society, substantial changes outside and within the family are intricately related. As traditional societies have been transformed by modernization and economic growth, family life has been modified in important ways. The following discussion examines several aspects of modernization and some of their influences upon intergenerational relations, mate selection, and marriage. The primary dimensions of modernization considered include the expansion of education, the growth of employment outside the family, income growth, and urbanization.

Education

Since modern societies require an educated and skilled labor force, virtually all currently developing societies have striven to develop extensive educational systems to train young people. The pervasiveness of the increases in education throughout the developing world is illustrated by McDonald's (forthcoming) analysis of data for developing countries participating in the recent World Fertility Survey. In all 34 populations considered education was greater for younger than for older women, and in some instances the increases in education were substantial. For example, the percentage of women with some post primary education in Korea increased from 13 percent for ever-married women 40-49 to 47 percent for those 25-29. In Kenya and Venezuela the increases across the same age groups were from 3 to 24 percent and from

13 to 32 percent respectively.⁴

The potential influences of school enrollment and educational attainment on the lives of individuals and their families are numerous (Schultz, 1973; Thornton, 1980; Caldwell, 1992). One immediate influence of school enrollment is the reduction in the amount of time parents and young children spend together. Instead of spending most of their maturing years in homes with family members, young people now enter school at very young ages, where they spend considerable amounts of time away from parents.

While increases in school enrollment are likely to decrease the amount of time young children spend with their families, the effect for older children depends upon the age at which children left home traditionally. In Western societies where older children often left their parental families to live and work elsewhere, increased schooling might delay the time of leaving the parental home for alternative living arrangements as Katz and Davey (1978) report for Hamilton, Ontario. Thus, in the West a probable result of expanded school enrollment is that older children lived with their parents longer, even though much of that time was spent in school. Nevertheless, the amount of time spent outside of family households--either their own families or those of others--would increase overall as school enrollment increased. For societies like China where children lived with parents until marriage, the effect of schooling increases is probably similar for older and

⁴These comparisons are probably underestimates of the true increase in education over time. This expected underestimate occurs because the comparisons were limited to ever-married women. Women who marry later in life tend to have higher levels of education, and more of these educated women are excluded from the younger cohort than from the older one.

younger children: consistently less time spent with the family.

The time demands of school attendance are likely to decrease the availability of children to work in the family economy and to increase the age they commence regular employment. Thus, their productive capacities are largely forgone during the younger years. Longer schooling also substantially increases the direct costs of rearing children. These shifts may lead to lower fertility since the financial costs of children increase and their economic value declines (Caldwell, 1976; Knodel et al., 1983).

School attendance also represents a shift in the locus of control and supervision from parents to a public institution, at least during portions of the day. Although the values and goals of school and family may overlap, they also probably diverge in important ways. School attendance also modifies relationships with peers by bringing together children whose families may not know each other well and by providing a basis for new nonfamilial primary groups. In those instances where educational systems are coeducational, the pattern of interactions between the sexes is modified with implications for mate selection.

Rapid increases in educational attainment create an educational generation gap. Children will have more access than their parents to the latest ideas and skills, both directly through the schools and indirectly through the access their literacy gives them to an information network transcending the limited world of their parents (Ogburn and Ninkoff, 1976). The superior levels of education and access to new ideas among children probably increase the ability and willingness of children to challenge the authority of their parents and cause hesitancy on the part of parents to enforce their wishes (see Hull

and Hull, 1977; Caldwell, 1982).

Education provides young adults superior opportunities in the labor market, leading to better paying jobs. The result may be more autonomy from parents because children have more money of their own to spend or because their contribution to family finances is enhanced. A recent study in Taiwan, for example, found that highly educated women were substantially more likely to have worked in nonfamily enterprises and to keep some of their earnings if they did work (Thornton et al., 1982).

Education also provides young people with access to new ideas, both those of the elites of their own societies and those originating elsewhere. Some of these messages highlight the advantages of the modern Western family and its emphasis on individual freedom and autonomy (Caldwell, 1982). Other messages may come from nationalistic governments that stress allegiance to the state and party rather than the family. By spreading these messages, schools have significant potential for modifying family dynamics.

Nonfamily Employment

The creation of the family wage economy where people work outside the boundaries of their households is an important part of the development process (Anderson, 1971; Tilly and Scott, 1978). Even before the coming of large-scale industrial endeavors in the West cottage industries were established where young people and their mothers were employed in their own homes but worked for someone other than the husband or master of the family (Levine, 1977). The establishment of large-scale industry further increased nonfamilial employment. This new development, of course, did not occur in a vacuum, but rather within the context of a largely rural and agricultural society that was organized

along family lines. In the early stages of industrialization many work settings retained important aspects of familial organization with adults organizing and directing family members within the work place (Anderson, 1971; Hareven, 1975, 1982; Tilly and Scott, 1978; Smelser, 1959). The family economy and the emerging industrial structure of production became increasingly separate, however, as people became involved as wage laborers outside of the family's direct authority (Tilly and Scott, 1978).

Although there is little systematic information about the motivations and ideas of people during the early stages of industrialization, it appears that both parents and children continued to view the economic activities of young people as contributions to the family. Initially, the economic activities of children were responsive to familial rather than to individualistic concerns, and were regarded both by children and parents as an obligatory contribution to the family (Early, 1982; Tilly and Scott, 1978; Hareven, 1982; Kung, 1978; Dublin, 1979; Salaff, 1981). In many instances the decision of children to be employed in the nonfamilial economy was probably made more by parents than by the children themselves as Ware (1977) reports for Africa (Early, 1982;

The trend toward nonfamilial employment was rapid both in the West and in currently developing populations. Vinovskis (1981) reports that by the middle of the nineteenth century substantial fractions of women in Massachusetts worked outside the home before marriage, and the experience is very widespread today. In a study of developing countries participating in the recent World Fertility Survey McDonald (forthcoming) found that in 26 of 32 populations where comparisons were

possible the percentage of ever married women who had worked outside of agriculture before marriage was higher for women aged 25-29 than for those 40-49. In some populations the increased participation of single women in the paid labor force has been dramatic. For example, in Taiwan, whereas only about one-fourth of those born during the 1930's and reaching adulthood right after World War II worked outside the home before marriage, five-sixths of those born in the late 1950's did so (Thornton et al., 1982).

The increasing separation of occupational and family roles has far-reaching effects in the lives of young people. As with increases in school enrollment, nonfamily employment shifts the locus of primary activities from the household to nonfamilial institutions. This change probably results in young people spending less time with their parents and having more opportunity to interact with peers in a nonfamilial setting (Tilly and Scott, 1978).

Although industrialization and economic development has typically resulted in a separation of home and work, governmental policy may be able to reduce this effect by encouraging small-scale economic enterprises. Certain aspects of economic growth, although by no means all, might be accomplished as efficiently using the traditional household economy as using large-scale bureaucratic organizations. The successful adaptation of the household economy would minimize the dislocation of individuals from their families.

The influence of the changing locus of work on the living arrangements of young people is substantial and complex. As employment was increasingly located outside the household in Western societies, there was less need for young people to leave their parental family to

work and live in the households of others (Katz and Davey, 1978). In Taiwan, the practice of adopting young children into the households of others also declined, a change which Wolf and Huang (1980) attribute to changing economic structure.

In many geographical locations during modernization families can find nonfamilial employment for their children within commuting distance of the household. This has been true of most urban families throughout the world. In some countries, including the United States and Taiwan there was extensive growth of industrial employment in previously rural areas, which facilitated the involvement of rural families (Vincovskis, 1981; Thornton et al., 1982). With good transportation facilities rural families living in close proximity to cities could work there without changing residences--as the development of a good railroad system in Belgium allowed (Lesthaeghe, 1977). In these types of locations the separation of workplace and household in the West probably increased the proportion of children who could and did live with their families. Katz and Davey (1978), for example, report that among urban families in Hamilton, Ontario the likelihood of children living with their own families increased during the early stages of modernization. In Taiwan, where most children traditionally lived with their own parents, nonfamilial employment probably has had little influence on residential patterns of children when there were employment opportunities near their homes.

Urbanization

Since many nonfamily jobs often involve large-scale organization and concentration of workers, industrialization is accompanied by urbanization--both the establishment of new cities and the growth of old

ones. However in a place like Taiwan the extent of urbanization has been restricted both by efforts to encourage rural industrialization and the opportunity to do so because of small distances and good transportation and communication links. Nevertheless, in most rural areas, of developing societies, including Taiwan, taking advantage of industrial employment usually requires geographical mobility. Some families move as entire units from agricultural areas where the family is the production unit to urban areas and a wage economy, but in many cases it is young people who take jobs outside the family as wage laborers and migrate to urban areas while their parents maintain the traditional economic unit in the home village (Anderson, 1971; Hareven, 1982; Hareven and Tilly, 1979; Tilly and Scott, 1978; Modell and Hareven, 1973). In cities these migrant young people often lived with other relatives or nonrelatives as boarders and lodgers. The importance of this phenomenon for industrializing America is illustrated by the fact that 15-20 percent of all urban households in the nineteenth century included lodgers (Modell and Hareven, 1973). In addition, in the early period of industrialization in the West many companies developed dormitories to house single workers (Dublin, 1979; Hareven, 1982; Hufton, 1981; Hanlan, 1981; Tilly and Scott, 1978), a phenomenon which has been replicated in modern Taiwan and other developing societies (Kung, 1978; Thornton et al., 1982). In Taiwan, about one-third of all women reaching adulthood recently have experienced living in a work-related dormitory (Thornton et al., 1982).

Because work-related dormitory living represents a break from traditional living arrangements, there was concern both in Taiwan and the United States that residents would not have the supervision they

required, and efforts were made to ensure that dormitory living was as similar to familial arrangements as possible (Dublin, 1979; Hanlan, 1981; Kung, 1978). Supervisors were assigned to guide the behavior of the young residents and rules concerning appropriate behavior were developed. However, Kung (1978) reports that in the Taiwanese dormitories she studied the number of supervisors was too small to allow close supervision, making it ultimately impossible for dormitories to provide supervision and control comparable to that received at home.

Although many young people migrated from rural to urban areas, many of these moves were relatively short distance, permitting extensive visiting and return migration (Anderson, 1971; Hanlan, 1981; Ware, 1977). In addition migration was often a family strategy with multiple members of the same family and community relocating in the same area (Anderson, 1971). These factors mediated against the isolation of young migrants from their families.

Even though social control and supervision of young people probably decreased with dormitory living, these arrangements do not reflect the degree of independence associated with the maintenance of a separate house or apartment. There are reports both from Taiwan and the United States that the establishment of independent living arrangements by single persons was viewed as undesirable and to be avoided (Kung, 1978; Hareven, 1982). This orientation and insufficient financial resources probably retarded the increase of such arrangements.

During the twentieth century as living standards increased, as the population became more urbanized, and as the flow of rural-urban migrants decreased, the phenomenon of boarding and lodging in the United States almost disappeared (Modell and Hareven, 1973). In recent years,

however, single persons in the West have taken the initially-discouraged step toward residential independence and are now increasingly maintaining their own private households (Kobrin, 1976; Michael et al., 1980). Between 1950 and 1982 in the United States the percentage of never-married men 25-34 maintaining their own households increased from 10 to 43 percent, and an even larger increase occurred among women (Thornton and Freedman, 1983). This new pattern of independent living represents both a new stage in the life course and a new pattern of intergenerational relations. This trend has important implications for the amount and type of housing needed and the functioning of the housing market itself. It is too early to know if this new innovation will also be adopted in currently developing populations.

Although it is probably impossible to distribute new economic opportunities geographically according to the traditional distribution of population, it may be possible for governments to encourage the establishment of jobs in rural areas to minimize the necessity for young people to migrate to find jobs. The potential for this is increased by transportation facilities that enhance the possibilities of commuting to jobs. This policy might retard the amount of separation among family members associated with migration to urban areas. Adequate housing and social support for young people who are unable to work near their homes is also of continuing concern. The provision of adequate housing and favorable social environments should be a high priority policy goal.

Wage Income

Because of the familial motivation of market employment, the control of parents over the earnings of their children was extensive in the West. Hareven (1982) suggests that children contributing to their

parents was an "unwritten law" in industrializing Manchester, New Hampshire. Dublin (1979) writes that payroll records from Lowell, Massachusetts during the 1850s and 1860s even ".....provide repeated instances in which fathers signed for and probably picked up their children's pay envelopes. These children, then, did not even receive their wages, which went directly into the family till." The evidence suggests that while many young people picked up their own pay checks, most contributed substantial portions of their earnings to their parents (Early, 1982; Tilly and Scott, 1978; U.S. Department of Labor, Women's Bureau, 1923). Further, the contributions of children to the standard of living of the family were often substantial and made a significant impact upon family finances (Early, 1982; Dublin, 1979). In fact, the expansion of industrial employment may have increased the contribution of older children to the family economy.

The continuing integration of children into the family economy during the initial period of industrialization has also been documented for Taiwan. A major theme of Kung's (1978) study of Taiwanese factory workers is the continuing obligation of single workers to contribute their incomes to their families, and a recent island-wide survey found that more than 70 percent of single employed women mostly gave their earnings to their parents (Thornton et al., 1982). As in the West, these earnings of adult children often have a substantial impact on the standard of living of the entire family (Arrigo, 1980; Diamond, 1979; Salaff, 1981). The continuing integration of wage earning children into the family economy has also been reported for Africa and India (Adepoju, 1977; Ware, 1977; Caldwell 1982).

The control of children over their earnings has expanded steadily

in the West (Tilly and Scott, 1978). Children living away from home probably began to keep larger fractions of their earnings, and today there is even little expectation of children contributing substantially to their households when they are living with their parents (Bachman, 1983).

The control of parents over their children's earnings is also declining slowly in Taiwan, and, with more young people working, the proportion with money of their own to spend is increasing (Thornton et al., 1982). These changes are also reflected in the expectations and views of adult Taiwanese: the percent expecting to live with or be supported by their sons in old age has declined, and there have been increases in the percentage of people who believe that young people are now less willing to support their parents in old age, to contribute wages to parents, and to take advice from parents (Coombs and Sun, 1981).

Working, living, and controlling resources outside of family households provide children opportunities and resources for independence and autonomy. Under these circumstances parents are less able to observe, supervise and control their children. Thus, it becomes easier for children to be influenced by others and to redefine their values and behavior in a nonfamilial context which includes access to many ideas and influences unavailable in rural areas. As Anderson (1971) notes for England access to new sources of income for children can substantially modify the interrelationships between children and parents, with parents adjusting their behavior and authority to be consistent with the new economic relationships (also see Goode, 1970, 1982). Caldwell et al. (1982) notes a similar accommodation of parental authority to

nonfamilial work opportunities for children in South India, although parent-child relations may have changed more for married than for unmarried children. The increased autonomy of young people in the West was also noted by contemporary observers, who often decried the change (Anderson, 1971; Hanlan, 1981).²

The freedom and autonomy associated with wage employment, urban living, and nonfamilial housing also have a reverse side: vulnerability. Children living and working away from the parental home are not only relatively independent of family authority but also quite removed from parental protection. This increases the possibility of exploitation, an especially important possibility among young women (Tilly et al., 1980).

Mate Selection and Marriage

Because the changing structure of education, employment, and living arrangements of young people modifies their activities, relationships to the economy, and interactions with parents and peers, it would be surprising if these shifts had no influence upon mate selection and marriage. As young people spend more time in school, work outside of households, and establish their residences apart from parents, opportunities for interaction with peers, including those of the opposite sex, multiply while opportunities for parental supervision decline (Kung, 1978; Mareen, 1982). One reflection of these shifts is the decreased control parents have in the marriages and choice of marriage partners of their children.

Because Western parents as compared to those in China traditionally

²Ware (1977) notes, however, that in at least one African society wage employment implies little independence. Among the Mossi the control of the elders over the marriage market is so pervasive that there is little young people can do to gain independent adult status without parental approval.

had less control over children's marital choices, the potential for decline in control was considerably less. Nevertheless, there is indirect evidence that there have been declines in parental control over children's marriages in the United States and Europe, although many parents still maintain the ability to influence the process (Lantz et al., 1977; Smith, 1973; Tilly and Scott, 1978).

Data collected by Parish and Whyte (1978) in Hong Kong from refugees from Kwangtung Province in the People's Republic of China suggest that the involvement of young people in marital choices has been increasing there, while the pace of the decline in the control of parents over the choice of marital partners in Taiwan is astounding. The percentage of Taiwanese women reporting that their parents decided their marriage declined from over 75 percent for birth cohorts of the early 1930's to just 15 percent for recent birth cohorts of married women, while the percentage saying that the decision was entirely theirs increased from 5 to 33 percent (Thornton et al., 1982). McDonald (n.d.) reports trends in the same direction for several groups in Indonesia, and Caldwell et al. (1983) state that while parents continue to arrange marriages in South India, young people are consulted more now and have more say in the choice of a mate. An examination of the determinants of the mate selection process in Taiwan also found that both education and employment outside the home were positively related to the participation of children in the mate selection process (Thornton et al., 1982).

The extension of schooling provides young people a new set of activities and roles. Since education takes time and is valued by individuals and their families, it can lead to postponement of marriage. Of course, the potential for education to delay marriage is much greater

in societies like India where traditional age at marriage was very young than in Western societies where age at marriage was traditionally old enough to permit the attainment of high educational levels before marriage.

The influence of paid employment outside the home on age at marriage probably depends upon the traditional mate selection process, the existing pattern of age at marriage, and the control of parents over the earnings of their children. In the case where age at marriage was young and parents controlled mate selection and the earnings of their children, parents might want to postpone the marriages of their employed children so they could retain their earnings longer. This motivation might be particularly strong for parents of girls in patrilineal societies where the married couple live with or near the husband's parents. For these families the arrangement of a marriage for a daughter with a high income is tantamount to a reduction in family income. Thus, increases in the paid employment of unmarried women in this type of society would probably lead to increased age at marriage.

Most of the populations of Asia, including the Chinese, fit this patterns of traditional early age at marriage and parental control over earnings and mate selection. Increased paid employment in these countries has been accompanied by significant increases in age at marriage, and in many of these populations the increases have been rapid (Smith, 1980; Smith et al., 1983; McDonald, forthcoming; Coale et al., 1979). The relevance of employment shifts, as well as educational increases, has been documented for several countries by studies showing that educated women, those living in rural areas, and those who work outside the family marry later than others (McCarthy, 1982; Thornton et

al., 1982).

Where marriage is traditionally postponed and children have extensive control over their earnings and the choice of a spouse, additional wage jobs and higher incomes probably lead to earlier marriages. The wide discretion of children in this setting would allow them to translate more job opportunities and higher incomes into earlier marriages. However, the preceding discussion shows no examples of societies that completely fit this description. While age at marriage was typically high in the West and parental control was generally less than in many Asian countries, parents still had influence over their children's earnings and mate selection. Thus, Western children who may have been motivated to use their paid income to marry and establish their own households may have been frustrated by parents who wanted them to continue to contribute to the parental household.

Data from Western populations are generally consistent with the expectation that the ability of children to translate wage income into earlier marriages was frustrated by parental control of those earnings until World War II. There were only modest overall changes in age at marriage during the early years of modernization in the West, although there may have been important changes in some areas (Watkins, 1981; Levine, 1977). After World War II, however, there was a substantial marriage boom which lowered marital ages and increased the overall prevalence of marriage (Hajnal, 1953; Watkins, 1981). This increase in marriage may have been facilitated both by the increased income of young people and their increased ability to use their incomes to marry and establish their own households.

This analysis suggests that the influence of modernization on

changes in age at marriage depends upon the authority of parents over their children. Children with more freedom to spend their earnings and more say in the selection of a spouse probably have greater ability to translate expanded job opportunity into earlier marriage. Conversely, the more control parents have over their children the more motivation they are likely to have to delay the marriages of children who can contribute significantly to the parental household.

The work of Caldwell and his colleagues in South India establishes the relevance of declining mortality for age at marriage in populations with a wide difference between the sexes in age at marriage. In South India women traditionally married significantly younger than men. As mortality declined and increased the number of younger relative to older people, the number of women relative to the number of men in their prime marrying years increased. The result was a significant marriage squeeze which put an upward pressure on age at marriage for women and decreased the value of women in the marriage market (Caldwell et al., 1983). Although Caldwell et al. limit their observations to South India, it is likely that this phenomenon has occurred in other societies with similar traditional marital patterns and improving mortality conditions.

The incidence of premarital sex and pregnancy is also modified by changes in the activities of young people, their interactions with their peers and parents, the mate selection process, and age at marriage. In traditional India, marriage, generally preceded menarche, which effectively limited premarital sex and pregnancy. As age at marriage has increased past the age at menarche in India, the potential for premarital sex and pregnancy emerge. Similarly, in countries where the sexes are strictly segregated and spouses are chosen by their parents

there is little potential for premarital sex. In traditional societies that strictly control premarital sex, the potential for premarital sex and pregnancy increase as interaction between the sexes increase, children spend more time away from their parents, and children become more involved in the mate selection process. These changes have been accompanied by significant increases in the incidence of premarital sexuality and pregnancy in Taiwan in recent years (Thornton et al., 1982), and increases in premarital pregnancy have been reported for Korea and the Chinese population of Malaysia (Rindfuss and Morgan, 1983). In traditional Western societies Shorter (1975) argues that there was relatively little premarital sex, but that its incidence increased in the early stages of modernization. Interpretation for later periods is complicated by the increased use of contraception (Shorter et al., 1971).

The issue of adolescent sexuality, pregnancy, and childbearing is a major policy concern in Western countries today, with serious energy being devoted to the search for solutions to decrease the level of pregnancy and childbearing. The evidence from Asian countries indicates that this set of social issues may not be limited to Western societies. Since Western policy makers have not yet been able to devise and implement effective policies to lower the rate of pregnancy and childbearing among teenagers, their experience provides little basis for optimism for policy initiatives elsewhere. Nevertheless, the seriousness of this issue in the West suggests the need for currently developing countries to carefully consider this set of issues.

Summary

Many aspects of traditional family structure and relationships,

particularly as they intersect with the lives of children and young adults, have been modified in many populations of the world. This paper has shown that many of these changes are related to several dimensions of modernization, including the expansion of education, the development of a wage economy, urbanization, income growth, and the reduction of mortality. Processes and mechanisms whereby these forces could have had their influence on the family lives of young people have also been suggested.

Many of the changes in family life accompanying modernization have been remarkably similar in Taiwan and the West--the separation of the workplace from the home, increased training of children in nonfamilial institutions, the development of living arrangements outside the family household, increased access of children to financial resources, and more say by children in the mate selection process. However, at the same time the general outline of change in the two cultural settings has been similar, specific aspects of change varied between the two areas because of significant preexisting differences in family structure, residential patterns of children, age at marriage, and autonomy of children. This conclusion demonstrates the role of the preexisting family structure in determining the course of family change during the modernization process and suggests that the effects of these preexisting differences will persist well into the future.

This paper has shown how modernization influences family life by changing individual patterns of education, employment, and living arrangements. The influence of modernization, however, is not limited to those who become educated and work and live outside the family household since the behavior and ideas of those who have these

experiences can be observed and modelled by young people living in more traditional circumstances. Similarly, by providing children more alternatives, the increased availability of schools, paid employment, and nonfamilial living arrangements can alter the relationships between parents and children even if children do not participate directly in these institutions (Anderson, 1971; Caldwell et al. 1982). In addition, as new patterns of behavior become more available, norms and expectations can shift and influence the behavior and relationships of nearly everyone in the population. Consequently, the spread of new family structure and behavior can proceed even more rapidly than the development of schools, the growth of nonfamilial employment and living arrangements, the expansion of cities, and the growth of income. Unfortunately, there is little available research documenting how the lives of individuals not directly participating in the new patterns of employment, education, and living arrangements are influenced by changing opportunities and values.

Although this paper has stressed the importance of structural shifts in education, employment, and residential patterns, these structural changes probably cannot account for all important trends in family structure and relationships that have occurred. Studies of Western families have shown the importance of ideological and religious trends (Lesthaeghe, 1977, 1980; Lesthaeghe and Wilson, n.d.; Lockridge, 1983; Goode, 1970). Particularly important is the spread of secularization and the ideals of democracy and egalitarianism, which could significantly modify family relationships.

Secularization may also be an important element of family change in Asia (Caldwell et al., 1982). In addition, the introduction of Western

technology and economic organization in many currently developing societies has been accompanied or preceded by the spread of Western ideas and values. These include both general ideas about democracy and freedom and specific ideals of the modern Western family such as small family size and nuclear living arrangements. The spread of these ideas throughout the population, would have significant potential for modifying norms and behavior (Caldwell, 1976, 1982). Indigenous nationalistic movements can also foster independence among young people and modify intergenerational relations (McDonald, n.d.). As Thadani (1978) has argued, more theoretical and empirical research is needed to specify exactly how these new ideas and values impact upon family structure and relationships.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The author appreciates the comments and suggestions concerning an earlier draft of this paper provided by Ronald Freedman and the organizing committee for the Seminar on Social Change and Family Policy. Marge Dalian and Dawn Haavisto provided assistance in the preparation of the manuscript.

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Implications for families of third world fertility trends

by PETER McDONALD

Introduction

Most of the world's developing countries particularly those with large populations have had active central government policies to curb the rate of population growth. These policies have been based, almost invariably, on conclusions derived from macro-economic planning, that is upon the notion that the ladder to economic development cannot be scaled unless the so-called burden of dependency is reduced. While there are more and more mouths to be fed, children to be educated, houses to be provided, medical and social services to be supplied, how can a country even begin to improve standards of living. The argument is very powerful.

In implementing population policies, governments must deal with the childbearing decisions of individual families. In terms of propaganda, this is usually done by transposing the macro-economic notion of the burden of dependency to the micro-economic setting of the individual family. The message for the family is that if you want to shake off poverty and join the middle class, have fewer children. Posters depict bedlam and misery in a household with a dozen or so children compared with the serenity and well-being of the two-child family. It is not unusual that the so-depicted, two-child family is a middle class, white collar family. The assumption is that micro-economic life revolves around the decisions of nuclear families and that economic organisation consists of the nation-state dealing directly with nuclear-family households.

In reality, however, the family economy is not a microcosm of the national economy, more particularly so among peasant families. To begin, the peasant family deals with greater uncertainty than the state and is much more concerned with long-term issues than the state. Personal security in old age is generally a much more pressing problem for the peasant farmer than is the care of the nation's aged in thirty years time for the state. Consequently the farmer attempts to minimize risk over a long period of time. If security in old age is determined primarily by whether one has a son (or daughter depending on the cultural context) who makes good, then one has twice as much chance of achieving this aim with two sons and no chance with no sons. Though this has been said many times, the leading population and development journal, Population and Development Review, has felt the need recently to publish the same message yet again (Cain, 1983).

Families internally may also exercise a degree of exploitation which would be intolerable at the national level. Members having control over the means of production are relatively free, often even supported by the prevailing morality, to exploit weaker members. If the weaker members are children or children-in-law, the more there are, the more there are to exploit, or more politely, the more labour is available to promote the family economy. I have been describing a situation where the familial mode of production still prevails. In this mode, family organisation rarely follows the nuclear type but much more commonly consists of vertically extended (stem) or horizontally extended types. As such, individual couples are not free to make their own decisions about child-bearing as portrayed in the government posters.

Even with a shift to the labour market mode of production, families for a time may still be able to maintain exploitative control over their workers in the wage economy, essentially through the continuance of the morality which supported exploitation under the familial mode. For example, daughters

working in factories may hand over their entire earnings to their father because this is the morality that had prevailed when daughters worked within the family circle.

Not the least of the difficulties of planning at the family level, is the possibility that central government policies may change in the future. In the area of fertility, for example, there are several examples of this. Malaysia is now in the process of moving to a pro-natalist policy having been anti-natalist. Singapore is providing benefits to the third child in educated families where in the past third children were heavily penalized. China has also changed its population policy several times since 1949. Now the one-child family policy is promoted in China but it is reported that there is resistance to sterilization because people feel the policy may change in the future (Croll, 1983, p.93). Governments and government policies may come and go but the needs of families continue. Families then may have strategies for survival which do not mesh in with prevailing government policies.

Nevertheless government family planning programmes around the world have achieved a measure of success. This success, however, has been more particularly in eliminating the very large families than in consolidating a two or one child norm. Yet the two or one child norm is the aim of most programmes because the two-child family leads to zero population growth while the Chinese one-child policy is a temporary measure designed to bring about a decline of population. In the remainder of this paper I shall focus on the implications for families in third world countries of a decline of fertility from a moderate/high level (an average of about 5 children) to a low level (2 or 1 child). These implications provide at the same time an impression of what the obstacles to fertility decline are likely to be.

Changes in Family Structure

A shift from a five to a two or one-child family has a quite startling effect on the likelihood that various relationships will exist in a family. This is illustrated in the accompanying table. In the five-child family there is almost certain to be both a boy and a girl (0.94) and it is also almost certain that a child of the family will have both a brother and a sister (0.88). The latter circumstance is impossible in both the two-and-one-child families. If life chances are better if you have both an elder brother and an elder sister, your chances are reasonably high in the five-child family (0.43) but zero in the smaller families. Whether these various relationships matter is, of course, culture-specific. The table shows, for example, that in a system of primogeniture where boys other than the eldest must fend for themselves, the smaller family norm is clearly advantageous. On the other hand, if the family economy takes a patrilineal form and success depends upon the number of laborers that the patriarch can call upon, clearly the larger family norm is preferable. In the situation of the one-child family, the patriarch would have to do most of the work himself.

- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE -

Where success is achieved through a broader family network, a clan for example, it is clear from the number of first cousins an individual would have, that fertility decline has a massive impact on the size of the clan. The cousin-less, one-child situation leaves no scope whatsoever for any clan-like family structure. Put very simply, fertility decline would inevitably lead to the decline of extended families and the dominance of the nuclear family. This has numerous implications. For example, if big and powerful families are an important force in the political structure, particularly in local politics, fertility decline will eat away the power of these families leaving a vacuum to be filled by the nation-state. This would change the entire

structure of local economic relationships, alliance marriages would no longer be very relevant and hence youth would become relatively independent of their parents.

Most obviously, if the having of a son is culturally important, this is virtually certain in a five-child family but not so in the one-child family. The Chinese Government has promoted the idea that girls should be responsible for their own parents in an attempt to provide support for the one-child policy. However, parents are quick to realize that the married couple of the future under a one-child family will have to support two sets of parents. If resources are scarce, it will be very difficult for a man to provide support to his parents-in-law at the expense of his own parents. While the 1982 Constitution of China states that it is the duty of children, once grown up, to support and assist their parents, it is also reported from a village study in 1977 that:

In families with several sons there was a degree of confidence and investment in the future of the domestic group that was not characteristic of families with one son and many daughters (Croll, 1981, p.148).

While there is little or no provision for old age support from either the commune or national level, the possibility of not having a son at all apparently remains a frightening prospect to most Chinese.

The differential impact of fertility decline on groups in the community also warrants consideration. In China, party-members and cadres (and even their immediate relatives) are expected to be an example to others by following the one-child policy. In the longer-term, the net result of this would be a decline in the size of the cadre/party member group in the community. Similar considerations have apparently led to the support of a three-child family in Singapore for the educated group.

Implications for the Household Economy

Fertility decline is inconsistent with a familial mode of production. Labour in families is a cheap resource and in most circumstances this means the more the better. The familial mode depends also on inter-family relations and these can be promoted through alliance marriages. The more children, the greater the potential for alliance marriages. In times of great scarcity, there will be difficulties for large family groups and some short-term adjustments such as infanticide or delay of child-bearing may be necessary. However, the small family during a period of great scarcity will not prosper, in fact, because of its reduced access to resources, it may be wiped out altogether.

This is a pressing problem in contemporary China. The long-term restrictions upon migration and the new economic policy, the responsibility policy, has consolidated the household as the basic unit of production in rural China. The power of households within the collective has increased. Rewards pass to the head of the household and this means that the opportunity for cheap labour within the household exists. Under these circumstances, two to three (not one) children per couple are welcome additions to the labour force of the individual peasant household (Croll, 1983, p. 96). Although there may be a huge unemployed group, their employment by a household with access to land will be more expensive than work done by family members. Furthermore, it is claimed that 'the institutional grip of the family upon its members, especially in rural areas, has actually tightened' (Kane, 1983, p.50). These rural realities thus appear to be in conflict with a one-child policy. Of course, this will not be the case for the unemployed group without access to land.

The familial mode of production is even more entrenched in South Asia and so it comes as no surprise that fertility there has declined only slowly despite a long history of a policy to promote decline. The same is probably also true in the Middle

East where the system of endogamy serves to preserve the strength and unity of families.

There is a danger here of a muddle of cause and effect. I have set my question in terms of the implications for families of fertility decline. The alternative question of the implications for fertility decline of familial organisation is generally more pertinent. That is, it might be argued that fertility will not decline to low levels unless the familial mode of production passes away. On the other hand, there is no doubt that if fertility, through whatever means, is reduced to a low level, this will be the death-knell for the familial mode of production. In an actual case, both processes may be occurring simultaneously. The questions then become what starts the process and what keeps it going. These are questions to which J.C. Caldwell has brought much attention in recent years (Caldwell, 1982). Essentially Caldwell's view is that fertility decline proceeds apace when the net flow of intergenerational wealth switches from the direction of children to parents to the direction of parents to children. At this stage, the familial mode of production will be in a state of decline and the labour market mode will be emergent. Behind the switch of direction of the intergenerational wealth flow is the intrusion of the nation-state into the affairs of the family. For example, the state will say that for the future good of the society, all children should be educated to a given minimum level. Children are thus withdrawn from the family work force and may need to be replaced by wage-labour. Alternatively the state may facilitate the emergence of wage-labour opportunities which draw off workers from families. This may even be supported by family enterprises facing hard times and excess family labour. Thus the family may struggle to support a son migrating to an urban area. In the long-run, however, the effect is the same, that is, the strength of the familial mode of production is eroded.

The state may also employ more radical means to break the power of family-based economies such as land reform, collectivisation,

price controls over rural production and so on. Compulsory military service is also a useful way to siphon off young men in their prime and to provide them with a different set of ideals. The state propaganda machine may promote a new, modern image of youth, respectful of parents but loyal to the state. It may even be that the state's family planning programme will indeed find a hearing among some families or that a degree of compulsion is exercised.

All in all, fertility decline to the level of the two-or one-child family implies the rise to dominance of the nation-state and a labour market economy. A further implication is that the care of the aged will be less guaranteed both because of the changed loyalties and because each aged person will have fewer children.

The Role of Women

The principle role of women under the familial mode of production is reproduction of the family's work force. Girls and older woman may also work hard in the production process, but reproduction is a woman's central role. In Asia and Africa, the reproductive role traditionally commenced whilst the girl was still in her teens and continued, depending upon the demand for labour, until she was in her mid-thirties or early forties. Reproduction thus occupied 20-25 years of her life. Clearly a shift to a one or two-child family involves a massive reduction in a woman's reproductive span. Where high maternal mortality previously prevailed, this reduction would also have led to a more secure view of the future.

With the reproductive span much reduced it is highly likely that child-bearing will not begin early. At least, this has been the experience in low fertility societies and there are probably a variety of reasons. First, early childbearing in a low fertility society implies a rapid turnover of generations. At the extreme,

if women had their children at age 18 in a one-child society, generations would turnover every 18 years. Under such circumstances, it would be not at all unusual to have four or five generations living at the same time. Second, there may be some feeling against the prospect that a woman may have completed her fertility by a very early age. Perhaps this derives from a sense that the reproductive role is the natural or normal role for a woman during her twenties. Third, as I have already described, low fertility implies several major structural changes which are likely to lead to later marriages. Alliance marriages are no longer of great value, there will be labour-market opportunities for single women, education levels for women will have increased, potential husbands will be seeking wives who are more than just the means of reproduction. Fourth, there will be an inevitable shift of emphasis from the quantity to the quality of children and for this reason the mother will be expected to be mature, experienced and well educated - not a mere girl.

This pressure to delay marriage and the commencement of child-bearing is problematic in societies where traditional morality allocates a low status to young girls and where loss of virginity is held to reflect very badly on the girl's family. This conflict is already evident in South Asia and the Middle East. In these areas, traditional morality is prevailing, marriage payments remain very high and marriage is primarily the business of parents. Not unexpectedly, fertility is not declining rapidly.

At the other end of the reproductive span, the earlier cessation of fertility leaves essentially two options for women, the Western options of devoting available time and energy to the rearing of her small family or spending more time in the paid labour market.

The latter option appears to prevail in those countries where fertility has declined rapidly, that is, in East and Southeast Asia and in Latin America. In China, interestingly, there is

great concern that too much time and attention will be devoted to the one child, both by its parents and its grandparents. Campaigns have therefore commenced warning parents of the dangers of spoiling the child. The children are also exhorted to avoid being spoilt.

Suffice to say that the role of women in the society, both younger and older women, will have changed markedly if fertility levels have declined to a low level.

Intra-family Relationships

Low fertility is also likely to lead to considerable change in the nature of inter-personal relations within the family. Under the familial mode of production, the husband-wife relationship will be primarily economic. Their marriage will have been arranged by their parents with economic alliance being the chief motivation. Their relationship within the family will revolve around production, reproduction of labour, and exploitation. In patriarchal societies, the husband who is swayed by affection for his wife will not be respected. She is there primarily to be exploited for the general welfare of her husband's family. A husband who placed his wife before his mother will be contravening centuries of tradition. In a low fertility society, the world will have changed dramatically. Marriage is more likely to have resulted from self choice after a period of courtship. The wife will be better educated and may have experienced work beyond the family circle. The delay of marriage for women will mean that the husband and wife will be closer in age. Economic enterprise will revolve around the nuclear family household rather than the broader family. The norm therefore is likely to be for companionate, affectionate relations between husband and wife.

The trend towards companionate marriage will introduce a new pressure into marriages, that is, the need to maintain the

quality of the affectionate relationship. This is all the more important as with declining mortality and a decline in the age of parents when their last child leaves home, the couple must live together for a long period of time without the presence of other family members.

The achievement of low fertility also requires a degree of communication between husband and wife on the matter of contraception. This communication would extend, however, to the very nature of the sexual relationship. In the past, sexual relations would have been integrated with the reproductive function of women. In some societies, when reproductive goals were achieved, sexual relations between husband and wife either ceased or became very infrequent. With low fertility, the nexus between reproduction and sexual intercourse is broken and couples must come to terms with sexual relations for their own sake.

Parent-child relationships will also take on a new form with low fertility. Children will have become net consumers at least while they are continuing their education. The child will rise to prominence as greater parental attention is focussed on the quality of its life. In the short-term, education can give children a status out of all proportion to their place in the society. I witnessed this in a village study which I conducted in South Sulawesi in Indonesia. No women in the village over the age of 20 had ever been to school but the change in education had been so great that virtually all 12 - 13 year old girls were in school. Women in the parental generation were in complete awe of the skills that their daughters possessed and at the freedom that they had.

Freed from the economic framework, parent-child relationships will also become more affective in nature. I have already referred to the worry in China that this will lead to doting parents spoiling the child. Again the rise to prominence of an affectionate relationship will introduce the additional tension of the need to maintain the quality of the relationship.

Parents seeing the need for support in old age, may become more dependent on the one or two children who might provide that support. The child's status is thus further enhanced. In addition, as economic opportunity would lie primarily in the labour market rather than in the family, the child will be relatively independent of the family and the older family members will be heavily dependent on the child's success in the labour market. They are likely therefore to divert resources to the achievement of that aim. The reversal of the parent-child wealth flow thus takes on considerable momentum. Parents' success becomes evaluated according to whether their child has been upwardly mobile, not according to their own endeavours. The ethos develops that parents especially mothers who do not devote almost all of their energies to the greater well being of their children are irresponsible. The development of this ethos through the period of decline in fertility in the West is clearly evident.

Relationships between the children of a family will also change. Under the familial mode of production the roles of each child are usually well defined. It may be that the eldest son inherits or that property is divided among sons or that daughters marry out into allied families. The actual roles depend upon the culture, but the knowledge that roles are fixed defines the relationships between siblings. However, when a labour market economy predominates, any one of the sons may succeed in it and even unmarried daughters may be a considerable source of cash income for the family. The elder daughter may work in a factory and earn income which supports the further education of her younger brother, or she might keep all the money as savings for her marriage, or she might spend it all on herself. The rules become less rigid and what happens is likely again to depend on the quality of the affective relationships in the family.

Decline of the familial mode, depending on the type of family organisation, will also lead to the decline of relationships with

wider kin, that is, uncles, aunts, cousins and so on. Members of the broader kin network will no longer be part of the same economic enterprise. Grandparents may also find new roles emerging. In China, for example, the grand-parent stage was traditionally the time that a person could take a rest after a life of hard work. Now with the decline in fertility and the absorption of married women (daughters-in-law) into the work force, the older generation have been left with many household duties, shopping and child-care.

Concluding Remark

It is not very difficult to see that what I have been saying is that low family size implies the Westernization of family structure, values and relationships. I would also say that this implication is becoming widely recognized and is the explanation behind some recent reversals of policy on family planning in developing countries. The movement towards low fertility and the Westernization of the family is sometimes presumed to be an inevitability. It is now evident that this is by no means the case as the trend is seen as an attack on traditional family and religious values. The 1950's idealized version of the Western family has been the model for family planning programmes around the world. But it has always been just that, an idealized version, a fact which Westerners have been more willing to acknowledge in the past fifteen years.

The realities of Westernization have therefore become more evident in recent years and groups within developing countries have sometimes become concerned, perhaps because they see their traditional values under attack or perhaps because they see their vested interests being eaten away. The drive towards lower family size which proceeded apace in many countries during the 1970's is in the 1980's beginning to falter. This is evident in the Middle East and South Asia but Malaysia provides perhaps the most surprising example of this trend. Fertility declined very

rapidly in Malaysia in the 1970's and was beginning to approach Western levels. More recently, however, the decline has levelled off and in complete reversal, the Malaysian Government now looks to a future population of 70 million. In part Malaysia's new direction is influenced by a rejection of the macro-economic argument put at the beginning of this paper. It is argued that a larger domestic market is the key to development. At the same time, however, the move will receive support from those involved in the consolidation of Islamic family values in Malaysia. The presumption that Western-style technological development implies the adoption of Western social values and structures, a view which has been implicit in family planning programmes throughout the world, is now being questioned.

TABLE 1: The Chance of Various Family Relationships Occuring
In Five, Two and One Child Families.

TYPE OF RELATIONSHIP	NUMBER OF CHILDREN		
	5	2	1
Chance of having a son	0.97	0.75	0.50
a daughter	0.97	0.75	0.50
both a son/daughter	0.94	0.50	0
a brother	0.97	0.50	0
a sister	0.97	0.50	0
both brother/sister	0.88	0	0
elder brother	0.61	0.25	0
elder sister	0.61	0.25	0
both elder brother/sister	0.43	0	0
Chance of being eldest child	0.20	0.50	1
eldest boy	0.39	0.75	1
Possible combinations of sex and birth order	32	4	2
Number of first cousins after two generations with given family size	40	4	0
Average number of members of a three generation patrilineage*	19.5	6	3.5
Possible maximum size of a three-generation patrilineage*	37	16	5

* A patrilineage is defined as the patriarch and his wife,
his sons and their wives and children.

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TUESDAY, 21 AUGUST 1984

**Families with children and social policy
approaches to family support and
education**

Family policy as latter-day children's policy

by GILBERT STEINER

[This paper has been prepared for discussion at the XXth International Seminar on Social Change and Family Policies--Melbourne, Australia, August 19-24, 1984. Documentation is omitted from the discussion version.]

Our function here is to examine the relationship between social change and family policies. The former is said by the symposium's sponsors to have brought into question both the value of marriage and the traditional role of women in family life. Of no less significance, social change has increased the probability of single parenthood whether resulting from unwed motherhood, divorce, or separation. To what extent are these phenomena matters for public policy attention?

I shall argue that social change ~~per se~~ may provide reasonable justification for a democratic government to concern itself with family life. Just how that concern is implemented, however, depends on how government evaluates the need to protect institutions and groups indirectly affected by change. Public officials honestly may judge changes involving cohabitation, divorce, separation, women in the workforce, unmarried parenthood, contraception, and abortion to endanger a nation's future. Or, they may judge such changes to jeopardize the condition of, say, the very old or the very young or any other group not directly a participant in any of these changes but nonetheless a potential beneficiary or victim of them. To put it differently, decisions about the routine conduct of everyday family life ideally are outside the concern of public policy. Unless and until these decisions are made in numbers sufficient to endanger the polity or to destabilize preexisting public programs, government

intervention is not appropriate. When intervention does occur, public policy should seek to modify the pattern of social change through incentives and restraints, to reconstruct public programs in a manner consonant with newly-dominant values and behavior, or to combine these responses in some appropriate mix. Whatever intervention does occur is itself susceptible to acceptance, rejection, or refinement.

The public purpose most likely to justify intervention has been a national interest in arresting a precipitous decline in population. When a perceived need to check precipitous population decline served as a guiding image for public policy, it justified intervention -- intervention by carrot, to be sure, in the form of services and benefits, not intervention by stick in the form of regulation -- but intervention still where intervention would otherwise be deplored. "There is a legitimate national need to encourage procreation" is easier for politicians to abide than "there is a national need to improve family life."

By the same token, a perceived need to arrest precipitous population growth can also be a guiding image for public intervention in otherwise private family matters. In a democratic society, that image may lead to family planning services and to education in family planning, to a liberal attitude on abortion, to adoption subsidies, and to rejection of universal benefits for children. In a collective society like the People's Republic of China, the intervention stemming from that same guiding image may be active rather than passive -- prohibitions and penalties rather than benefits and services.

family policy acquired high repute as a logical aspect of the population policy emphasized by Alva Myrdal in *Nation and Family*. Instead of developing an equally logical guiding principle, however, recent proponents of what they term family policies are more likely to assert the desirability of universal programs than to attend to the justification for breaching the wall of separation between government and family life. To the extent that this wall should be breached, I believe that a national interest in protecting affected children against the consequences of social change furnishes a guiding principle for the modern era. Services, benefits, and sometimes regulations targeted to such children constitute a defensible family policy. Indeed, the present legitimacy of family policy is to be found in its role as a disguised children's policy.

I. Pronatalism and Family Policy

Let us recognize the uncertainty that has been engendered in recent years by widespread use of the term, "family policy." We know that it was once understood to mean population policy -- incentives to procreate provided by a government that views with alarm the consequences of an aging population. So, in 1941 Alva Myrdal's point of departure was the plausibility of Sven Wicksell's most pessimistic hypothesis about Swedish fertility and nuptiality. What Myrdal termed the "most reasonable" of the four alternative hypotheses constructed by Wicksell pointed to "a continuous, rapid, and cumulative population decline" as the birth rate declined from the 14.1 of 1931-1935 to the predicted 6.4 in 1981-1985. The most obvious effect of population decline, Myrdal wrote, is "the aging of society." Its effects were

described in the grimmest of terms:

The psychological attitude of the people will be different . . . Old people are not the most enterprising investors or administrators. Still, they will have the power over wealth and will hold the key positions . . . The total cultural atmosphere must tend to become static as the old gain in importance.

. . . Old people are not the ones particularly to tackle new problems or to adjust with a minimum of friction to new situations. Yet economic and political problems are likely to become more complex. Problems are less likely to take care of themselves in a shrinking population than in an expanding one. A certain psychological discomfort may also result from the very competition between young and old. Public advantages of the one group or the other will be the subject of battles which the old are likely to win on account both of greater power and of greater numbers at the ballot. . . It will certainly also be more difficult for the young to advance because the old will more completely control the career posts. The conclusion can hardly be avoided that it will become more difficult to be young in a society that is controlled by the aged.

Nothing in this gloomy forecast impelled Myrdal to deviate from recognition of the right to voluntary parenthood as a superior value premise related to the principles of democracy. Naitner obstacles to providing knowledge about birth control nor force or coercion with regard to matters of matrimony and parenthood are allowable, she wrote. Moreover, any propaganda for families and increased families should be honest. Exhortations to duty, to patriotic glorification, or to religious obedience were believed to be undemocratic and hence beyond the pale.

Myrdal's argument that avoidance of precipitous and destructive population decline should be made compatible with voluntary parenthood led to a practical conclusion: "Measures to encourage families should take the form of honest education and of attempts to remodel the social and economic foundations of the family institution . . . Parenthood can be made voluntary and society can remodel its very basis so that more children can still be welcomed."

For society to remodel its very basis, however, it would obviously not be enough to develop or change one or another social program. Population policy seemed to Myrdal to be inseparable from the many other goals and values of society, to be an "intensification and redirection" of all social policy because "It would be futile, not to say undemocratic, to try through propaganda to influence the individual to have more children without offering him more appropriate social conditions for his children."

The Swedish birth rate for 1981-1985 will actually exceed the most optimistic of the Wicksell hypotheses. No one knows to what extent that outcome is a function of the Swedish experiment in social policy

and to what extent the outcome is attributable to those mysterious forces that have long made demographic forecasting so treacherous. Twenty-five years after the publication of *Nation and Family*, Mrs. Myrdal acknowledged that, if writing the book anew, she would have reemphasized aspects of the message to reduce any semblance of a "pronatalist" approach. Her 1967 note goes on to say that while trends in Sweden during the 1920s and 1930s ~~if unchecked~~ pointed to population decline, it "was a temporary thing, serving to dramatize the message of our work on formulating a social family policy but not in reality directing that policy to any greater inclination to breed children."

Yet the discussion of "Problems and Principles" that constitutes the first part of *Nation and Family* surely has coequal themes -- one of them deals with the bleak social and economic consequences of Wicksell's "most plausible" hypothesis about depopulation; the other deals with the importance to democratic values of voluntary decisions about parenthood. To forestall the bleak consequences without disturbing democratic values, Myrdal addressed the idea of population policy -- the intensification and redirection of all social policy to provide more appropriate social conditions for parenthood. Without a national need to check the apparent trend to depopulation, the argument loses an important theoretical underpinning. Without an explicit tie between pronatalism and the national interest, intensification and redirection of all social policy to provide more appropriate social conditions for parenthood becomes a policy objective in search of a justification.

Sweden's program of government services for parents and children was instituted with the pronatalist need still very much a part of the scene. By the time demographic trends changed, the program had become institutionalized. When Mrs. Myrdal indicated she would "reduce" the pronatalist emphasis, the services program was deeply ingrained in the Swedish system to the point where many who by then took the program for granted would have been hard put to explain its origins and justification. Like the first stage of a rocket -- initially indispensable, subsequently superfluous -- pronatalism fell away from Swedish population policy after carrying it to a critical height.

The encouragement of procreation is a perfectly legitimate governmental objective (as is the discouragement of procreation) when data suggest trends towards depopulation or overpopulation. Whether government efforts really make a difference is doubtful, but a package of services-to-families (or to small families alone) is an obvious and logical way to try. Once pronatalism is shed, however, what is left of population policy is an implementation strategy -- services to families -- that lacks a public purpose. When population policy is reduced to services to families, the services program is left without the problem it was designed to overcome. Pronatalism offers a clear connection between serving the national interest and diverting extensive public resources to families. If pronatalism is not or need not be a public policy objective, why should otherwise self-sufficient families be favored over any other social groups in the distribution of public goods and services?

The family policy idea that became a rallying point for many social-welfare-oriented scholars and activists in the United States in the 1970s did not come out of the same pronatalist heritage that distinguished much of European family policy and that accounted for the institutionalized strength of European family policy. Lacking roots in the American system, when the term "family policy" was first broached about, it was, as Professor Laurence Lynn put it, "as amorphous and unyielding to precise analysis" as any term in current policy debates. Of course, this was so because the family policy idea had no underpinning in America -- no pronatalism to guide thinkers and doers as it had guided Alva Myrdal through "Problems and Principles" to specific provisions in Sweden.

"Why now in the U.S. are you raising the question of family policy? What is the current crisis that suggests the need for a family policy?" Rita Liljestrom of Sweden asked American participants at an international conference on family policy. Why, indeed, and what is the crisis? According to proponents, family policy is needed deliberately to nourish "strong" families, and to forestall family-weakening consequences of other public policy. Improving the quality of family life rather than increasing family size is now the goal espoused by proponents of family policy. For policymaking purposes, that goal is at once too vague and too ambitious.

II. The Limits of Social Policy

The design of policies that positively affect the quality of family life challenges the inventive capacity of any government. Problems of design present only the first of several difficulties. A

second difficulty appears in libertarian democracies that prize privacy and reject the primacy of the state -- constitutional limits and legal tradition constrain permissible government action. Finally, even good inventions that are within traditional and constitutional boundaries may pose insuperable administrative problems as ideas move toward implementation.

The intangible sentiments that are the foundation of strong family relations are susceptible neither to legislation nor to executive order or court decree. Government has no mechanism to enforce love, affection, and concern between husband and wife, parent and child, or sibling and sibling. Because intangibles are so important to family relationships, even identifying the characteristics of strong families and of failing families poses problems. No one knows, for example, how many persons live together in family groups sharing resources and chores, nursing each other as necessary, and celebrating or commiserating with each other as the occasion requires, all as a practical adjustment to life" demands rather than out of deep emotional attachment. Nor does anyone know how many superficially stable families are really composed of incompatible parents sustaining family life temporarily "for the sake of the children." And if they could be identified, it is a safe bet that one observer would characterize such families as strong since they hold together, and another would characterize them as failing.

Whatever the route to the conclusion -- statistical data and scholarly analysis, personal experience and observation, or reports in the media and from opinion leaders -- a decision to countenance family policy implies a belief that a valuable institution is in jeopardy,

that the family model is a good one and that it needs more shoring up than private agencies can manage. were it not believed that the model is a good one, government could be indifferent to its deterioration. were families not believed to be in jeopardy, government would be expected to respect the privacy of these voluntary associations through which people share emotional, physical, and economic strengths and weaknesses, and re-create themselves.

The path from private institution to public responsibility can be readily traced. Each family remains an essentially private institution, as long as the various needs of family members are met by the working of the idiosyncratic and volatile formula that defines family relationships. when the needs of individual members cannot be satisfied by changes in the formula, the family becomes dysfunctional. when enough families become dysfunctional, public or quasi-public support systems try to take up the slack, meet missing economic, physical, or emotional needs.

Family policy has to do with mechanisms for identifying family dysfunction, and with the organization of responsibility in public support systems: decisions about when public programs will take up the slack and the conditions under which they will do so. In the ideal world, there would be no slack to take up -- every child would be planned and wanted, would be physically- and emotionally-healthy, and would live with economically self-sufficient parents who maintained affectionate, interdependent relationships between themselves and with their child or children -- and there would be no need for family policy. In the real world, dysfunctional families are not uncommon, perhaps are inevitable. Indeed, an important study group in the United

States has characterized the "self-sufficient, protected, and protective family" as a myth. As they have come to command more money and more services, it seems sensible not only to ask how policies to help dysfunctional families are working, but also to ask whether policy should be designed to forestall family dysfunction rather than only to mitigate its consequences after the fact.

Dual objections, one philosophical and one practical, are quickly raised to the idea of family policy designed to forestall dysfunction. The philosophical objection holds that family is a last bastion of privacy in an already overregulated and overorganized society, and should not be the object of policy that would surely be intrusive but might not be useful. The practical objection is that the diversity of family forms and styles is simply too great to be encompassed by a national policy, that what is dysfunctional in one family may be quite tolerable in another. Since both objections are compelling, the burden is on proponents to make the case for family policy that is preventive in intent.

On this subject, politicians are hard to persuade, sensing trouble. The politician who will jeopardize election or reelection prospects by subjecting family relations to public intervention wants to be able to identify the specific target and to be able to explain why it is an appropriate one. Programs that even imply the idea of a "model family" are unacceptable to a society devoted to maintaining numerous cultural and religious heritages, each carrying its own view of how a family should function.

Dysfunctional families once were a problem for voluntary charity or for local government. A pregnant adolescent, for example, might be sheltered away from her home neighborhood until delivered of a child for whom adoptive parents had been arranged. The unfortunate adolescent could be reported as visiting grandparents on the farm. Alternatively, a pregnant adolescent of the lower-class, in a family without appearances to keep up, waited out her time at home, then added her child to the household for collective care. In either case, members of parliament and cabinet officers were not expected to worry about it.

In the United States, dysfunction stemming from economic weakness was recognized formally as a national problem only as recently as 1935 when the Social Security Act made provision for money payments to children deprived of parental support because of death, continued absence from the home, or incapacity of a parent. That same act (a piece of legislation devoid of pronatalist roots) recognized dysfunction stemming from emotional weakness in authorizing limited services to some children -- homeless, dependent, neglected -- deprived or intimate ties to their biological parents. For 25 years, neither the money side of public assistance nor child-welfare services got more than cursory attention. For even more years, no national government response whatever developed to such other manifestations of family dysfunction as abusive behavior, incest, delinquency, adolescent pregnancy, runaway youth. Not all of these unpleasant matters lend themselves to a case count, but as adolescent pregnancies, runaways, divorces, and abortions each approached or passed one million per year, increasing numbers of families in the United States may have come to

sense it could happen to them.

Any such sense would have been reinforced by commentaries on the state of the family that began to appear in the mid-seventies. An example is the sweeping judgment rendered by a Columbia University psychiatrist: "Drug abuse, alcohol abuse, minor and violent crimes are increasing problems not just in poor black families, but in affluent white families, not just in broken families, but in seemingly intact families, not just when mothers work, but also when they stay home. The American family is being undermined by the divisive forces at work in society. . . ." If no data were offered to support the judgment, it still sounded right. Family dysfunction became a public issue less because of actual evidence of massive numbers of new cases than because of a generalized uneasiness about family stability with which numerous families could empathize.

Even for those who are persuaded that families are more troubled than they used to be, what government might do to help them and how it will do it are political questions of considerable complexity. The problem is that as a target of public policy, family takes on the characteristics of a kaleidoscope. Its most common form is the nuclear grouping of father, mother, and minor children within a single household, but it is also more and it is less and it can be none of these and it is different at one time from another. But in recent years, in the United States at least, the so-called typical family of working father, homemaker mother, and two minor children accounts for only 7 percent of husband-wife families. Yet, at some time in their histories most American families still take on that configuration. If public policy is addressed to the 7 percent it has immediate effect on

only that small fraction of families, but -- like high school enrollment which involves a comparable percentage of the population at any moment -- it deals with a period through which most persons have or will have passed.

Family forms change not only as an inevitable consequence of the passage of time, they also vary as a consequence of free choice. The two-parent nuclear grouping may include either a homemaker mother or a working mother: the trend is clearly toward the latter, although there are still more of the former. Variations on the basic nuclear theme are extensive. Single-parent households resulting from death, desertion, separation, divorce, unwed motherhood, and single-person adoption obviously constitute a family. So do households in which a child or children live with a grandparent or some relative other than parent or parents. And while a marital relationship or the presence of a child is usually thought of as a *side-gua-ooo* of family, many cohabiting couples -- including some whose relationship is homosexual -- consider themselves to be no less a family than is a legally married, childless couple. An early lesson learned by politicians who recently took on the issue as a policy problem was that policy would have to recognize social change: the existence of varieties of families and of numerous patterns of behavior within families. Social policy could not be written to address the family, but only families.

Big numbers, then, help explain the interest in families. Problems of families become public problems when there is fresh thinking about old issues as in paternal care of infants or when the presumably deviant population can be counted in the millions as is the case with divorce, abortion, adolescent pregnancy, and runaway

children. In other areas like family violence, data are soft but estimates that range into the millions and terms like "epidemic proportions" are accepted as surrogates for hard numbers.

Another explanation of the interest in families in the United States is the identification in middle-class families of behavior that Americans once associated with the welfare class. For example, among the latter, significant numbers of deserting fathers and unmarried mothers were long taken as evidence of unstable family patterns. High rates of divorce -- since 1975 the divorce rate annually has been exactly half the marriage rate -- and of abortions now offer evidence of a comparable instability in middle-class family patterns. Again, while data on family violence are fragmentary, disorderly, and even suspect in some respects, what there are suggest there is no socio-economic class or ethnic group that may be ignored. "Studies of the incidence of domestic violence," a United States Senate Committee reported in 1978, "have found that it permeates all socio-economic levels." Growth in the number of working mothers of young children has created a child-care problem by no means limited to the poor. The disposition of society to accept marital dissolution and out-of-wedlock births as part of the regular order of things has not been accompanied by a comparable disposition of the fathers involved to make child-support payments part of their regular order, even when they can afford to do so.

It develops, in short, that loving, mutually-supportive, traditional, long-lasting family relationships are no more certain outside the very poor population than within it. American and Western European politicians willing to address families as a policy issue come

to understand that the political stakes are high because the population of troubled families is isolated neither by geography nor class nor race.

A conference of family policy experts meeting at Notre Dame University a few years ago identified three faces of family policy that collectively address most troubled families. The three faces are described as economic, remedial, and substitutional. The most common form of the first is a system of children's allowances or of tax benefits for children -- compensation to families for the costs of rearing children. A second approach, described by Professor Pierre de Bie of Belgium as remedial, emphasizes counseling services and family education programs -- essentially emotional and psychological assistance to parents. The third face of family policy in this formulation is one that substitutes for direct family care by providing such services as day-care of children, home health aides, and meals for snut-ins -- routine services for households unable for whatever reason to provide such services for themselves.

While each of the three faces appears as part of some country's family policy activity, all three are rarely found together. But, absent the combination, is there really a family policy? In summing up the work of the international conference held at Notre Dame, Professors Joan Aldous and Wilfried Duxon have acknowledged the pragmatic character of family policy and put it in the best possible light: "The absence of any guiding image," they have written, "enables policy-makers to take measures which, while they may lack coherence, also cope with the diversified and even conflicting demands of ideologically opposed groups in any given society."

A less charitable view holds that it is a guiding image that defines a public policy. Without a guiding image, any program expected to affect any household in any way may reasonably be characterized as an element of family policy. Without a guiding image, political actions can be taken independent of social objectives. A guiding image supplies the "why" that justifies the "what". Forty years ago, Alva Myrdal had a guiding image -- the need to stem, by democratic means, an anticipated precipitous decline in the Swedish birth rate. The image guided a flow of provisions designed to effect change. Similarly, in the United States two decades ago, Daniel Patrick Moynihan had a guiding image -- the need to stem, by democratic means, a perceived increase in female-headed black families in the United States. At the respective times, their respective nations chose to buy Myrdal's image and to suppress Moynihan's guiding image. America continues to worry about the numbers and the conditions of female-headed black families, but it still has no guiding, ~~image~~, controlling, image of the problem and no flow of provisions to effect change.

No one knows how to tell whether the quality of family life has been improved. Judgments about the quality of the air or the water depend on counts of increased or decreased levels of harmful particulates. An evaluation of the quality of family life also depends on an output measure. The birth rate is a convenient output measure although not an infallible one. An increase in a previously low birth rate can be a reflection of an improved quality of family life. On the other hand, such an increase is now evident in the United States despite the conspicuous absence of programs designed to affect family life.

If there are to be costs incurred for policies to improve the quality of family life, there should be a way to recognize benefits. I believe it to be in the health and welfare of children.

III. Family Policy for Unlucky Children

Much of the thrashing about on behalf of family policy that has been apparent in the last eight or ten years is best appreciated as an attempt by proponents to have governments do better things for children under a family policy label than had been done previously under the children's policy label. Children's advocates correctly understood the consequences of recent social change to be increased jeopardy for a large number of children. If their needs were to be met, a formulation more imaginative than the old category of "child welfare services" had to be invented. "Child welfare services" served smaller numbers badly. Larger numbers seemed doomed to equally indifferent service. No country could point with pride to its children's policy as a model to emulate. Family policy, on the other hand, seemed to give brighter promise.

Concern about the numbers of unlucky children in real or potential jeopardy is well-taken. Children living in two-parent households that are economically self-sufficient are low on the roster of public concerns, but over the last decade divorce, separation, unmarried parenthood, adolescent sexuality, and women's entry into the labor force -- social change on a massive scale -- has worked to increase the numbers of American children who do not live in two-parent households that are economically self-sufficient. These children are in jeopardy. Their physical care, economic support, and social and emotional

development are less likely to be adequate than is true of children deprived of neither a parent nor of a parent's earned income.

In the United States, the proportion of children living with one parent has almost doubled during the last decade. The proportion of children with working mothers has increased from under 40 percent to 55 percent. Among children under 5, the increase is from 29 percent to 46 percent. In 1970, one child in 9 lived with a mother only; by 1982, one child in 5 lived with a mother only. (Among blacks, the change was from three in 10 in 1970 to nearly one-half of all black children in 1982). The increases in the numbers of children in female-headed households are largely attributable to divorce and to out-of-wedlock childbearing. Children living with a divorced mother increased from 2.3 million to 5.1 million, while children living with never-married mothers increased from 0.5 million to 2.8 million.

The median family income of children living in husband-wife families was about the same in 1981 as in 1970; that of children living in mother-only families fell more than 10 percent and is just one-third that of luckier children. Children are now the age group in the United States more likely than any other age group to be living in poverty. Poverty among the aged declined from 25 percent to 15 percent between 1970 and 1981, but among children poverty increased from 15 percent to nearly 20 percent. Although the increase in the proportion -- from 10.5 to 14.7 -- of white children in poverty was greater than that for black children, a very large percentage (42) of black children were poor in 1970 and an even larger percentage (45) in 1981. By the end of the 1970's, an absent father -- separated, divorced, deserted, or never married to the mother -- accounted for the eligibility of 83 percent of

children dependent on public assistance. "Absence of the father," the category most sensitive to social change, thus continued a steady growth: it had been 70 percent in the late 1960's and 62 percent at the beginning of that decade.

The tiresome recitation of numbers need not be prolonged. The economic status of children has deteriorated, the living arrangements of children have deteriorated, the likelihood of parental care of small children has declined. These are matters of moment both in the United States and in other countries. But these problems are not new, only unsolved old problems that have come to affect an ever-larger number. Whatever its other consequences, social change spawns groups of disadvantaged children.

Family policy has little or nothing to do with what I term "lucky children" -- those in intact, self-sufficient, "normal" households. Social scientists and politicians have both learned in recent years that the world is harder and more demanding than it seemed to be in the sixties when it was possible to espouse a program -- wasteful or no -- and argue that families could choose to use it or to pass it over. "Women," it was often said in the United States a dozen years ago, "should be able to stay at home or to work, as they decide. Day-care services should be universally available so that those who choose to work full- or part-time are able to do so without being concerned about child-care." In the world of the eighties, we know there is no free country that can implement such an idea. Nor can all children be provided more than token government-allowances.

Yet, for child advocates, family policy has an appeal not casually dismissed. For nothing else has provided consequential benefits and services to unlucky children while seeming to be concerned with meeting national need. The Swedish experiment in social benefits remains the envy of child advocates everywhere. Although its origins in pronatalism are often overlooked and now regretted by Alva Myrdal herself, the program of benefits and services to children remains. Family policy is a fabrication of the mind that sees a solution to the needs of a larger number of disadvantaged children than comparable policies with other names had been able to provide smaller numbers of disadvantaged children.

Family policy is a response to social change, a way for government to mitigate the effects of social change on children. It is to children's policy what a guaranteed annual income is to a children's allowance program -- a new version of an old benefit. It cannot be more because social policy in democratic societies is more likely to accept than impede decisions that couples make about beginning, formalizing, interrupting, or terminating family life. In the family sphere, social policy follows social change. Social policy is incapable of controlling change yet must be sensitive to the needs of those affected by it. So family policy is action by government to sustain innocent victims of change in family styles -- children. Once those limits to family policy are understood, family policy ceases to be all things to all persons, priority needs fall into place, and governments become less likely to enact imperfect, ambivalent, or simply useless "family" policies.

Divorcees, children and the public

by JAN TROST

Introduction

Children or minors are vulnerable; they should be taken care of properly--physically, emotionally as well as socially.

A century ago, like today, most children stayed with both parents during the period until they reached age of majority. A century ago, however, those children, who did not, were either born by an unmarried mother ("out of wedlock") or one of the parents had deceased. Today, very few are born by a truly unmarried mother (she is cohabiting with the father of the child) and very few have a deceased parent. Most of the children, who do not stay with both parents until age of majority, are sooner or later experiencing a parental divorce or separation.

When one of the married parents dies, normally, the surviving is automatically awarded sole custody of the minor. But when the parents divorce, there has to be a decision about custody, one way or another.

When a social phenomenon is becoming increasingly common, changes in the social policy of society should be considered. We will here discuss the recent issues of sole and joint custody as well as to address three areas where the social policy should be considered--the concern being the best interest of the child with the background of the above mentioned changes.

The three areas are

- A. The divorce law and its application;
- B. The financial situation for the children and the parents, post-divorce; and
- C. Joint and sole custody

Custody

Custody can have a lot of diverse meanings. It seems to be evident that most laws of today, one way or another, indicate that to be a custodian means to have the rights and responsibilities to take care of the minor child and to decide about the child's upbringing. The Californian law, e.g., states that the one having custody of a child has "the rights and responsibilities of childrearing." The Norwegian law states that custody means that the child has a right to be taken care of and a right to solicitude. The Swedish law is nowadays more explicit: The custodian has the right and responsibility to decide in matters concerning the child's

personal circumstances and shall in accordance with the child's increase in age and maturity take more and more consideration to the child's points of view and wishes.

When looking carefully at the "rights and responsibilities" it is evident, as Smith (1980) has noticed, that there are truly no rights, only responsibilities; to decide for the best of the child cannot reasonably be called having rights; it is a question of responsibilities, whatever it might be called.

When the parents are married and living together with each other and with a minor child, both have custody (in most societies). The legal custody should, however, not be presumed to be the true or physical custody. There are, without doubts, families where only one of the parents, in some cases the mother, in other cases the father, practices a sole physical custody. The background for this might e.g., be one's dominance over the other, or the other's refusal to participate in any decisions or care.

Since this article concerns the post-divorce situation, let us not bother about custody when the parents are married, when they are cohabiting, when they have been cohabiting and are separated, or when they have never been married to or cohabiting with each other.

After divorce it has been most common for the court to decide or confirm which of the parents should be given the burden or the advantage of having custody of the child. In true life sometimes this has meant that the legal custody has been with one of the parents, but the true or physical custody has been with e.g., one of the grandparents of the child.

In many of the "developed" countries the tradition during most of this century has been to award the custody to the mother, e.g., for the US it is estimated that the custody of all children except about 5-10 percent has been awarded to the mother (cf. Weitzman and Dixon, 1979). Sweden has slightly different figures, 80-85 percent of the children are awarded to the mother (Trost, 1975). Some countries, e.g., Belgium, have traditionally more often awarded children to the father; in these cases, however, the laws have clearly said that custody should not be given to the parent who has "caused the disruption" of the family.

In most cases the decision by the court, however, is a confirmation of what the parents have decided upon themselves. In some (many?) cases the mother has been the "natural" custodian e.g., because she has been a housewife, because of the job of the father (traditionally) has not made it

possible for him to take care of the children (in Belgium in fact when the legal custody has been awarded to the father, in many cases his mother has had the true custody). In some cases the parents have agreed that the mother should be the custodian and have based their decision upon the perception that the father would not be given the custody of the child if the court were to make a true decision and not only a confirmation. Not infrequently has this perception been impressed upon the parents or improved by legal advisors. In such cases no one knows what the court would really have decided. Trost (1975) has shown that in Sweden in the beginning of the 1970's the courts were more "radical" in their true decisions than were parents when they decided. It should, however, be noticed that the few cases (less than 5 percent of all divorce cases with at least one minor child) where the court has to actively decide are not necessarily representative for all cases—those where one of the parents at an early (or less early) stage in the process gives up.

"What is in the best interest of the child?" is the question upon which a decision should be made. No one knows the answer, but in some countries joint custody is said to normally be in the best interest of the minor child.

Most extreme in this respect, to our knowledge, are California and Sweden. Since 1980 the Californian law says that the first order of preference, according to the best interest of the child, should be joint custody and that it should so be awarded when the parents agree to an award of joint custody. Furthermore, "in making an award of custody to either parent, the court shall consider which parent is more likely to allow the child or children frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent." The law also states that the parent's sex should not be taken into consideration. It is easy to say "tulip-rose."

The Swedish law valid from July 1, 1983, goes even further than the Californian law. The Swedish law states that the joint custody during marriage shall continue after a divorce automatically if not one of the parents or both ask for sole custody. If they agree, their agreement should, in Sweden as well as in California, be interpreted by the court as in line with the best interest of the child. From 1977 the Swedish law gave the parents after divorce (and after as well as during cohabitation) a right to have a joint custody if they agreed. Earlier the Swedish law was very precise in stating that after a divorce there could be only one custodian.

In Norway as well as in many states of the USA, the law was not as clear. This has meant that in Norway, as well as in some of the states of

the USA, some courts have interpreted the law in one way (sole custody only) or in the other (joint custody not being against the law).

Gradually more and more of the states in the USA have moved over to clear statements that joint custody should be an option if the parents agreed. Norway has had such a law since 1982.

So, what is joint custody?

How common is it?

The Californian law differentiates between joint physical custody and joint legal custody and states that awarding joint legal custody does not necessarily mean awarding joint physical custody. To our knowledge this law does not define joint legal custody but seems to define joint physical custody as when the parents assure the child of frequent and continuing contact with both parents. It is still unclear to us whether a joint legal custody could exist when e.g., the child stays with one of the parents and the other lives far away which makes direct personal contacts with the child impossible and only makes indirect contact possible (via telephone, letters, etc.).

The Swedish law is clear in these respects. The child can very well live all the time with only one of the custodians, but if the other, because of absence, illness or otherwise, cannot take part in the decisions, then the one with whom the child lives is allowed to decide as long as the decisions are not of high importance to the future of the child. The Swedish meaning of the term indicates that joint custody is fairly empty as a concept because if the parents can communicate in a reasonable way, trust each other, etc., then there is no need for a joint custody, if both of the ex-spouses look upon themselves as responsible parents and can communicate, a sole custody would be enough. But on the other hand a joint custody might very well help or force the one with whom the child does not regularly stay to go on feeling the responsibility and help or force the one with whom the child stays to go on letting the other one to be allowed or forced to act responsibly.

A Swedish study indicates that in about 75 percent of the cases with joint custody the child or children stay with one of the parents, seemingly a sole physical custody and joint legal custody, and in 20 percent of the cases the child or children alternate more or less regularly between the houses of the parents/custodians (Anderason and Sandström, 1982).

The American conception seems to equate the joint physical custody with the joint legal custody. E.g., Roman and Haddad (1978) define joint

custody as an arrangement "in which parents agree to equally share the authority for making all decisions that significantly affect the lives of their children" and "in which child care is split equally, or at the most discrepant, child care resolves itself into a two-to-one split."

Regularly, the one not having custody is supposed to pay child support; whether he or she does so is another question. In Sweden it was decided, a couple of years after the law about joint custody came, that even in cases of joint custody, the one with which the child does not stay has to pay child support.

To our knowledge no truly reliable data on the occurrence of joint custody in Norway, Sweden or the USA exist. From a Swedish study on the aftermath of divorce we have, however, extracted some data. Data for this study was collected in 1980/81 by post mailed questionnaires sent to a representative sample of men and women who divorced in 1978 (cf. Trost and Hultåker, 1982). In about 13 percent of the cases the ex-spouses have joint custody. There are no differences in the rate of joint and sole custody when the children are boys and girls. There is, however, a slight curvilinear tendency by age of the child. The rate of joint custody decreases by age to the 7-9 year class and increases by higher ages.

Among the children living under legal joint custody 33 percent also live under physical joint custody while 44 percent are taken care of by their mother and 17 percent by their father.

The same study shows that when there is a sole custody, 70 percent of the children are under the custody of their mother but only 14 percent are under their father's custody (five percent live with physical joint custody and the remaining ten percent are in custody under someone else or there is a lack of response).

From another Swedish study that aimed at getting knowledge about the day care arrangements in Uppsala (cf. Trost, 1983), we have extracted information on custody among divorced parents and also among separated parents who have cohabited.

This study shows that 19 percent of the children are under joint custody of the ex-partners. It also shows that the older the child the less common is joint custody; 33 percent with joint custody when the child is 0-3 years-down to five percent when the age of the child is 16-18 years.

The same study shows that when sole custody is awarded, as many as 89 percent of the children have the mother as sole custodian and only 11 percent the father.

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Data also indicate a strong tendency to the effect that, when sole custody is awarded, the older the child the more common it is that the father is awarded custody of the child; when the child is aged 0-6 as much as 100 percent of the children are under the sole custody of the mother and down to 80 percent when the child is 16-18 years old--20 percent of the children live with their father who is the sole custodian (cf. Table 1).

Thus when considering joint as well as sole custody, we can see that the occurrence of sole mother-custody remains fairly constant by age of the child. The younger the child the more common it is for the fathers to have sole custody or joint custody--about a constant relative number of fathers are awarded either sole or joint custody independent of age of the child. Formulated otherwise, the younger the child, the less often the custody is with the father alone, but the children are "compensated" by joint custody.

Thus, with legal joint or sole custody, the old traditional standard remains to the effect that more women than men take care of the children; traditions change slowly (cf. Trost, 1980).

Table 1: Sole and Joint Custody When Parents are Divorced or Separated after Cohabitation (Uppsala, Sweden, 1982), Percent

Age of the Child	Sole Custody		Joint Custody	n
	Mother	Father		
0-3	67	0	33	43
4-6	73	0	27	165
7-9	73	2	25	210
10-12	71	10	19	179
13-15	68	15	17	212
16-18	76	19	5	155
All	72	9	20	964

Source: Data processed for this paper, based upon the material described by Trost (1983).

In the divorce study the respondents were asked whether they were satisfied or not with the custody arrangements; 76 percent of the men and 71 percent of the women were "much" or "rather" satisfied among those who have joint custody, while only 53 percent of the men but as many as 81 percent of the women were satisfied among those with sole custody. It seems reasonable to assume that the difference between men and women in their satisfaction with sole custody, to a high extent, is dependent upon more women having sole custody than men.

Policy Implications

What social policies could be implied? We will mention some possibilities.

First, however, let us indicate some limitations that are obvious to us. They, to some extent, build upon our views on what is humane; one might claim that we hereby take some political stands from which we want to and try to abstain.

1. The aim of social policy should not be to help individuals or families to be happier, neither should it try to enforce higher degrees of happiness; thus, emotions should not be the target. The rationale for this statement is the pragmatic notion that society cannot successfully legislate about emotions or feelings but about practical/technical/economic means to support groups or individuals.

The aims should be of a more technical nature and should be attempts toward simplifying people's lives by financial resources, matrimonial laws, abortion laws, etc. These types of policies will hopefully lead to more persons surviving divorces in a decent or good way.

2. Social policy should not aim at changing "natural" trends--to the contrary they should aim at following the "natural" trends. Let us exemplify: From 1956 to 1973 Hungary had a liberal abortion law. The fertility rate was low in the beginning of the 1970s and the abortion rate was high. So the pro-natalist and pro-abortion government changed its attitude into a pro-natalist and anti-abortionist way.

As a result in 1973, Hungary got a restrictive abortion law. As an effect of this law the fertility rate increased and the abortion rate decreased. But, as everyone knowing something about reality could

predict, the changes were mainly of a temporary nature. People know how to handle and circumvent—that is true for especially the better off in society; those suffering from such policy changes are to be found mainly among the less well off. Furthermore, it can be argued that to try to increase the fertility rate through abortion policy is inhumane, illogical, and obviously inefficient. In Rumania, as Tietze (1981) has shown, the legal abortion rate decreased after a restrictive abortion law was introduced in 1966, the fertility rate increased for a while, and returned to almost the same level as before the law changed. Most important, however, is that the abortion induced mortality rate increased tremendously.

3. We all can probably agree upon the statement that the family is the most stable and resistant social institution. Thus the family should be regarded, from societal perspective, as a valuable phenomenon. Does this mean that parts of the social policy should be family policy? No, not necessarily.

It could be argued that the policy should be directed toward individuals and toward households. The weaker part of e.g. a marriage needs some legal protection in order to be protected from some of the physical, mental, financial, etc. abuse that the stronger part could enforce. Principally speaking, the same is true e.g., for the minor child versus the parents.

The household, not the family, might be the proper target for social policy means, like e.g., housing subsidies. This is partly due to the problems of defining family in a practically proper way. Partly it is due to, the concern discussed above, of technical and not emotional aims. The household is reasonably easy to define, and it is a limited unit with physical/technical needs to a much higher extent than is the family which is less limited and with more emotional needs.

Many of the policy makers fear or dislike the increases in divorce rates. So what could they do?

Before answering that question we have to ask them why they fear or dislike increases in divorce rates. Two types of answers are most likely. One of them builds upon independent ethics, e.g., religious morals. The only advice in regards to social policy would be: try to convince the population to switch over to your independent ethics. Certainly, more restrictive divorce laws do not help; they might result in fewer divorces and more separations, but the means are inhumane—the end does not

justify the means.

The second type of answer to the question "Why?" builds upon consequential ethics; consequences like "the children suffer when their parents divorce," "almost always one of the partners will suffer," etc. The main advice to the policy maker would be that they thus should think of means to help those who would suffer.

Differtent sorts of data show that more children of divorced couples than nondivorced couples are worse off in society; they have e.g. higher crime rates. As Manniche (1984) has demonstrated, however, children to parents who have not divorced are better off "only on condition that the parents are reasonably happy or satisfied in their marriage."

Let us take a look at some possible social policy means in order to prevent the children from suffering.

A. Make improvements in the divorce law and in the application of the law.

One example of improvement in the law could be to get rid of all fault grounds. It could be argued that if one or both of the spouses do not get along together and want a divorce then there is a bad relationship and both are "responsible." Even if that argument would not be accepted, the fault grounds can only harm. If one of the parents is labelled by the other parent and also by society as the one who has "caused" the divorce, then there is an important risk that the child will also blame that parent for the disruption. Children want to and need to love both of their parents which is easier to do and fulfill if there is no blame.

The application of the law can be improved in a similar manner by e.g., attempting to resocialize legal advisors so they will abstain from ideas about blame when advising on concerns like division of property, child custody, child support, etc.

A third possibility for policy makers is for themselves to realize that a divorce or a wish for a divorce does not indicate a failure. Most of the fault laws as well as most no-fault laws imply, directly or indirectly, that the marriage was a failure. In almost all cases the marriage was not a failure; many years or many periods were probably good ones. So even if the last part of the marriage period was bad, the marriage should not be labelled as a failure. Even if the entire marriage would have been a "failure," such a labelling can only cause harm for the ex-spouse/parents, the children, or for

society.

It is common for divorced persons to state "I should never have married him/her." In most cases the statement is wrong--the problem is not that they married (they had in most cases many good periods together, they had nice children, etc.), the problem is that they look upon marriage in an unrealistic and too romantic way. Why should the marital dyad last until death apart?

It is positive for the couple (and mostly for the society and the couple's children) if the two partners are satisfied with each other and their situation. So is the case in most marriages to start with--the first years or so. If one or both of the two in a couple after some time are dissatisfied, the first period was still a good period--one good period is better than none.

If we look upon marriage to necessarily, or as an ideal should, last (happily) until death apart, then we are logically prone to classify divorces as marriage failures.

When a dyad or marriage is formed the only bond keeping the two together is the emotional bond or the love for each other, slightly exaggerated. After some time more and more bonds add, e.g. financial, social, and children. Since marriage is formed based upon the emotional bond, it seems reasonable that when that bond disappears--one or both cease to love the other partner--the dyad might, could, or even should be dissolved.

As indicated above, policy makers should be realistic and recognize what happens in society.

- B. Take a look at the financial situation for the children after divorce--and their parents.

We would not dream of claiming that a good financial situation makes children or adults happy. But certainly a poor financial situation can only harm and cause damages.

It is fairly easy to figure out what are the economic needs for children (or how much are the costs for the upbringing of a child per time unit). It is, however, not so easy to decide about who should bear the costs. Most of us would say that the parents should do so, during marriage as well as after divorce.

The parent who has the physical custody is more or less forced by the circumstances to bear his/her share. When only one of the parents has the physical custody, the other one should pay child

support. If he/she doesn't pay his/her share to meet the needs for the child, then what is to be done? In the USA a law will probably be taken to the effect that the non-custodial parent should be forced to pay, even if the two parents do not live in the same state.

Sweden has a somewhat different social policy system. If the non-custodial does not fulfill the obligations, society makes an advance payment upon request by the custodian, who has not only the possibility, not only the right, but also the responsibility to request if the child's needs cannot be fulfilled otherwise. Society in its turn requests reimbursements from the non-paying parent. If the reimbursements do not occur, the agency representing society can make attachments of wages.

The right of society to force the non-custodial to pay has not only the effect of justice. More of them will pay voluntarily because of the risk of being forced to pay. It will mean, whether voluntarily or forced, that he/she will not have guilt feelings for not supporting the child. The non custodial parent who can pay but does not, runs the risk of having guilt feelings for not supporting the child. Such guilt feelings easily turn into avoidance, which is negative for the child who needs positive contacts with both parents. Rules forcing the non-custodial parent to pay child support might have the effect that society will be blamed, but the risk that the child will be blamed is smaller. It can also mean that the non-custodial will try to use the visitation rights more often than not, which maybe should not be looked upon as a right of the parent but as responsibility. Generally, the more contacts between the child and its parents, the better for the child.

But what should or could the policy maker do when the non-custodial parent's financial situation does not permit the payment of any or all of the reasonable share of the costs? These cases are numerous and are sometimes forgotten in the debate.

Some societies, like e.g., the USA, have adopted a policy to the effect that the custodian could ask for and receive social welfare.

Is this policy solution a good one or the best one? There is a disadvantageous risk involved; to ask for welfare can easily lead to the unwanted effect that the parent will negatively label him/herself as a welfare-receiver or that the parent will perceive him/herself to be so labelled by others and by society. Perceived

negative labels can easily cause two negative effects for the child. One possibility is that the perceived labelling leads to a feeling of inferiority and apathy; the parent might come in a *circulus vitiosus*. These cases will in the long run mean higher demands upon society and thus increasing costs. Another risk is that the parent will be too proud to ask for help and too afraid of being labelled even if help is needed. In both cases the child will suffer, which is what the policy maker wanted to avoid.

In some societies policy makers have tried to avoid these possible negative effects by giving to the parent not only the right but also the responsibility to request that the difference between what the child needs and what the non-custodial parents pays be paid automatically to the custodial parent by society.

Policy makers should decide about rules for how the two parents should share the costs. It is better for the child if a non-satisfied parent blames society for unreasonable demands than if the parent blames the other parent.

Sweden recently changed its rules for how to decide about the amount to be paid in child support. Since this system seems to have many advantages in that culture, let us briefly describe it. Children are defined to cost (per time unit) a certain percentage, varying dependent upon age, of a "basic amount." This amount follows changes in the consumption index. Both parents' incomes are to be calculated after deduction of income taxes. Then the cost for personal needs and the costs for possible other dependents' personal needs are deducted. A "disposable" amount is left, one for the non-custodian and another one for the custodian. The decision on the amount to be paid by the non-custodian is based upon the belief that the two parents, relative to their remaining disposable amount, should take responsibility for the needs of the child.

But, if this amount to be paid is smaller than what each child is by law guaranteed to receive, then the difference is paid by society with no reimbursement demands. The rationale for the new system is that every child by the society which has the task of protecting the weak citizens (and children are weak, vulnerable, and dependent) should be guaranteed a decent financial standard. At the same time, if the parents cannot afford to support the child, society has the obligation to support not only for the child's sake but also for

the parents'. As Eriksson (1977) has demonstrated, many of the non-custodial parents had debts to society to the amount that they would never be able to pay--that was prior to the new system.

The only obvious problem with the "basic amount" system is the definition of the "basic amount," which is used in many other respects too, e.g., when calculating retirement pensions. The problem is that the "basic amount" is tied to changes in the consumption index. That was no problem earlier when salaries increased at the same rate as costs or even higher, but now the situation is the reverse.

- C. What about joint and sole custody? To our knowledge most laws claim that custody should be decided upon with the best interest of the child as the guideline. The fact that custody, when it is a matter of sole custody, in many countries is awarded mainly to the mother and fairly seldom to the father might be a problem as regards equity between men and women. It could hardly be a problem for the children; or at least not a problem worth being concerned about here.

The question of joint or sole custody, however, is relevant to our policy makers with consequential ethics against divorce.

Some countries, many of the states in the USA, and Norway, give the parents the option of joint or sole custody. California favors joint custody by pushing divorced parents toward joint custody, and Sweden favors joint custody by automatically awarding it if not one or both of the parents take a legal initiative for a sole custody.

It should, however, be remembered that legal custody is not equivalent to physical custody. Some societies have tried to regulate physical custody, thus making it closer to legal custody.

From the social policy perspective of the kind here discussed, the option of joint as well as sole custody has some obvious advantages; it gives the parents, who so wish, not only a physical joint custody but also a legal joint custody. But it allows also the possibility for the parents to have a joint legal and a sole physical custody. In some cases that is confusing. In other cases it might have the positive effects of allowing the non-physical custodian to take more responsibility for the child and making it easier for the physical custodian to force the other parent to take more responsibility, have more and better contacts with the child, and pay child support more willingly and regularly.

There can, however, be some doubts raised when society, like in Sweden and California, more or less obviously enforces a legal joint custody upon the parents and the children. Other social policy means should be taken together with the legal policy. Shouldn't the policy makers take some responsibility in making sure that the legal possibilities are not abused by e.g., legal advisors in order to avoid short-term conflicts, or dominant parents/ex-spouses?

In any case, whether there are possibilities for joint custody or only sole custody, the policy maker should, in order to prevent some negative effects of the divorce upon the child, take steps in order to help parents decide for short time periods. A solution at the time of divorce is by most individuals seen as a decision "forever," i.e., until the child is an adult. But a decision at one time can be a good solution for a limited time period and a bad solution in the long run. Thus, parents, legal advisors, and courts should be convinced that decisions at one time could very well be reconsidered and a redcision might be necessary. This certainly does not mean that the former decision was a failure. Too many of us look upon a divorce as a failure of the marriage, and too many of us look upon a need for a change of the custody as a failure of the earlier decision.

A joint custody with alternative living, e.g., shifts every week, might be good for the child if the parents live relatively close to each other, the same school district, the same neighborhood, etc. Such a situation is likely in many cases in the immediate aftermath of a divorce. But as time goes by, one of the parents will, more than likely, have to move which makes the alternate living impossible or inconvenient. It would be superfluous to label such an occurrence as a failure—it just means that it is time for a reconsideration and a new decision.

Finally, the intention of this paper has been to indicate some changes concerning family and children that are common if not universal. The second intention has been to discuss some possible social policy means that should or could follow the changes earlier indicated.

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The child's use of family resources

by GAY OCHILTREE and PAUL AMATO

The purpose of this paper is to examine the ways in which family resources are utilised by children in the development of competence. It is part of a more comprehensive study of children's perceptions of family life. This research sees the child as an active participant in family processes, not just in terms of the child's overt behaviour, but in terms of the child's feelings and interpretations of events which affect behaviour. Many studies of children and families have been concerned with very specific aspects of child development, such as emotional adjustment or school achievement. However, this study examined a range of outcomes in order to gain a broad picture of the child's developing capacities. The concept of competence, because of its breadth and generality, provides a theoretical framework leading to a more comprehensive picture of the child's abilities (Edgar, 1971, 1980; Inkeles, 1965; Smith, 1969; White, 1959). It also provides a perspective which stresses positive capacities rather than defects (Wine, 1981).

Competence

Competence is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1976) as 'ability (to do, for a task); sufficiency of means for a living.' As such, it covers a wide range of attributes and skills. For the purpose of this study,

'competence' means intelligence in the broadest sense: being able to take care of personal needs, knowing how to interact effectively with a range of people, being able to change the environment as well as adapt to it, and having the skills to cope with living in the particular local environment and in contemporary society. At an emotional level, it means having the self confidence to try things with an expectation, if not of immediate success, then of success in the long run (Connolly & Bruner, 1974). Competence will vary to some extent according to the social context in which the individual lives, but some 'core' abilities are necessary for people in all walks of life.

Robert White (1959) initially utilised the concept of competence to describe the individual's 'capacity to interact effectively with the environment'. Competence, according to White, is not present at birth and does not develop simply as the result of maturation. At the time he was writing, White was trying to move away from the currently popular theories of drive reduction, innate instinct, and social reinforcement as the motivations for child learning and exploration. He proposed instead that the play and exploratory activity of the child, by having an impact on the environment, produce a feeling of efficacy. Because this feeling is rewarding, these

behaviours become motivated in their own right. Thus, the child develops an intrinsic motivation to control the environment, as opposed to an extrinsic motivation based on external reward and punishment. According to White, as the child plays and explores, a feedback loop linking behaviour, environmental effect, intrinsic reward, and motivation is created, leading the child to become cumulatively more competent in controlling the ever more complex environment.

White argued that under primitive conditions survival depended heavily upon achieved competence. This was particularly true of humans where little is provided innately and much has to be learned through experience. However, few modern people live under 'primitive' conditions. Most live in highly industrialised and technological environments which require the learning of specialised skills and knowledge. The complexity of modern society and the specialised division of labour make the development of competence and mastery over the environment even more problematic as the growing child moves from the intimacy of the family to the broader world of social relations and work.

The behaviour of family members can facilitate or inhibit this development. Recent research has indicated

that babies, although limited in their physical development, actively attempt to master their environments very early in life. The environment in this sense is both physical and human, with the infant attempting to predict and control both (Donaldsen, 1978). When parents are responsive to the infant's actions, a mutually satisfying relationship develops, leading to a sense of efficacy and mastery in the child (Rheingold, 1971; Dreitzel, 1973; Lamb, 1976; Kagan, 1977; Edgar, 1980; Schaffer & Crook, 1978). Brewster Smith (1969: 214) described such parent-child relationships as benign circles of socialisation.

On the other hand, non-supportive parents create an environment which is not responsive to the child's efforts at producing an effect upon the environment. In these families, a sense of competence may not develop adequately. Such relationships were described by Brewster Smith (1969: 214) as vicious circles of socialisation. Vicious circles of socialisation involve varying degrees of learned helplessness (the converse of competence), where the child is not only exposed to a number of uncontrollable events but also comes to

expect that he or she is unable to control what happens. This can result in motivational, cognitive, and emotional deficits (Abramson, Garber and Seligman, 1980).

Families, therefore, are critical in the early development of competence. It also follows from the above discussion that families affect competence both in terms of the child's skill at predicting and controlling the environment, and in terms of the child's feelings of efficacy and control. Thus, Smith (1969: 220) distinguished between 'equipment for competence', such as skills, abilities, habits, and knowledge, and the 'competent self', which included components of self esteem, self-respect, feelings of efficacy and potency, and a behavioural orientation characterized by activity and initiative.

These self-feelings and self-perceptions are likely to be internalized by the child as relatively enduring aspects of the self-concept. According to Mead (1934) and the symbolic interactionists, a sense of self is developed in response to a person's perceptions of how others feel and think about him or her. The first 'significant others' of the pre-school child are family members. Through interaction, the young child comes to

adopt the perspective of family members toward his or her own actions and abilities. As the child grows, a 'generalised other' emerges and expands to include the peer group, adult authorities, and eventually the entire structure of society. Through this process, the evaluations of others in the home firstly, followed by members of groups outside the home, impinge on the sense of efficacy and competence of the child. The child's self-image, therefore, is related to experiences of success and failure in the eyes of others. However, as Smith (1969: 238) pointed out, this view of the developing self is somewhat one-sided, for the child also forms self-attitudes on the basis of his or her own achievements accomplished through intrinsic motivation. Thus, the 'competent self' can be seen as a generalisation formed from elements of both social and internal sources of evaluation.

Implicit in theories of the child as intrinsically motivated is the notion of the child as an active agent in family life. Kegan (1982), building on the work of Piaget and Freud, argued that it is through activity in the human and physical environment that children develop 'cognitive maps' of their world. These cognitive maps enable children to interpret and organise their

experience with increasing complexity and greater understanding of self and environment. Kegan described the spiral of action, meaning-making, and further action based on interpretation as the 'evolution of meaning' and saw it as similar to White's notion of competence. The competent self in this sense becomes more differentiated and autonomous through effective, adaptive interaction with the environment. Thus the child, in conjunction with parents and others, is active in the formulation of its view of self, others, and the larger world (Dreitzel, 1973; McKay, 1973; O'Neill, 1973; Collins, 1975).

Family resources and competence

It is clear that children differ considerably, both in their equipment for competence and in their self-conceptions of competence. To explain these differences, it is necessary to examine the general life situation of children in a search for factors which facilitate or inhibit this development. A useful concept here is that of 'resources for competence'. Resources consist of biologically inherited capacities,

personal relationships, material goods, information, social arrangements, or indeed any entity of 'raw material' which has the potential to be converted into forms of competence.

Since there are many forms of competence, many things can be viewed as resources. However, certain forms of competence are more highly valued than others in our culture, and by those who control the major institutions of our society (Inkeles, 1965; Bourdieu, 1977; Kagan, 1977; Edgar, 1980). In most western societies, forms of competence involving language ability, intelligence, social skills, leadership, and business acumen are more highly valued than forms of competence involving manual skills, child care, nurturance, domestic labour, or physical strength. People who possess valued forms of competence are more likely to succeed and to achieve the material and social rewards which society dispenses to the successful. Therefore, resources which facilitate the development of socially preferred and highly valued competencies can be considered to be more 'useful' than others (although this will always be the product of a given sub-culture, culture or historical period - Inkeles, 1965).

Resources for competence can be conceptualised as existing at a number of levels. First, some resources are biological in nature, and are inherent in the child at birth. These resources include size, sex, health, physical attractiveness, and some component of intelligence. Second, resources can exist at the social-psychological level of interpersonal relationships. As far as the child is concerned, the most important set of interpersonal relationships involve the family, with some children having parents who are more supportive, helpful, interested, and nurturant than others (Collins, 1975; Kagan, 1977). Third, some resources are social structural in nature. Thus, society distributes wealth, education, occupations, status, and power unequally to different classes and social groups. Fourth, entire cultures, by virtue of their shared values, knowledge, world-view, and 'way of life' allow for the development of some forms of competence at the expense of others. For example, a traditional hunting-gathering culture provides an ideal milieu for developing a range of physical skills and a sophisticated knowledge of the natural environment in a manner which is not possible in an urban, industrial, technology-dependent culture.

Although resources at all levels are important in the development of competence, this paper will address itself only to those resources which have their basis in the family environment, either in interpersonal relationships and family processes, or in the family's links to the larger social structure.

In relation to family interpersonal relationships, it was noted earlier that families can facilitate the development of competence in children by providing a responsive environment. To expand this notion, empirical evidence indicates that high competence family environments are those in which: the child has a close and supportive relationship with parents (Rollins & Thomas, 1979), the parents talk frequently with the child (White, 1979), the parents encourage the child to explore and manipulate its environment (White, 1979), the parents have high aspirations for the child (Henderson, 1981), the parents provide assistance with school work (Henderson, 1981), the parents use induction techniques and point out the consequences of behaviour to the child (Rollins & Thomas, 1979), the parents use authoritative, rather than authoritarian or permissive, styles of parenting (Baumrind, 1972), and where family life is relatively free of overt conflict between members (Rutter, 1979). In addition, Smith (1969: 237)

pointed out that 'The wise nurturance of competence in the young would seem to call for a deliberate progressive sharing of power and responsibility as the growing competence of the child enables him to use it'. However, missing in all these studies is the child's own perspective on family relationships and parental influence.

Beside these interpersonal processes, families also differ in the resources available to members by virtue of their position in the social structure. These resources include such things as education, wealth, access to information, correct forms of language, social standing, political influence, and access to influential social networks. Because economic and social resources are unequally distributed in society, children born into families with greater resources are likely to have a head start over children born into families with fewer resources. It is in this context that Edgar (1971, 1980) has referred to the 'social distribution of competence'.

The effects of being born into a family which is either high or low in wealth, status, and power are not transmitted to the child directly, however, for their impact is largely mediated by the web of

interpersonal relationships and interactional processes which exist in the family. In some cases, the availability of socially distributed resources may affect intimate family processes. For example, in relation to child rearing, parents in favourable economic and work situations can reward their children for good behaviour with outings, gifts, and shared leisure time. Control measures used by parents may vary for the same reason, for control by explanation requires time, as does control by love and love withdrawal. Conversely, control by physical coercion and force is cheap and requires little time from those who lack the resources of time and money (Collins, 1975, 268).

On the other hand, family processes may help to compensate for the disadvantages associated with occupying a low rung on the social ladder. Thus, a child born into an impoverished family, but with a home environment that is stimulating, warm, supportive, and encouraging, may be able to develop into a highly competent and successful adult. Conversely, family processes may neutralise the advantages associated with occupying a privileged place in the social hierarchy.

The family environment, therefore, can be seen to have great power over the nascent human being. It forms the initial world view, facilitates the development of skills and competencies seen as necessary, and helps to form the sense of self in the developing child. The importance of parents in this process is to a certain extent inevitable, for there is a power difference between parents and children, with parents having greater control over the environment, greater knowledge, and until the child grows up, greater size (Collins, 1975; Edgar, 1980). However, it is not completely accurate to say that the family totally determines the way in which a child develops. Children have talents of their own, are active constructors of their understanding of events and relationships, and develop interests and motives of their own (Edgar, 1980; Holzner, 1972). Thus, rather than state that competence is determined by the resources available to the child, we would prefer to state that competence is the result of the child's active use of resources, given the constraints of biology, family, social class, and culture. Furthermore, following Smith (1969:214), we argue that cause and effect relationships in relation to competence are not linear, but circular, with the components of behaviour, effects on the environment, the number and quality of resources, self-conceptions of

competence, and motivation all locked into a continuous feedback loop which spirals either upward toward increasing competence, or downward toward increasing incompetence.

Given the importance of the family environment in the development of competence in children, it is useful at this point to consider how recent changes in the Australian family may be altering the nature of resources which are available to children.

Changes in the Australian Family

Since World War II, the Australian family has become more diverse in composition, ethnic background, and lifestyle, which means that children are now growing up with a greater variety of values, life situations, and family processes than ever before. For example, since 1947, 3.5 million migrants have settled in Australia and produced 2.2 million children (Storer, 1981). While greater ethnic heterogeneity exposes children to a richer and more varied cultural environment, it also increased the chances that children will be exposed to racial discrimination, prejudice, and inter-group conflict.

Levels of fertility have also changed significantly. Fertility declined from an average of 2.95 children per woman of child-bearing age in 1971 to only 1.94 children per woman in 1981 (Institute of Family Studies, Annual Report, 1983). Smaller family size may mean that children do not have to share parental and economic resources with other siblings, thus increasing their relative share. However, it also means that children may have fewer chances to learn through interaction with both same-sex and opposite-sex siblings of different ages.

A related change has been the number of women in the paid work force, rising from 13 per cent in 1954 to 43 per cent in 1981 (Prosser, 1981). This trend suggests that children now have less time, overall, with their mothers than was the case in the past. However it may also reflect increased exposure to outside influences and interests through a variety of childcare arrangements, holiday programs and clubs. Furthermore the mother's income may make the difference between poverty or an adequate standard of living, and provide the family with additional resources such as special lessons, holidays or household goods.

The most controversial change has been the increasing rate of marriage breakdown and the consequent increase in the number of one-parent families, from 7.1 per cent of families with dependent children in 1969 to 13.2 per cent in 1981 (Edgar & Headlam, 1982). When parents separate or divorce, the resources available to the child change in several ways. First, there are usually economic consequences since the available income is usually considerably less than when parents stay together. The report, Poverty in Australia (Henderson, 1975) indicated that one in every three one-parent families is below the poverty line, and lone-mothers had the lowest incomes of all. One-parent families are more

likely than two-parent families to be living in private or state rental accommodation, and female headed one-parent families are more likely to be renting accommodation than are male headed one-parent families. One-parent families are also more likely to live in crowded conditions with fewer of the basic household appliances, and mothers in one-parent homes are more likely, if in the workforce, to be working full-time than are mothers in two-parent homes (English, et al., 1978). Finally, family processes and relationships also alter when a parent leaves to live elsewhere. For thus, the child is likely to find that only one parent, rather than two, is immediately available as a personal resource.

However, it is also likely that divorce results in a home environment less marked by constant tension and overt conflict for some families. While early research on the effects of living in one-parent families viewed such families as deviant or pathological, more recent research indicates that the quality of family processes and interpersonal relationships are generally more important than family type in predicting child outcomes (Rutter, 1971, 1979; Hess & Camara, 1979).

Many separated and divorced parents go on to remarry or form de facto relationships. Jones (1978) points out that for many children the remarriage of a parent may be more disruptive than divorce, leading to competition for the attention of the natural parent and intense conflict in the family. On the other hand, the remarriage of a woman with dependent children may mean a substantial increase in the economic resources available to her children.

Given these major changes in the Australian family in recent decades, one of the intentions of the present research will be to examine the relationship between family resources and child competence in the context of a changing family structure. This will involve an empirical analysis of recently collected survey data. Following the analysis will be a discussion of social policy implications.

The children's StudyMeasures of competence

As competence is such a broad and complex concept, it was decided that three separate aspects of competence would be measured in this study. Each was selected because it represented one of the rather different abilities which are needed to become a competent individual in our society.

- 1 Reading A reading test was chosen as a measure of educational competence because in our system of education, reading is the key to progress. Children who cannot read well cannot succeed in most subjects and have limited choice when they seek employment. A CLOZE reading test was used as a measure of reading ability as it includes more language and reading related variables than other objective measures. Most standardized tests focus on a few aspects of reading, such as word recognition and comprehension (Teale & Rowley, 1979). CLOZE includes semantic and syntactic knowledge, graphic cues, contextual cues, and the background knowledge of the student, all of which are part of reading ability (Hasegawa, 1980).

- 2 Self concept The second measure of competence was a self concept scale which was used to assess childrens' feelings about themselves. A child with a positive self image is more likely to have the confidence to tackle new tasks and to cope with failure or change. The Piers-Harris Children's Self Concept Scale (CSCS) was selected as it covers the two age groups of the children involved in this study and was designed primarily as a research instrument (Piers & Harris, 1969, 1977). Although this scale was normed and standardised in the United States, the items appeared to be relevant and applicable to Australian children (Amato, 1984).
- 3 Everyday skills Finally, a check list of 20 skills needed for taking care of personal needs in everyday life was developed. These skills ranged from making the bed to using a washing machine, preparing a simple meal, and using public transportation. They are the skills which are gradually learned throughout childhood and adolescence, and are necessary if the individual is to live an autonomous and independent life as an adult. The skills on this list, however, are rarely learned at school. (See Ochiltree & Amato., 1983, for a full description of each measure, including scale characteristics.)

The model

The model used as a conceptual guide to the research reported in this paper appears in figure 1. This model has been developed from the child's point of view. On the left hand side of the figure are lists of resources which are embedded in the family environment. These resources divide into two types. On the far left are a cluster of the more objective, 'given' resources which contribute to family environment. Some of these are linked to the larger social structure, such as family income, parent's occupational status, parent's education, parent's ethnicity, housing density, housing status (renting v. owning), and neighbourhood quality. Others can be thought of as family constellation variables, and include the number of parents in the household, the number of siblings, the mother's work status, the parent's health, and family residential stability. These aspects of family environment are largely beyond the direct control of the child. Together, they constitute 'Structured Family Resources' to which the child must adapt.

On the other hand are the more dynamic and intangible family resources which are referred to as 'Family Processes and Interpersonal Resources'. These include

variables such as the nature of the relationship between the child and his or her parents, the parent's aspirations and expectations for the child, and the absence (or presence) of tension and overt conflict between family members. These resources are ongoing, changeable, and are capable of being influenced by the child.

These family processes are assumed to directly affect the child's development of competence. The Structured Family Resources are also seen as having an effect on the child; however, much of their impact is mediated by family processes and interpersonal relationships, thus producing both direct and indirect effects on the child.

The child is characterised in the model as being an active agent. Thus, the child, through his or her interpretations and reinterpretations of family events, feelings, and overt behaviours, has a causal effect on the family environment, but mainly at the level of family processes and interpersonal relationships. This reciprocal relationship is portrayed in the model as a circle. However, if a third dimension could be added to the figure, the true relationship would appear as a spiral.

The outcomes of this reciprocal relationship are forms of competence (in this case, reading ability, self-esteem, and everyday skills). If the spiral is a benign one, family support and encouragement lead the child to attempt new challenges, and the child's level of competence is carried along the spiral to higher levels of development. If the spiral is a vicious one, lack of family support and encouragement lead the child to scale down his or her self-expectations and mastery attempts. The outcome will then be one of increasing incompetence, as the child slips further and further behind his or her peers.

The model also includes reciprocal linkages between the three outcome measures and the active self as well. These reflect the effect of intrinsic motivation, independent of the reactions of significant others. The model indicates that the child's level of achieved competence is a function both of his interpretation of his own behaviour, as well as his interpretations of the reactions and evaluations of significant others.

Such a complex model does not lend itself to a straightforward statistical analysis. Therefore, the research presented in this report will not attempt to test the entire model in a formal sense. Instead, the

model is used as a general guide to the selection of variables, and only certain relationships are analyzed.

(INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE)

METHOD

Sampling

In the first phase of sampling, 56 primary schools and 57 secondary schools were selected from across the state of Victoria, with proportional representation of all school systems. From these schools 1351 primary school children and 1234 secondary school children completed an initial screening questionnaire. In the second phase of sampling, these students were stratified on the basis of family type (intact versus nonintact) and were selected randomly from each class using a random-start constant-interval method of selection separately for each stratum. Parents of selected children were then contacted and their participation was requested. A final sample of 402 families was achieved in this manner (195 primary, 207 secondary). A full description of the sampling methods is available in Amato (1983).

Survey instrument

The children's interview schedule consisted of 165 questions designed to elicit information in 15 different areas, including the division of labour in the home, family relationships and environment, perceptions of parents (and step-parents), decision-making and rules, friends, interests, and school. The interviews were conducted at the school. The interviews ranged in length from one half hour to two and a quarter hours, with a median length of one hour.

The parent's interview schedule consisted of 155 questions designed to elicit information in a variety of areas, including the parent's relationship with the child and aspirations for the child, the child's competence and health, the family environment and relationships, the parent's marital relationship, values concerning children, and basic demographic information. The interviews were conducted in the parent's home, and ranged in length from thirty five minutes to three and a half hours, with a median length of one and a quarter hours. Both the child's and the parent's interview contained a large number of open-ended questions, as well as questions answered on standardised rating scales. A team of 18 interviewers

collected the data. All were given extensive training in interviewing children and adults before beginning.

Correlational analysis

The first step in the analysis involved the selection of 14 variables from the parent's questionnaire which reflected Structured Family Resources. These were family income, parent's occupational status, father's education, mother's education, father's ethnicity, mother's ethnicity, household density, housing status (renting or owning), neighbourhood quality, number of parents living in the household, number of siblings, mother's employment status, parent's health, and residential stability. These resource variables were then correlated with the three measures of child competence: CLOZE reading scores, self-esteem (CSCS), and everyday skills knowledge. These correlations appear in Table 1.

(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE)

Similarly, 15 items from the parent's and child's questionnaires were selected which were thought to reflect aspects of Family Processes and Interpersonal Resources. These included variables such as parent's

ratings of their closeness to the child, parent's aspirations and expectations for the child, children's reports of how much help they received from parents with school work and other problems, children's reports of how much interaction they had with each parent, children's perceptions of how interested their parents were in them, children's perceptions of family conflict and relationships, and children's reports of the frequency of various group activities with family members. These variables were also all correlated with the three measures of child competence. These correlations appear in table 2.

(INSERT TABLE 2 HERE)

A detailed report on this analysis is available from the authors (Amato & Ochiltree, 1984). However, to summarize these results, it appeared that both objective, structured family resources and family processes and interpersonal relationships were related to children's reading ability. In contrast, children's self-esteem appeared to be more strongly related to family processes and interpersonal relationships.

A series of multiple regression analyses were conducted to estimate the total amount of variance accounted for by each set of variables¹. In relation to CLOZE reading scores, the 14 structural resource variables accounted for 16 per cent of the variance in the primary school sample and 11 per cent of the variance in the secondary school sample. Similarly, the 15 family process variables accounted for 14 per cent of the variance in the scores of primary school children and 15 per cent of the variance in the scores of secondary school children.

In relation to the self-esteem scores of primary and secondary school children, the 14 structural resource variables accounted for, respectively, 8 per cent and 3 per cent of the variance. However, the 15 family process variables accounted for, respectively, 22 per cent and 9 per cent of the variance. Thus, at both age levels, family processes and interpersonal relationships appeared to be more important determinants of children's self-esteem.

In relation to the skills knowledge scores of primary and secondary school children, the 14 structural resource variables accounted for only 8 per cent and 6 per cent of the variance, respectively. The corresponding figures for the family process variables

¹The R^2 values" reported here have been adjusted to take into account the number of predictor variables in the regression equation and the number of cases. This provides a more conservative estimate of the amount of variance accounted for (Theil, 1971: 18).

were only 2 per cent and 1 per cent. Thus, neither set of variables appeared to be strongly related to this measure of competence.

Qualitative Analysis

It was argued earlier in this paper that the child is an active user of resources, and not simply a passive reflector of whatever resources are inherent in the family. It was decided, therefore, to adopt a qualitative approach to the data in an attempt to discover how family processes facilitate the child's translation of resources into forms of competence. This analysis was exploratory in nature, and involved an in-depth investigation of a smaller number of cases. Particular attention was paid in this analysis to the responses to open-ended questions from the interview schedules.

It was also decided to concentrate on children from families which were either very high or very low in objective, structured resources. To accomplish this, a general family resources score was computed for each family. This was done by submitting the 14 Structured Family Resource variables to a principal components analysis. This revealed an initial principal component which accounted for 22 per cent of the total variance and had high-moderate loadings for the majority of variables. This component, referred to here as a general 'Structured Family Resource' component, was

retained for further analysis. Families scoring high on this component had higher levels of income, education, and occupational status, were more likely to own their own home, had lower household density, had fewer children, moved slightly less often, lived in higher quality neighbourhoods, were more likely to have parents born in English speaking countries, had healthier parents, were more likely to have two, rather than one parent in the household, and were more likely to have the mother employed outside the home. A reliability coefficient on these data (Theta), produced a value of .673 (Theta can be understood as a special case of Cronbach's alpha in which a weighting vector has been selected to maximize scale reliability (Carmines & Zeller, 1979: 59-61)).

The first step involved selecting a sample of cases from the larger sample for a more extensive analysis. To accomplish this, it was decided to concentrate on children who were either very high or very low in family resources. For this purpose, the distribution of 'Objective Family Resource' component scores was trichotomized into high, medium, and low groups.

It was also decided to concentrate on children who were either very high or very low in general competence. For this purpose, high competence children were defined as children who were above average (i.e., above the median score) on all three competence measures. Low competent children were defined as children who were below average on all three measures. This procedure was repeated separately for children at both age levels. For the primary school sample, 26 children fell into the high competence group and 27 children fell in the low competence group. For the secondary school sample, the corresponding group sizes were 30 and 27.

These procedures allowed the entire sample of children to be crosstabulated on the basis of general competence (low, intermediate, or high) and structured family resources (low, intermediate, or high). Children falling into the low-low, low-high, high-low, and high-high cells in the design were selected for further analysis (see Table 3). Where structured resources are low, one might expect to find children who are low in competence. Likewise, when structured family resources are high, highly competent children might be expected to be the norm. More interesting are those 'anomalous'

cases where family resources are low, yet children have achieved a high level of overall competence. Similar to these cases are those in which children come from families with high resources, yet are below average on all three competence measures.

The logic of the analysis was therefore to compare high resource families where children were high in competence with high resource families where children were low in competence. Similarly, low resource families where children were low in competence were compared with low resource families where children were high in competence. Separate analyses were undertaken for primary and secondary school children, although these have been combined to simplify the discussion of results.

(INSERT TABLE 1 HERE)

High resources-high competence

Overall, the 22 families in this group (10 primary, 12 secondary) appeared harmonious, with little overt conflict and mutually warm parent-child relationships. In two families at primary level there was marital discord, but the parents in both cases were receiving marital counselling. At secondary level the parent-child relationship was somewhat distant in three families and in two families signs of marital conflict were apparent. However, the children in these particular families were highly independent and, rather than spending much time at home, interacted with a large circle of friends and were involved in outside interests such as sports and clubs. Almost all parents in this group had high aspirations for their children, and most encouraged their children to do well in life.

A representative family at the primary level consisted of nine year old Jane, who lived with her natural parents and four older brothers. Her father was a district manager for a large government authority and her mother was involved with home duties. Jane's father described her as 'enthusiastic, cheerful, polite, and friendly'. He expected that she would eventually

graduate from university, although his main ambition for her was simply 'to be happy with life'. Jane described her father as 'kind and helpful' and her mother as 'generous'. She also felt that her parents were interested in the things she did, and said that she was satisfied with the amount of time they spent with her and the amount of help they gave her. She thought she was above average at school and wanted to be a nurse someday. She was active in Brownies, played netball, and had music lessons. The family did not appear to experience any overt conflict, and family relationships appeared to be generally stable and warm.

At the secondary level, 15 year old Ben was typical of the more distant parent-child relationships mentioned earlier. Ben lived with his natural parents and two older brothers. His father was a managing director of a small company and his mother was a nurse. His mother described him as 'very outgoing and self-sufficient. I think he's happy enough - no problems with him at all'. She also said that he was good at school, and she expected he would undertake training to become a nurse (which is what he wanted), but her main ambition for him was 'just to be happy'. She had no concerns about his future and expressed complete confidence in him.

Although the mother stated that she was very close to Ben, they appeared to interact very little. According to Ben, she did not talk to him much and was not very interested in the things he did. Similarly, he felt that his father was not really interested in his activities because 'he works too much'. Furthermore, they rarely went out together as a family. However, Ben had many friends and was very active in both Venturers and Scouts and spent many weekends away with these groups. He was independent, cooked for himself, and counted a number of adults as being among his good friends. Although he spent little time with his parents, he nevertheless thought highly of them and stated that family life felt good 'all the time'.

Ben appeared to use his home, where he felt comfortable and secure, as a safe base from which to explore the larger social world. His parents, sensing his maturity, allowed him a considerable degree of freedom. Although people in this family appeared to go their own way much of the time, this was done in an atmosphere of mutual trust and support.

High resources-low competence

A general feature of the 15 families (10 secondary, 5 primary) in this group was a lack of cohesion and positive affect, with tension apparent in many relationships. This was not so for all families, and two families at secondary level appeared happy and close. However, in one of these cases the child had been very sickly in early childhood. In two families there was serious conflict between parents, which in one case was related to the father's heavy drinking.

A second major feature of these families was that in most, children felt that they did not have enough time with one or both parents. At primary level, four of the children felt this way about both parents while at secondary level five of the ten children had father's who were involved in their work to such an extent that they were rarely available. Another father at secondary level suffered from a mental illness. In addition, one child did not get along with her 'hot tempered' drinking father, and another child had a step father who was not close. Thus, in 8 out of 10 families at secondary level, a key feature was the lack of father involvement.

In each case, the child felt this lack and expressed regret. Furthermore, unlike the families in the high resource-high competence group, there did not appear to be strong feelings of mutual trust between members.

Amelia, aged 15, and her family of natural parents, younger sister, and two younger brothers is typical of this group at secondary level. Her father earned a good income in his own business which often required weekend and evening work. Most of the mother's time appeared to be taken up with the duties of wife and mother.

Amelia's mother described her as 'a bit moody, very quick tempered. She lacks confidence, she'll only go if you push her'. In addition, her mother said, 'I think she gets a bit upset with the fighting'. Her parents often argued over the children, money, sex, chores, and responsibilities. Her mother described her own health as 'terrible' and was quite often unhappy and depressed.

Amelia described her mother as 'easy to get along with' but 'she works too hard. She knows but she still keeps going.' The fights between her parents made her 'feel uptight and try to stop them because they really scream and yell'. Amelia wished her father would 'spend more time with her, but said he is 'always busy with his work' and that 'people ring up all the time wanting jobs

done'. Her description of her father revealed some ambivalence: 'He gets mad easy - easy to get along with if you don't get on the wrong side of him'.

At school Amelia saw herself in the middle of the class and generally liked it. Her mother wanted her to finish HSC, but if she can get a job after form five she will be allowed to leave. Amelia said she wanted to be a policewoman, but thinks she will probably be a sales girl. Amelia was keen on sport, belonged to a pony club, and played netball. However, her father thought she spent too much time on sport.

A typical family at the primary level consisted of George, aged 9, who lived with his natural parents, one brother, and one sister. His father had a supervisory position in a government department while his mother was occupied with home duties. George's mother described him as lacking in confidence. Although she later indicated that he was usually happy and was a responsible child, she also saw him as easily confused, timid, and afraid of new situations. When asked about her ambitions for him, she only hoped that he would stay at school until 15 since 'he's not too bright'. She repeatedly stated during the interview that he was not good at school, and she expected him to have

considerable problems as he got older. She also indicated several times that she was opposed to him becoming more independent, and felt he was simply incapable of doing many things.

George said that his mother was 'not really interested' in the things he did. He said he wished that both his mother and father would spend more time with him and help him more, but he realised that they 'have a lot of work to do'. He was aware that he was below average at school, even though he thought school was 'all right'. When asked what he wanted to do when older, he first said that he wanted to be a carpenter, 'but there will be no jobs'. He then said he wanted to be a football player, even though he 'can't kick far'.

Generally, the family did not appear to have much overt conflict, but family members were very low in interaction. They frequently did not eat meals together, and when they did, there was little conversation. George's mother reported that her marital relationship was only 'fairly happy'. She also reported feeling depressed occasionally and said that she missed the extra time and independence she had before she had children. The parents rarely played games with George or helped him with his school work, and the general

family environment appeared to be lacking in warmth and social support.

Low resources-low competence

Children in this group typically had a poor relationship with at least one parent, and families were characterised by multiple problems, including conflict, violence, health, psychiatric illness, and unemployment. The overall impression gained when reading the interviews was of a chaotic and negative family life. This group consisted of almost equal numbers of two-parent, step and one-parent families (11 primary, 7 secondary).

A typical family which displayed many of these characteristics was that of John, aged 9, who lived with his two sisters, brother, and mother. His parents were separated at the time of the mother's interview, but reunited one month later. According to his mother, John has always been closer to his father, although he has witnessed frequent displays of violence toward her. When asked to describe John, she said, 'Six months ago he was afraid of his own shadow. He's still a scook, but now he's also aggressive and starts fights. But at school he's a mouse - a mixed personality now'. John's

descriptions of his parents were somewhat remote and reluctant. He said at first when describing his father that he couldn't remember, and then said 'a worker, he fights'. His mother was described as 'got brown hair, she works'.

The father visits several times a week, although there is a restraining order because of his violence. He has injured John's mother on several occasions and is now receiving psychiatric treatment. His mother is under severe mental stress as well, but claims that she still loves her husband. John's older brother is 'a problem' and has also had psychiatric treatment for his violent behaviours. When asked if she had any worried about John, his mother said that 'His life could become a hell of a hassle and I can't do a great deal about it. I lack the courage to go out on my own emotionally and financially. I wouldn't cope'.

John thinks he is at the bottom of the class at school and his mother thinks he will leave before HSC. He also feels his mother is not interested in what he does and doesn't talk to him much. However, he does feel that his father is interested in him. Neither parent helps much with school work, but his father helps him a lot with football and he belongs to a football club.

Mark, aged 16, together with his natural parents and younger sister, are typical of this group of families at the secondary school level. Mark and his mother are both asthmatic and this is an important aspect of their family life. His mother's health is central to his description of her, 'She's small, she gets very sick sometimes because she's an asthmatic. We are always scared of that, worried about her health'. His mother feels he is closer to her than to his father because until recently his father has been doing shift work. She described Mark as 'extremely introverted but there are occasions when he can be a terrific show-off to gain attention.' Mark's parents disagree about his independence at times, as the father thinks he is tied to his mother's apron strings. His mother says that she would like Mark to be more independent and self reliant, but 'I don't give him the opportunity'.

The father is described in ambivalent terms by the boy: 'He's big. He's solid and really muscley and I'm always scared of him. Friendly. He will let you do things and another father wouldn't such as go out for awhile. He's not strict'. According to Mark, the times when it feels really good to be together as a family are just after an argument. As he stated, 'If my parents have an argument

everyone's all a bit uptight and a bit scared - and we are all happy again.'

Mark has just started going out occasionally with girls but he appears to have no hobbies, outside interests, and few friends. He likes school and says he is in the middle of the class, but is undecided about the future. His mother hopes he will get a trade diploma, but says it is up to him to decide.

Low resources-high competence

This group consisted of 20 families (10 primary and 10 secondary). Seventeen of these families were one-parent families. A major characteristic of families in this group was the strong and warm relationships which existed, primarily between the child and the interviewed parent (usually the mother). In contrast to the low resource-low competence group, both parents and children saw each other in a positive and affectionate light. Little conflict was noticeable in these families. In some cases there was, or had been, conflict with an ex-spouse or de facto husband, but this did not appear to impinge on the current functioning of the family. In

most cases the parents had separated (or died) several years previously. In some cases the parent reported that the child had been very upset at the time, and in some cases school work suffered temporarily. But in all families, including those where the child was still reporting distress at the separation, the members were operating in a harmonious and supportive fashion.

In the majority of families, parents had high ambitions for their children. These children, especially at secondary level, had a large number of friends and outside interests. Most of these children reported liking school and were generally in the middle to the top of the class.

Nine year old Meryl, who lives with her mother and older sister, was typical of this group. The family lived on Supporting Parent Benefits and what little the mother could earn at her part-time job. Her mother saw Meryl as sensitive, insightful, and confident in most situations and felt that their relationship was getting closer lately. Meryl described her mother as a 'nice warm person'. Meryl also liked her mother's boyfriend who lived close by.

Meryl was satisfied with the amount of time she spends with her mother and with the amount of help she receives from her, both with school work and with other aspects of her life. She considered herself to be above average at school. Her mother said that she would like Meryl to go to university, but she will have to decide this for herself. As yet, Meryl herself has not really thought about what she wants to do when older.

A typical family at the secondary level was that of Jane, aged 16, her mother, two younger sisters, and her maternal grandmother. Jane's family is still adjusting to the separation of her parents a year ago. The mother and children get along well, but Jane missed her father of whom she was very fond. Her mother described Jane as 'basically happy-go-lucky, but can be serious'. Until the separation Jane liked her father best but now had more understanding and affection for her mother. She said, 'I can talk over anything with her, except I don't like to talk to Dad about her...I talk about everything else with Mum. Can't talk about everything with Dad. he hasn't such an open mind as Mum'.

Jane felt that both of her parents were interested in her, and she was satisfied with the amount of time her mother spends with her. However, she wished she could

see her father more often. Her mother expected that Jane would graduate from university, but said that she would have to make up her own mind about it eventually. Jane felt that she was one of the best students in her class. She was also form captain at school, had many friends, and was active in a number of clubs and organisations. Although Jane expressed a great deal of pain and sorrow at the separation of her parents, she appeared to be coping well and understood the circumstances surrounding the separation.

Summary of findings

Several trends were apparent from the qualitative analysis. When comparing high versus low competence children from high resource families, three major differences wer observed. First, high competence children generally came from families where relationships were close, with frequent interaction between family members, while low competence children were more likely to come from families where relationships were distant, both in terms of affect and frequency of interaction. In high competence families, where interaction was less frequent, this was related to the child having extensive networks of friends and activities outside the home. It was also related to

parents giving up a certain degree of control over the child and encouraging their independence, while providing a trusting and stable home environment.

Related to this trend was a second one in which low competence children frequently complained that they did not have enough time with parents or that they were uninterested in what they did. At secondary level this concern was expressed more in regard to fathers who were often seen as 'workaholics', while at primary level mothers were mentioned more frequently as not being interested in what they did, although this trend was not quite as marked. Few of the high competence children felt this way.

Third, the parents of high competence children, in virtually all cases, held high educational and occupational aspirations for their children, while the opposite situation usually existed for the parents of low competence children. Each of these trends supports earlier findings in the quantitative analysis.

When comparing low versus high competence children from low resource families, several trends were apparent as well. First, low competence children generally came from families marked by severe multiple problems and

sources of stress. The chaotic, unpredictable, and demanding nature of family life appeared to leave many of these parents 'drained' of time, energy, and emotion. It is likely that children were seen as an extra burden by many of these parents. As a result, parent-child relationships tended to be distant and unrewarding. Second, high competence children, although coming from families which frequently faced substantial problems as well (often economic in nature), were nevertheless able to maintain a strong, supportive, close relationships with at least one parent. These parents interacted frequently with their children, expressed positive affect toward them, thought highly of them, and frequently helped them with problems and school work. Third, as was the case in the high resource families, a strong trend was apparent for the parents of high competence children to have higher aspirations and expectations for their children than did the parents of low competence children.

It must be pointed out though, that a large number of these families (17 out of 20) in the low resource, high competence group were one-parent families. Before divorce or separation these families may have been in economically better circumstances. The effects of earlier exposure to greater resources could be

continuing in spite of the fact that current resources are low. However, the more likely explanation is that children in one-parent families were responding to an improved emotional environment after the tension of an unhappy marital relationship were removed. Whatever the reason, it is clear that these families were highly fragile. Since they lacked the social and economic resources which most families take for granted, it is likely that the advent of some major problem (health, accident, unemployment) could throw these families into disequilibrium.

Overall, our analysis of data suggest that structured family resources (such as occupation, income, and education) are advantages in the development of child competence. Yet, much of their effect is mediated by their impact on family relationships and processes. Some families which were relatively impoverished in material terms were still able to provide enriched home environments involving warmth, high quality interaction, encouragement, and general support. Children in these families, although disadvantaged in certain ways, were able to draw upon these interpersonal resources when they were needed, and appeared to be well on the way to becoming competent adults.

It is apparent in our analysis of child data that children have their own personal interpretations of family relationships and circumstances. In other words the child is actively involved in interpersonal family processes, although with less power than parents to control the situation. Child attitudes and behaviour thus involves a great deal more than just immediate reactions to family situations and events, but are part of an overall set of expectations built up over time.

It is noticeable also that it is in the families of the high competence children that parents are prepared to support growing independence in keeping with the child's level of physical, cognitive and emotional development, while the parents of low competence children are less likely to accept or encourage independence.

Policy Implications

Support for children in families

If society acknowledges the importance of the family in the early development of child competence, and if we wish to support families to facilitate this development, then it is clear that increased economic support is necessary for all families low in structured resources. This would provide direct benefits to all low resource families by allowing parents to purchase, not only the necessities of life, but also the small 'luxuries' such as books, writing materials, games, and outings which allow a child to develop his or her full potential. This would also provide indirect benefits to 'high competence' families by removing the stress associated with economic uncertainty which could disrupt a fragile (but well functioning) interpersonal environment. Increased economic assistance to multiple problem 'low competence' families might also allow a re-channelling of time and energy into a restructuring and a building up of previously weakened social relationships.

However, it is also clear from our analysis that economic and material support is not the only way in which society can facilitate the development of child competence in families.

Support for the emotional, interpersonal aspects of family life would also be beneficial. It would appear from our data that high levels of objective, structural resources are useful to the child, but they do not, in and of themselves, guarantee child competence. Many of the children in the sample came from relatively affluent homes and had well educated parents with prestigious jobs. However, these families were often marked by a pattern of mutual 'disengagement', little expression of positive affect, and low levels of mutual support. In these families, parents were often unavailable, and could not be sufficiently utilized by children as aids in their own development. It was interesting to note that in almost all of these cases in the sample, children were aware of this lack and expressed it strongly.

For many families, rich or poor, the provision of increased support and education in the area of interpersonal relations could be useful. Ideally, this support should be available to all families who desire

it, and might take the form of marriage guidance, family therapy, human relations education, parent education, social skills training, counselling, or some new approach. An important point here is that social interventions can be made at both the level of social structure (distribution of wealth and privilege) and at the level of interpersonal family relationships.

Whether parent education can help to overcome lack of parental interest in children if it arises from larger family problems is a moot point. It may be of greatest aid to those mothers and fathers who are simply deficient in basic parenting and social skills (such as communication skills). However, when such courses are offered account needs to be taken not just of the general life circumstances of the parents, but also of the fact that many parents are uncertain and anxious because they are overly aware of the expectations of experts. Parent education is most successful where existing skills are recognised and built on, and where parents provide mutual support as they increase their skills (Pugh, 1983). Modern parents need confidence in their own ability if they are to deal with the experts (e.g. teachers and doctors) involved in various aspects of their children's upbringing (Keniston, 1977).

Fathers and work

The large number of high resource-low competence children mentioned above who regreted the lack of interest and attention shown by their fathers (usually due to involvement with work) highlights the importance of the role of the father. Highly competent children from one-parent homes did not express this regret, and usually felt that their fathers were interested in them even though they did not live in the household. Thus, the crucial factor seems to be the interest and attention of the father rather than his location.

The negative effect of the father's emotional distance and lack of attention to children is currently a cause for concern among many people in the western world (OECD, *The Educational Role of the Family*, 1983). Public attention needs to be drawn to the importance of the father in child rearing at all ages. Male attitudes to work and the organisation of work hours both need modification if the demands of work are not to detract from the father-child relationship. The traditional role of breadwinner can readily be used as a cover for shirking family responsibilities or as an escape from difficulties in the domestic situation. At present little media coverage is given to the effect of the

father's work on children, while a good deal of attention is focussed on working mothers. Both are important. However, it is mothers, rather than fathers, who are more likely to experience censure from the general public.

Education and child competence

A number of educational implications are also suggested by this research. First, one direct way in which children from low resource families can be helped is through the provision of more pre-school and child-care facilities. In Australia, pre-schools and child-care centres are not equally available to all children, and they continue to be inadequately funded (Early Childhood Services, Institute of Family Studies, 1984). This is a situation which requires attention, especially in light of the fact that Australia spends relatively small amounts of money on child-care and family support compared to a many European countries. Policy in this area must accept as facts that one-parent families and employed mothers now constitute large segments of the Australian population. Increased levels of affordable child-care services are likely to be especially beneficial to these groups.

However, it must also be recognized that the difficulties of children living in homes with poor family environments cannot be completely ameliorated through educational and child-care interventions alone. Well equipped schools and child-care centres, and competent, motivated teachers and care-givers are unlikely to completely compensate for an unsupporting and unpleasant home life. Therefore, programs in which educationalists work together with parents and family members would seem to have the best chance for success. One example would be programs carried out in Britain in which teachers show parents how to listen to their children read and how to assist with homework (Edgar & Ochiltree, 1982). Another example is the Homestart program in the United States where parents are encouraged to provide an enriched environment for their children. In addition it is important that teachers and others recognise that parents are the only people who have a full knowledge of the child and his or her idiosyncracies (Keniston, 1977). (However when parents are suffering from severe emotional problems they may also need programs which provide the additional dimension of emotional support.)

It is also important for educationalists (and others) not to fall into the trap of stereotyping children, and

their needs, on the basis of family type. One-parent families suffer from a negative image, with children often being seen as problems: tough, uninterested in school, psychologically disturbed, and prone to delinquency. Furthermore, research indicates that teachers often hold more negative attitudes toward children from one parent families than they do toward children from other family types (Edgar & Headlam, 1982). Most of these images have been discredited in recent years by empirical work (Cooper, Holman & Braithwaite, 1983; Ellison, 1983; Rashke & Rashke, 1979; Hess & Camara, 1979). Our data also bring these stereotype into question. Many of the most competent children in our sample came from one-parent families where a nurturant and supportive relationship existed with the parent. (However, educationalists may also wish to keep in mind the rather fragile nature of these well-functioning families where the effect of an unforeseen problem might be especially debilitating for the child.)

Likewise, educationalists (and others) should not fall into the trap of stereotyping children from more affluent families as well. One cannot assume that just because a child has 'everything that money can buy' that

competence will inevitably follow. Often, these children are the ones most in need of extra attention at school, since they lack sufficient attention at home. Thus, it is not only poor children or children from working class homes who can be 'disadvantaged'.

In conclusion, if we accept that children are not only the family's responsibility, but the community's responsibility as well, then it follows that support must be given to those families who lack the resources to ensure that their children develop to their full potential. Earlier in this paper it was argued that children are caught up in either benign or vicious circles of socialisation. The question therefore, is where, and how, does one most effectively 'break into' a vicious circle to modify it. Since the problem is partly in the individual, partly in the family as an interacting group, and partly in the larger social structure, attempts which address the problem at all levels are more likely to be successful than attempts which focus on one intervention point only.

Epilogue

Before concluding this discussion of child competence, two general issues will be raised. First, as noted earlier in this paper, different forms of competence are more highly valued than others within certain sub-cultures, societies, and historical periods. In our society, the person who possesses skills in the areas of language fluency and leadership, has a self-image of efficacy and power, and has a motivational orientation of competitiveness, individual initiative, and personal achievement, is the 'model' for success. However, an alternative view of competence refers to the person who possesses abilities such as interpersonal sensitivity, and specific helping skills, has a self-image of social competence, and has a motivational orientation of co-operation, social responsibility, and service to others. While such a competent person might be admired, he or she is unlikely to achieve the same level of material and social rewards as the first person in our example.

Ultimately, we should decide as a community, as well as parents, which forms of competence we wish to promote and encourage at the expense of others. This is a large-scale and complex question of social values, but

it needs to be addressed by policy makers, specially in the area of education (including human relations education). Values emphasizing interpersonal skills, helping techniques, and social responsibility are not as firmly embedded in school curricula as are values emphasizing language and analytic skills, obedience to authority, and individual achievement. In the United States, certain developmental psychologists such as Ervin Staub (1979) have argued that we have the educational know-how to teach children to be more cooperative, sensitive to the needs of others, and skillful in helping others. Similarly, research has revealed characteristics of family environment and parental behaviour which facilitate the development of prosocial orientations and behaviour and in children (Eisenberg, 1982). Intentional changes in educational and family processes could produce children more competent in these 'underemphasized' areas. Of course, whether we wish to shift the emphasis of much of our socialisation and education in this direction is open to debate, and many people would certainly be strongly against such a change.

A second, and related concern, refers to the degree of reciprocity between the developing child and the community. As we have argued in this paper, the

community should make a greater effort to facilitate the development of competence in children. The question arises then, of what the community "gets back" for its investment, and who actually benefits most from such a policy. Certainly, individual children will benefit.

But do we wish to invest considerable social resources in children and see them develop into highly competent adults, only to then see them move into highly paid and prestigious occupations in which they maximize their own self-interest? We would argue that explicit in the notion of greater community support for children should be a clear expectation of reciprocity. Thus, the developing adult should perceive that a kind of "Debt" is owed to the community not in economic terms, but in terms of service and a sense community responsibility. Thus, raising children who are not only efficacious and capable in relation to their own needs, but in relation to the needs of others as well, would be a desirable direction in which to move.

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Table 1 Product-Moment Correlations Between 14 Structured Family Resource Variables and Three Measures of Child Competence for Primary and Secondary School Children

	CLOZE Reading		Self-Esteem		Skills Knowledge	
	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
Family income	.20*	.09	.08	-.02	.02	-.02
Occupational status	.23**	.09	.18*	.01	.16	.04
Father's education	.10	.22*	.15	-.11	.06	.18*
Mother's education	.29***	.25***	.22**	.02	.01	.08
Father's ethnicity	.05	-.03	.00	.05	.14	.01
Mother's ethnicity	.03	.11	-.05	.04	.11	.07
Household density	-.11	-.18*	-.17*	.05	-.15*	-.02
Housing status	.18*	.10	-.01	.10	-.07	.10
Neighbourhood quality	.24***	.14*	.04	.14*	.02	.08
Number of parents	.09	.03	-.03	.00	-.19**	-.08
Number of siblings	.05	-.13	-.10	.10	.08	.16*
Mother's work status	-.05	.08	.03	.01	.07	.01
Parent's health	.17*	.07	.19**	.11	.00	.21**
Residential stability	.17*	-.12	-.07	.16*	-.20*	.08

^a Primary n = 195, Secondary n = 207. Ns for particular correlations vary due to missing data.

* p < .05, two-tailed

** p < .01, two-tailed

*** p < .001, two-tailed

Table 2 Product-Moment Correlations Between 15 Family Process and Interpersonal Relationship Resources and Three Measures of Child Competence for Primary and Secondary School Children^a

	CLOZE Reading		Self-Esteem		Skills Knowledge	
	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>	<u>Primary</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
Parents						
Relationship closeness	.17*	.10	.13	.20**	-.03	.02
Educational aspirations	.26**	.36***	.16	.11	.11	.15
Educational expectations	.36***	.44***	.29***	.10	.14	.07
Children						
Help from mother	.05	-.09	.11	-.05	.08	.09
Help from father	.12	-.11	.19*	.12	.00	.10
Father talk to you	.09	-.04	.25**	.18*	.12	.08
Father interested	.01	.01	.30***	.20*	.15*	.04
Mother talk to you	.09	-.02	.17*	.00	.09	-.05
Mother interested	.19*	.06	.07	.09	.07	-.01
Parents get along	.08	-.01	.21*	.08	.05	-.11
Parents angry/disagree	.05	.10	-.19*	-.13	.08	.05
Feels good together	.03	-.14*	-.08	.13	-.06	-.01
Family yell and scream	.03	.07	-.08	-.26***	-.05	-.07
Go out as a group	.16*	-.12	.14*	.08	.05	-.03
Go our separate ways	-.12	.12	-.10	-.14*	.05	.09

^a Primary n = 195, secondary n = 207. Ns for particular correlations vary due to missing data.

* p < .05, two-tailed

** p < .01, two-tailed

*** p < .001, two-tailed

Table :3 Organising Scheme Used to Guide Selection of cases for Qualitative analysis of Child Competence.

		<u>Family Resources</u>			
		<u>Low</u>	<u>Intermediate</u>	<u>High</u>	
Level of Overall	<u>Low</u>	18*	21	15*	54
Child Competence	Inter-				
	<u>mediate</u>	97	97	98	292
	<u>High</u>	20*	14	22*	56
		135	132	135	402

* Cases falling into these cells were selected for detailed qualitative analysis.




Figure 1: Model Used as a Conceptual Guide

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WEDNESDAY, 22 AUGUST 1984

**Youth policies and the
family/work/education relationship**

Youth conflicts and public policy challenges in Western Europe

by ROLAND ECKERT and HELMUT WILLEMS

This paper presents an explanation of youth movements and youth conflicts. The weakening of familial control, the rise of juvenile subcultures due to the interindividual competition, the cult of creativity in "human capital class" youth are seen as preconditions. The theoretical concepts of "post-materialism" and expanding "discretionary resources" can explain the rise of the movements. The goals of these conflicts are discussed in economic terms as small business issues. Party politics and youth movements are analysed as different means for attaining political influence. The question of escalation and deescalation is discussed on the basis of observations made on the youth conflicts in Zürich, Amsterdam, Berlin and Frankfurt.

CONTENTS

1. Public authorities' conflict with youth movements - a social problem?
2. Which factors influence the mobilization of young people?
 - 2.1. General preconditions: the importance of peer groups and the decline of familial control
 - 2.2. Special conditions: the cult of creativity in youth subcultures, emerging in the "human capital" class
 - 2.3. Explaining the growth of protest movements
 - 2.3.1. 'Postmaterialism'
 - 2.3.2. Expanding discretionary resources
3. Goals and issues of youth movements and youth conflicts
4. Party politics and youth movement activities: different ways of attaining political influence?
5. Escalation and deescalation
6. Some observations on the youth conflicts in Zürich, Amsterdam, Berlin, and the Frankfurt Airport
7. Conclusion

1. Public authorities' conflict with youth movements -
a social problem?

Many social movements of the sixties and seventies can be characterized by a high rate of youths' participation. In some of these movements such as in Munich 1962 and Zürich 1981, the vast majority of participants was under 25. Of course, it has never been all of youth which was engaged in movements, but rather always small segments of the young population. The occasions for protest demonstrations, riots and other forms of unconventional political behavior and the immediate objectives have always been quite various. Through the world-wide communication-media, however, a common consciousness, similar forms of action, strategies and objectives were soon crystallized. Aside from the political groups which aimed at changing the economic and power-structures of society, there appeared other, rather nonpolitical movements such as the hippies, meditation-, encounter- and therapeutic movements. Then, between the two extremes, in the early seventies appeared various other groupings which wanted to combine the changing of self with the changing of society, such as the ecological movement, the "Alternativbewegung" and women's movement. The center of these movements in the sixties was above all the realm of higher education. Their leaders were students, teachers, professors, social workers, journalists, scientists, and artists.

In the late seventies, a broader range of young people, coming from outside the educational system, and older people joined the movements. In some case, it was possible to establish ties with groups outside of the educational sphere who were affected by specific economic or political developments, e.g. with the farmers threatened by the expansion of the nuclear power industry, or with the tenants inhabiting houses and neighborhoods threatened by speculation brought on by impending urban renewal.

Youth shaped even the image of those movements that had been initiated by adults (for example, the Peace Movement, the Anti-Nuclear Power Movement, and the Runway West Movement Frankfurt). That is why protest movements in Europe are seen as a youth problem.

The following analysis is concerned with those youth conflicts which at the moment are still setting the themes of political discussion. We do not refer to the youth riots in Great Britain because of the specific role of ethnic problems in these conflicts. Here, the following questions arise:

- Which factors influence the mobilization of young people?
- What are typical goals and issues of the new movements?
- Are party politics and movement activities different ways of attaining political influence?
- Which factors influence the escalation of conflicts with public authorities?

Answering these questions, we will discuss the subcultural approach, the relative deprivation thesis, and the resource mobilization theory.

2. Which factors influence the mobilization of young people?

2.1. General preconditions: the importance of peer groups and the decline of familial control

The educational sector in modern society has expanded continually in terms of the number of pupils and students as well as with respect to the length of the educational period. Therefore, young people are increasingly held together in groups of the same age. Important traditional agents of educational control, such as family, neighborhood and employer, are thus weakened as they are increasingly replaced by the "horizontal" influence of peer groups (the peer group thesis is discussed among

others by Coleman 1961, Tenbruck 1962, Coleman et al. 1974, Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1981). Allerbeck and Hoag (1983) found growing clique membership among youth from 1962 to 1983.

With that increases the probability that young people form their own value preferences and that the values of the adult generation will therefore not automatically be adopted. As long as young people were trained and educated mainly in direct contact with adults (e.g. apprenticeship), they experienced a kind of "natural" authority which existed by virtue of the age difference as well as practical superiority. In this situation, authority was an unquestionable reality. In the homogenous age-groups of today, authority must be repeatedly justified or even fought for. A standard for equality thus becomes a norm and the willingness to accept instituted authority diminishes (Klages and Herbert 1983). These exclusively young groups are also closely in touch with the mass-communication network which targets its influence on special groups more with seductive persuasion and reinforcement than with a commanding or educating tone. In this way, the traditional cartel of control over youth by family, school, church, and employer has been broken. From the variety of norms and values which society offers, young people can choose those which serve as meaningful interpretations of their life situations. So far, the change in values among youths and their increased participation in social movements has not been explained as the effect of structural changes within the family, but as caused by change in the relative importance of the family and neighborhood as agents of social control (in relation to the influence of mass media, school, peer groups, subcultures, etc.). There are two conditions, however, which result directly from changes in marriage and the family. In so far as parents are not dependent on children as a form of "old age insurance", they have less need to control their children. In so far as young people do not need parents' productive means, parents have less power to control. In so far as intergenerational economic ties are weakened, there is no need to control the

choice of spouses, and spouses and/or partners can be freely chosen. With this change from "ascription" to "achievement" in relationships, the market of sex or marriage partners and therefore the interindividual competition among young (and older) people increases. They can select those activities, with which they can assert themselves in the competition for love, social status, and acknowledgement (Eckert 1983). For young people, there is a broad range of alternatives from sports, music up to religious activities, which they can use for their presentation of self in the inevitable interindividual competition. The variety of juvenile subcultures is due to this "product-differentiation" dynamic. (The subculture approach of the Center of Contemporary Cultural Studies at Birmingham (Brake 1980) neglects the effects of interindividual competition among youth.) The participation in social movements is just one of these alternatives for the presentation of self and the acquisition of a personal identity. Movements create processes of "shared collective reinterpretation of both individual and group biography as well as a collective analysis of current situational contexts and forces impinging upon the group" (Marx and Holzer 1977, p. 433).

2.2. Special conditions: the cult of creativity in youth subcultures emerging in the "human capital" class

On this market of identity-offers, young people in school and highschool often interpret and structure their life situation in terms of creativity. The cult of creativity reaches back into the 18th century. Since that time, an ever increasing amount of people have sought to assure their future through education instead of unskilled work or the possession of productive means.

The separation of production from reproduction released each of these spheres from the direct imperatives created by the pre-

sence of the other. Both spheres could then be rationalized. We know that the productive system was rationalized through specialization and often overlook the fact that the family, such as it came to be in the milieu of civil-service in the 19th century and as the "nuclear-family" of today, is itself the result of specialization (Eckert 1979; Tyrell 1979). Increasingly released from the obligations of production, the strategic interest of the family became the "character-formation" and development in the offsprings' talents. This means that in the "Bildungsbürgertum", a class which secures its status through higher education (understood as investments in human capital), the stabilization and development of an inner world became economically possible and strategically important (Eckert 1982).

The purpose of education is not to provide solutions to current problems but to cultivate the general problem-solving abilities. The cultivation of the inner world is meant to insure the individuals' futures. It is separated from the realm of everyday experience. Dominant is not the concretely proven solution to a problem but the general capacity for problem-solving; not the invariable decision-making rule, but generally formulated values; not situationally-prescribed mores, rituals and taboo, but a morality which always must first find its meaning in application; not precise knowledge of the immediate reality, but fantasy and imagination of new and different possibilities. The modern family, released from productive activity, develops a variety of aspirations and capabilities which can only seldom be realized in a specialized occupation. Behind the everyday world, a symbolic world made "real" by education is constructed. The everyday world is judged according to this symbolic world. In short, context-specific perceptions and competencies are constantly relativized by concepts which are independent of everyday context (Bernstein, 1959). Thus, a certain utopian potential comes to exist as part of the inner world: a surplus of potentiality demanding its use. This is what we understand creativity to be.

Specialists for this symbolic reality have appeared. Writers, painters, musicians, philosophers, and savants start gaining significance and clientele. Their reality, however, differs from that of former priests: it is not an existing, prescribed truth which they expose, but the establishment of self through the creative act. The "cogito ergo sum" is expanded. Whoever thinks, makes music, paints, changes "the world", or in any way "participates", is.

But beyond the realms of family, education, and leisure, this self-establishing through creativity encounters a world which is not only already "established", but which above all stabilizes itself by means of a plentitude of rules which are not at the service of momentary feeling, thinking and creating. For in the same process in which modern subjectivity was institutionalized as a consequence of specialization, the perfection and extension of the modern economy, state, and long-distance communications have developed and made various spheres of action increasingly interdependent. These are anonymous in character, hardly even perceivable - just as their material expression, the modern technology. Here, the coordination of behavior cannot take place through spontaneous momentary comprehension, but is always preprepared in the form of conditional programs with reduced alternatives. By any other means, a minimum of predictability of behavioral consequences could hardly be guaranteed. The corresponding technology exists as a plentitude of if-then statements, which, although capable of modification, do not allow ad hoc changes. Modern subjectivity produced through family and education and its opposite, the impersonal conditionality of the work and decision-making systems of our society, are both the products of the same process of differentiation. The conflict between the subjective desire for a creative role and objective intransigence, in short, as some kind of alienation, is the consequence of one and the same societal development.

Modern youths do not only develop the desire for creativity, but also can find ways to experience "self-realization" on a thoroughly authentic basis: in the "uncommitted periods" between childhood and occupational life, family of orientation and family of procreation, they have the chance to develop in small groups forms of communication and work in which they can "find themselves". Ever since the 'Sturm und Drang' period, circles of friends, informal associations and groups have repeatedly come into existence in the climate of the ever-expanding educational institutions. The young people in these groups provide their own cultural education, work and play together, and they often distance themselves from the official institutions by establishing in opposition to them. The commonly developed concepts and models are temporarily free from the burden of possible consequences. They have effects which do not immediately strike back at their creators. Thus, the barriers represented by established rules and proven functional connections can be ignored, and new solutions can be stabilized directly within the protective atmosphere of the group.

All of these existential situations originally came into being in educational organizations or within their sphere of influence. It is possible that the expansion of educational systems, the release of youth from intergenerational economic ties, the opportunities offered by communication systems, no longer controlled by and restricted to the immediate neighborhood, and finally the ever-expanding realm of "leisure", have opened such life-situations to others who are not students, artists or savants. Hesse's "Morgenlandfahrt" and his "Steppenwolf" (1972) for example are becoming behavioral models offered alongside others in the supermarket in our pluralistic culture, although they are inimical to market and consumer-society. This is due to the special nature of the mass media which, while levelling local and traditional differences, can at the same time create a marketplace where highly specialized subcultures can develop and organize themselves beyond local boundaries.

2.3. Explaining the growth of protest movements

2.3.1. 'Postmaterialism'

There was an upsurge of protest movements in the sixties. Many different explanations for this phenomena were offered. We will discuss only those two which had the greatest influence on the contemporary discussion. Ronald Inglehart (1977) emphasizes changes in values. His "postmaterialistic orientation" is explained in terms of Maslow's (1970) needs hierarchy by the declining marginal utility of material goods in the fifties. Protest movements, he argues, began to arise as that generation which had not consciously experienced economic depression, the war or the post-war period, reached adolescence. In the fifties, the desire for material security was dominating. With the fading fascination of comfort and career, the self and its erotic, aesthetic and political development became the new theme for many individuals (Eckert 1973). Maslow's theory of the hierarchy of needs, to which Inglehart refers, may not have universal validity, but it expresses well the thematic change of the sixties: from that of "existential management" to "self-realization". (A less romantic explanation in economic terms can be found in Hirschman's (1982) critique on Olson's (1965) theory of collective behavior.) But according to Inglehart's data, it is not clear whether the postmaterialistic orientations are a result of birth cohort and the relating historical experiences, of age or of the affiliation to the educational system (see Bargel 1979; further critiques: Herz 1979; Baethge et al. 1983). In so far as Inglehart finds postmaterialism primarily among the upper middle class, there is furthermore a confounding of educational and economic status effects. Kaase and Klingemann (1979, p. 541 f.), on the other hand, point to the fact that in Germany and Austria age and education are indices for the degree of postmaterialistic orientation, while in the United States and Great Britain age is the most important of the two. Similar

results were obtained by Bargel (1979) and Klages/Herbert (1983).

In the Trier study of married couples, the duration of education was the most important factor in determining the renunciation of traditional gender-specific roles - measured as the subject's expectations of his/her partner (Eckert and Hahn 1975-1979).

On the basis of these studies, we can assume that education has an influence on the development of 'postmaterialistic' orientations. They also show that age affects orientation. The question whether the age effects are the results of economic changes between 1950 and 1960, as Inglehart assumes, remains unanswered. We think it is just as plausible to explain the correlation with age using the age-specific relationship to the educational system, which has expanded in the last thirty years.

2.3.2. Expanding discretionary resources

A more utilitarian approach is offered by McCarthy and Zald (1977). They posit a "social movement sector" in society which emerges when "discretionary resources" increase with growing wealth. With this argument, they reject the assumption of relative deprivation theories that there exists a relation "between preexisting discontent and generalized beliefs in the rise of social movement phenomena" (1977, p. 1214). "The greater the discretionary wealth controlled by individuals and organizations, the more likely it is that some of that wealth will be made available to causes beyond the direct self interest of the contributor" (1977, p. 1225). They argue: "As the amount of discretionary resources of mass and elite public increases, the absolute and relative amount of resources available to the social movement sector increases" (1977, p. 1224). They propose

to analyse social movement organizations as if they were economic organizations competing for limited resources.

The theories of Inglehart and McCarthy/Zald are not incompatible. Both are surplus theories. But McCarthy/Zald don't consider that 'discretionary wealth' or 'time' is used by different social groups in different ways. The youth movements use these resources according to the specific values of educational (or human capital) class, as we have already mentioned. A problem for resource mobilization theories is to explain the prevalence of the social movements in Europe despite the decrease in discretionary wealth. According to the resource mobilization theories, relative deprivation is not responsible for many of the sixties' movements. It could, however, be important for the issues of conflicts in the seventies.

3. Goals and issues of youth movements and youth conflicts

There are many themes of the youth protest and alternative movements that have arisen since the early sixties. There seems to be no common principle underlying. These themes include the denial of the pressure to achieve, the opposition to imperialism, the criticism of science, the stress on personal growth, women's issues, anti-industrialism, etc. What do all these have in common? Certainly, the greater self-reflective potential which is present in the realm of higher education can stimulate the thematization of the relations between individual, society and environment in quite different problem-areas. It is not unlikely that this heightened sensitivity would lead to demands for equality of youth, women, homosexuals, ethnic groups, etc. with the rest of society, as well as to the rise of therapy and meditation movements, all of which can be regarded as the direct consequences of self-thematization. Yet, there also appears a recognizable pattern in the themes of conflict which

is independent of subjective perception and which perhaps calls attention to the deficits and tensions within society as a whole.

In particular, it seems to be the increasing labor-divisive specialization, the energy-intensive production, the worldwide economic interdependence and the centralization of political decisions which are the basis of the new conflict themes. The results of economic growth have shown that growth not only eliminates shortages but also creates new ones, that short-term advantages are being attained through the creation of long-term damage (Hirsch 1976). There is a contradiction of regional and national interests in energy production and transport with local interests in an unspoiled life. The continued expansion of governmental activity has also shown that planning measures easily reach limits where their side-effects begin to undermine the objective benefits (Luhmann 1981, p. 143-158). There are many examples of this: traffic-planning and urban renewal have unintentionally contributed to the ugliness and ghetto-character of the cities; the propagation of equal-opportunity policies combined with the actual, ever-present inequality of occupational rewards has sharpened competition in the school system and reduced instruction and evaluation to the level of the quantitatively measurable and justifiable; the production of scientifically-trained specialists has generalized the powerlessness of the layman; the attempt to maintain order in a free society has led to the restriction of freedom; the attempt to secure international peace puts us under the threat of death through weapons of mass destruction.

The interest groups in these conflicts have not yet found distinct organizations. These conflicts often lack the institutional arenas, the institutionalized actors and the rules to carry out the game. In contrast to these conflicts, the opposition of capital and labor is in part institutionalized through wage-bargaining; the interest of the consumer, which is neither identical with that of capital nor with the wage-interests of workers,

is protected through market mechanisms, anti-trust laws, testing institutes and consumer leagues. And we have a network of social security which guarantees an minimum of buying-power. Capital, labor, consumers, and social security compete in the industrialized world, but they all ultimately profit from productive gain and from national, European and world-wide economic integration and interdependency. Protest-movements and citizens-initiatives, on the other hand, often try to advocate the interests of groups which are negatively affected by the same developments and have little or no political representatives.

4. Party politics and youth movement activities:
different means of attaining political influence?

Politicians make only these problems into issues from which they expect political advantages. Established parties are always under pressure to represent the various interests of local and functional groups, and yet at the same time they must make themselves in some way credible as the advocates of the interests of the whole.

Oligopolistic competition among political parties, however, limits their ability to transmit additional interests and forces them to make cost-benefit calculations for each case: what will the representation of a particular interest cost in terms of organization time, how much loss of support can be afforded in the pursuit of a cause, how much support can be expected to result from other sources? Parties do offer the chance to bring an issue and certain concepts for its solution into the mainstream of the policy-making process, but they can do this only by making compromises, forming coalitions, log-rolling and dealing in support while at the same time fending off other, "less vital" issues which might endanger the new coalitions. Therefrom result some of the "limits of pluralism" (Gamson 1975).

Thus, the parties, as institutions, have limits which are not (or not necessarily) due to the corruption of functionaries, but rather to the conditions under which they must work: the functions ascribed to political parties, those of the articulation of interest and of the aggregation of interest (Almond and Powell 1966), contradict each other to a certain extent (Eckert 1975). Thus, party democracy is insensitive to issues which are not or not yet of use in winning votes.

The insensitivity of the policy-making process becomes worsened in its effect by the time-lag in policy-execution: political decisions (e.g. the promotion of urban construction) from the day before yesterday were in the planning stages yesterday, hit today upon changed societal conditions (recession and high birth-rate years), and bear consequences tomorrow which their initiators could never have dreamed of (e.g. squatting). Even the planners, who regard themselves as experts on the future, cannot understand a situation which has undergone basic changes since they construed their plans.

The dynamics of party democracy are depicted by the economic models of Downs (1957). These models, however, assume that the suppliers of politics are the parties which compete for votes. Hirschmann (1970) showed that buyers, if they are discontent, cannot only change to another supplier (voting with the feet), but can voice their objections. We assume that political products, not offered by the large parties, are offered by small dealers which do not compete for vote, but for acknowledgement and "discretionary resources". They provide the means for voicing objections. Thus, we combine the economic theory of democracy and the economic theory of social movement as "resource mobilization". Briefly ignoring the self-interpretive justification of politicians and of activists, we might be able to formulate the relation between the two spheres (party vs. movement) in economic terms: those niches which the oligopolistic competition among political "concerns" leaves unfilled are occupied

by small business: movement organizations and citizens initiatives which specialize in certain issues. As long as the latter do not seek to gain a parliamentary majority, they can take up or create social problems without regard to opposing coalitions or loss of votes. They have nothing to loose, and in this lie their chances of mobilizing public opinion by spectacular attacks. If they succeed in that, the large parties themselves come under pressure. It can then become costly for them to ignore an issue rather than to take it up. Small and even marginal groups can thus gain social significance when they mobilize the mass-media through demonstrative deviance and the breaking of regulations, such as when they simultaneously call the societal self-conception into question by the reference to central values. Through the resonance of the media, they can then establish themselves as the cultural and political representatives of higher ideals and unselfish interests. Once they are recognized as the "conscience" of society, they can exercise pressure on institutions and figureheads who refuse or fail to put those values into action which they have generally accepted. While the use of political institutions (parties, pressure-groups, etc.) is only possible with long-time political commitments, media can be influenced without this and are therefore the resource appropriate to the life-situation of youth. (The difference between pressure-groups and social movements is described by Useem/Zald 1982.)

These 'New Politics' create severe dilemmas for political parties and the process of representation:

"The result is a structurally based propensity toward protest activity in advanced industrial societies, as it is difficult for parties to respond to publics with widely differing values and goals. The parties are primarily oriented toward electoral politics, which disadvantages minorities. Protest is the great equalizer, the political action that weights intensity as well as sheer numbers." (from: Kaase/Barnes, 1979, "In conclusion". Pp. 531 f. in Barnes, Kaase et al., Political Action.)

A dynamic and reciprocal relationship comes into play between demonstratively deviant movements and society. These movements attract youth for different reasons. In terms of Oberschall's "rational choice theory", young people participate in social movements because they have much less to risk by taking part, while adults stand to lose that which they have gained in the achievement of familial, occupational, social and financial status (Oberschall 1973; Allerbeck 1973; Gamson 1975). More significant in this respect, however, is that they can become the exponents of ideals and thus gain the feeling of personal importance, acknowledgement and social status in their social group. This is all the more true of youths from the "human capital" class who have been oriented towards the generalized ideals of society through the educational system (more precisely, in religious, cultural and civic courses in school) and on whom has been impressed the significance of a personal commitment to those ideals. Even when their groups are small, they can gain cultural and political importance (Eckert 1973). Even without much financial and organizational power, they can gain attention by arousing the media through new creative, phantastic or deviant actions. Mass media is selective: it is not the ordinary, but rather the exceptional which has value as news-story. The perception and transmission of unconventional behavior is thus amplified. In this context, violence too is "learned": the selective nature of the mass media rewards violent, provocative behavior with greater attention.

Youths therefore have - although short of money and institutionalized power - specific resources. They have time and can risk more than adults. By these means, they can produce spectacular news for TV and can influence the themes of public discussion (see Molotch 1979).

5. Escalation and Deescalation

Which processes then run their course when it becomes impossible to find peaceful, institutional channels for carrying out conflicts? The infliction and experience of violence induce learning processes which are difficult to reverse. As one demonstrator of the '68-generation said: "As I had to run and was hit on the head, I learned more about politics than in all your classes at the university." What was it that he learned? The confusing complexity of modern society became clear and simple, composed of the good (those fighting for "the cause") and the bad (the system, the "pigs") (see Oberschall 1973, p. 324-328).

Violent conflicts create situations which demand an interpretation from the side of the demonstrators, from the police and from the public as well. The theories which provide the interpretations are not available for the greater number of the participants at the beginning, but often only after a confrontation. Political movements do not increase and improve on their means through training courses or education, but rather through events. And these create a need for interpretation in the participants, to be provided later by theoretical homework. The importance of the dialectical process of ideology and action is stressed by Levitas (1977).

The riots of '80 and '81 in Western Europe have created a new youth movement, which will probably take over the eco-anarchial theories. Other than in 1968, the possibility of violence is always immanent today. Even those who subscribe to non-violent action must reckon with violence on the part of other demonstrators and police. And when both sides prepare for conflict under the assumption and calculation of the hardest possible reaction from the other side, an internal arms-race is underway which hardens the inimical image of the opponent (Kriesberg 1982).

The room for concession-making on the part of authorities and police, since bound to the rule of law, is small. Yet, in the public discussion, it became evident that there are competing objectives in the interventions of governmental authorities: one is the objective of deterrence, and the other is the possible non-violent regulation of conflict. As long as police control and repression are not total, the strategy of deterrence sets loose further processes of escalation.

We know how things then typically proceed: a few of the protestors learn that violence mobilizes the media and with it, the politicians. They also learn that when the authorities strike back, echoes of solidarity come resounding from other parts of society. An over-estimation of their own power and chances for success is readily made. They know that a similar mechanism makes guerilla-movements strong. The closing off of communication to an ever-smaller personal and ideological radius of "camerades" begins to narrow their perspective on social reality: they overlook the high degree of integration of the population in the existing political system. Ultimately, this kind of false evaluation can lead to terrorism (Eckert 1977). This process is present in the logic of escalation.

In this context, Fireman et al. (1979, p. 30) points at the significance of "encounters with unjust authority".

"Encounters provide occasions in which events can alter the consciousness of participants about the operation of an authority system. They provide occasions on which solidarities and collective commitments can change rapidly and the strength of commitment to struggle can be assessed. They provide occasions in which social control arose by authorities may occur or be provoked, leading to deligitimation of the authority's system."

The path of non-escalation is narrow and is becoming more narrow with every escalation threshold passed. The room for playing out such conflicts is small. Authority can hardly tolerate certain kinds of action. Any experience that illegal actions, for whatever reason, might not be prosecuted, would bring about an inevitable escalation to the principle of "might makes right". Citizen vigilantes and mercenary troops

would be the result. Demonstrators would have to look to the police for protection. Therefore, the legally constituted authorities cannot forgo the enforcement of the laws as long as they remain unchallenged in the legislative process.

"All too often, however, the authorities' reaction to social protest is not based on a calm and rational exploration of the most advantageous response, but on faulty information, erroneous views about human nature, misconceptions about crowd behavior, and ignorance of the efficacy of rewards as opposed to punishment."
(Oberschall, 1973, p. 304)

6. Some observations on the youth conflicts in Zürich, Amsterdam, Berlin, and the Frankfurt Airport
(A more detailed analysis is provided in a free paper by Eckert/Willems)

In Continental Europe, the most violent conflicts between social movements with high participation of youths and state authority have occurred in recent years in Zürich, Berlin, Amsterdam, and at the Frankfurt Airport. In Zürich and Berlin, youth subcultures with hedonistic orientations, anarchistic ideologies, and their own legitimacy beliefs initiated and constituted the movements. In Amsterdam and Frankfurt, they participated in great numbers so that formerly small groups increased to become mass movements. The same is true for the European Peace Movement and the Ecology Movement (Brand 1983).

In Zürich, Berlin and Amsterdam, they perceived their claims for their own enclaves and life styles (youth center, cheap houses, etc.) as realizable and legitimate. They based these hopes on political promises for (in Zürich a referendum for the autonomous youth center; in Berlin and Amsterdam the acceptance of former squattings) and the success of other groups. None of these movements, however, was able to realize of their expectations. Davies' J-curve (1969) can be considered as an appropriate description of the Zürich, Berlin and Amsterdam rebellions where increasing expectations could not be realized. The experience that other societal groups

received substantial state subsidies whereas their own needs received no public support, confirms Gurrs' (1970) suppositions of relative deprivation.

The experience of relative deprivation did not exist at the beginning of the protests but emerged during the conflicts. Blumer's (1978) argument that the likelihood of protest increases when groups begin to feel that the social order that produces the deprivation is illegitimate, is also supported by these findings. This argument is especially important for the understanding of the ecology and peace movements, which stress the irreversible consequences of today's decisions for future generations, and therefore question the democratic legitimacy of these decisions.

The resource mobilization theory does not provide a totally adequate explanation. There was no discretionary wealth to mobilize as a resource; there was at most the time of unemployed, young drop-outs, students and pupils, and unemployed social workers. In all cases, the conflicts were triggered by political decisions (some of them are better described as non-decisions): in Zürich, official procrastination with respect to the plans for a youth center which had already passed a referendum; in Berlin and Amsterdam the urban-renewal programs and the resulting real estate speculation. The same basic conflict pattern was also present in other cities such as Bochum and Freiburg, where youths laid claim to unused building complexes. The ecology movement was formed against the construction of nuclear power plants, the Runway West movement against the construction of another runway on Frankfurt Airport, the peace movement against the dual tract decision. In the latter (Frankfurt, peace movement, ecology movement) the initiators have not been young people. But those forms of unconventional politics were especially attractive to them.

The social movement had some success in the media. In all of the cases, media can be considered as their resource. They succeeded in making news and creating topics of public and parliamentary discussions. By these means, they have functioned momentarily as opinion-makers and opinion-shapers. People's

attitudes towards urban renewal policy and ecology problems show a drastic change. This is the more true for youth. In West Germany, the Greens, the political party of the ecologists, were able to increase their votes from 1.4% in 1980 to a total of 5.3% in the elections of 1983 and to move into the National Parliament. The proportion of young voters who voted "green" was especially high: 30.9% of the 18-25 year old voters and 10.9% 25-35 year old voters in the 1983 elections voted for the environmental party (Statistisches Bundesamt 1983). More than others, youths have increasingly identified with these movements. On the other hand, the movements have only had a minimal direct influence on political decisions. The "red factory" in Zürich, the "BO factory" in Bochum and the "Dreisameck" and "Schwarzwaldhof" in Freiburg were cleared of squatters and demolished. Only a few of the squattings in Berlin have been legalized through contract; most of the houses have been cleared. Not much has changed in the results of real estate speculation: many apartments remain vacant.

We thus have the following results: the specific resources of the new social movements (fantasy, rule-breaking, personal commitment, mass mobilization and violence) can influence the media: they haven't, however, influenced political decisions. The interest in wealth and security ("bread and butter issues") still dominates the majority of voters' decisions; moreover, the long-term organizing capacities of social interest groups remain important for parliamentary decisions. Institutions are more permanent than movements.

The concerns of the new social movements will attain political importance at least through the efforts of political parties. It is rare that a new party can directly influence political decisions. In the majority of cases, their effectivity depends on the other parties' concern for votes. In order not to lose too many votes to the newcomer, the established parties have to adopt their themes and some of their concepts.

Parties and lobbies, however, do not offer the opportunities for participation which the social movements have provided to youths. The present conflict within the West German BBU ("National Association of Citizens Initiatives for Environmental Protection") and within the Green Party correspond to the conflict between the political form 'social movement' and the political forms 'lobby' and 'party'. Most of the political activity is frustrated by opposition coming from the organizations' ranks. The movement-oriented members' reproach that the lobby and the party have betrayed the basic principles of the movement are to be heard at every delegate meeting. This confirms Traugott's (1978) thesis that social movements show anti-institutional orientations.

The political failures of the movement lead one to ask how the activists have coped with their disappointments. There is, as yet, no concrete material available on this subject. If we apply Merton's (1968) theory of anomie as a scheme for formulating the modalities of coping with disappointment, the movement will either disband or split up into sub-groups: those who retreat into the subculture milieu; those who cynically and ritualistically search for professional success in society; those who pursue the goals of the movement with the socially-conform instruments of the politician or journalist; and perhaps those who follow Merton's 'innovative' path and resort to violence. These various forms of coping with frustration depend in part on the socio-cultural background of the protesters and their active involvement in the movement.

A more resigned attitude can be expected from the many sympathizers who entered the movement at a time when it was given national importance and receiving much public attention through the media. Their specific form of support, mostly through participation in demonstrations and the signing of petitions, points to a more diffuse readiness to criticize and protest than to more determined forms of political activism. They therefore give up relatively quickly or turn to other contemporary topics of social debate.

The situation is different for the sub-group consisting of the politically active members of the "alternative" scene. These people were usually involved at early stages of protest and, above all, could be mobilized when the protest intensified. They were also ready to engage in forms of protest going beyond demonstrative participation, such as active and, in part, violent forms of resistance. These strategies and the resulting confrontation with the state led on the one hand to resignation and retreat. On the other hand, they led to the radicalization and self-imposed separation of various groups from the rest of the movement. These groups will continue to use violence to reach their political goals and will attempt to apply their methods in other protest movements.

The last group aims at the long-term realization of the movement's political goals. The parliamentary representation of the movement through their own political parties, the expansion of the movement's organizational infrastructure and the professionalization of alternative organizations and projects (e.g. alternative banks, newspapers, construction companies, education centers, schools, etc.) are all signs of the structural solidification and institutionalization of the protest movement in European countries.

7. Conclusion

- (1) An increasing number of young people meets in peer groups without control of family and neighborhood.
- (2) In these groups, the increasing competition for acknowledgement and love induces strategies of presentation of self and search for identity which lead to the establishment of various subcultures.
- (3) The cult of creativity and participation, a middle-class (or better: 'human capital' class) phenomenon, is radicalized in these subcultures.

- (4) If time is available as a discretionary resource, some people thematize the relationship between individual and society, society and nature and take the contradictions they have become aware of as the basis of social movements.
- (5) Compared to institutionalized interest groups and political parties, social movements can make enemies without caring about coalitions and bargaining processes. Therefore, they can gain public attention through the use of demonstrative deviance.
- (6) This behavior is attractive especially to young people. They risk less than adults and they can contribute to politics without having much organizational power.
- (7) The observations on youth conflicts show that the theories of emerging norms in subcultures, of relative deprivation, and of resource-mobilization fit different stages of the movements. They also show that the authorities' reactions contribute to the escalation of conflicts.
- (8) Movements are powerful in media, powerless in politics. This results in unsolved problems of coping with disappointment.

What is the appropriate political answer? On the one hand, politics can not reward illegal behavior. Whoever claims a higher, "principal" morality (in Kohlberg's (1976) sense) for himself alone cannot expect to be free of the legal consequences. All societies depend on a conventional morality because law must be applied uniformly and not be altered opportunistically from case to case. Otherwise, individuals "help themselves" by taking the 'law' into their own hands. Demonstrative law-breaking can give a signal to legislators to change the law; the social and human interest in the consistent validity of the law as such, however, remains.

On the other hand, there is a danger that the gap between legality and perceived legitimacy is widening: squatters call attention to the social-binding nature of private ownership; nuclear-power opponents claim that the contamination of future generations, who have no say in the matter, is democratically illegitimate; "Third-World shops" demonstrate that trade, even if formally free, can actually impinge on freedom. Law and justice do not always cover the same ground. If individuals, however, begin to doubt that their most basic interests are being represented in the democratic process and in the legal processes of government, their relationship to these institutions will become inimical, their attitude one of cynicism.

We believe that there is no solution that can keep society free of conflict. As long as there are interests which find no spokesmen in the markets, in organized labor or in the parties, we will have to reckon with unconventional forms of political participation. As long as the mass media select spectacular behavior, there will continue to be a temptation to break the law. As long as in the educational system young people are kept in uniform age-groups and internalize the important relationships of society on the basis of its central values, many will continue to be attracted to idealistic movements which seek to "get back to the roots". Perhaps it would be a first step forward, if we would accept the conflicts as real facts; if politicians, planners, and policemen could become aware of this willingness to act and could develop an escalation-preventing sensibility. The sequence of non-decisions, false hope and confused police activities contributed to the escalation in Zürich and Berlin and hindered the institutionalization and peaceful regulation of the conflicts. Even if these conflicts are inevitable, there is no need for the escalation of violence.

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Adolescent competence, leaving home and changing family patterns

by DON EDGAR and FRANK MAAS

If the business of youth involves developing the skills and abilities necessary for adulthood and for full participation in society, the environment for going about that business is now characterised by uncertainty and conflicting pressures. Part of the process of achieving adulthood involves the gaining of independence from the family of origin, certainly emotional independence and almost universally, economic and physical independence as well. Nevertheless there are many different experiences of gaining independence especially in Australian society where numerous socio-cultural value systems coexist as a result of more than three decades of extensive immigration. In addition family resources are unequally distributed so the achievement of economic independence will reflect the structure of family inequalities in society. Family socialization values also vary across status groups, so both parental willingness to support a prolonged youth dependence and young people's own view of the dependence/independence cycle will vary.

The process of becoming independent for young people is highly significant not only for young people themselves but also for their families of origin and for the broader community. For youth, independence should be associated with the achievement of autonomy in their personal, economic and social affairs, with a strong sense of control and efficacy, and with the ability to progressively take on levels of responsibility in numerous spheres. It should provide opportunities for personal growth and the development of exchanges of mutual obligation and caring for others. For families, the independence of children can provide new opportunities for learning and exploration, a widening of horizons, a chance to recast existing relationships and anticipate future interchanges of caring based more on mutuality and less on obligation. For society as a whole the successful integration of young adults provides the lifeblood of regeneration, a strengthening of worthy elements and a challenging of entrenched but decreasingly relevant structures.

The experience of youth in gaining their independence is therefore one of the really crucial transitions in social life. The nature of those experiences, the conditions under which they occur and the outcomes are of vital importance and should be regarded accordingly. Consequently many nations are endeavouring to develop policy responses to the components that go to influence the process of becoming independent. This paper attempts to identify some of these important components and suggests policy objectives that are worth aiming for. The argument will be developed that the context within which the process of becoming independent is carried out is changing rapidly and is doing so in each of its facets. The resultant environment is consequently confused and uncertain and young people are reacting in a like manner. The argument will also be pursued that existing stratifications in society are becoming more entrenched and that intergenerational ones are growing. Finally it will be argued that the current policy responses evident in Australia, while more appropriate than those of the previous decade, are still only scratching at the surface of problems that require strategies of a more fundamental nature.

The Competence Model of Youth Transition:

Independence is not possible without the development of two broad forms of competence:

- . 'equipment for competence'
 - the skills for competent role performance as socially defined, the capacities to control (within social limits) life situations; and
- . 'the competent self'
 - the sense of efficacy or control which enables the individual to act independently in the service of his/her own goals, motives and value system.

'Equipment for competence' will vary with the young person's 'objective' social reality, his/her position within the social structure according to

- . parental background resources
- . family status within the social division of labour
- . language styles and skills
- . family and individual experience of relative authority and control
- . individual sex and the social status of the sexes.

- INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE -

This 'location' within the social structure will affect both access to opportunities and the actual development of 'equipment for competence'. Since resources are unequally distributed and opportunities are socially structured, life chances will vary for young people accordingly. They will be able to achieve independence or the capacities for control depending on

- . the range of roles available to them
- . their interpretation skills
- . their marketable capacity.

Obviously the first two of these will reflect the nature of family socialization and the type of education system they have experienced. The third will depend more on the (changing) nature of the market at this transition point in their lives.

As the opportunity structure changes for youth on the (open or closed) market, there may well be a disjunction between

'equipment for competence' and the real life chances to be competent, i.e. young people may have the skills but yet not have the chance to use them.

Equally, there may be a disjunction between the skills and capacities learned (at home and at school) and the types of skill demanded by the changing market. Structural and technological change will bestow advantages on those with best access to information and consequently with the most lead time to adjust to new opportunities. Conversely those proceeding according to outdated perceptions will develop skills which are required less and less.

The Changing Context of Youth Transition:

Before discussing in more detail the specific contexts whereby young people may develop 'equipment for competence', it is important to map out briefly the general social background against which those particular sectors that relate to youth are set. The most obvious area undergoing rapid change is the world economic order and that part of it occupied by Australia. Australia has enjoyed a high level of income per capita since World War 2 but has been overtaken by the more rapidly developing countries in recent years. The economies of Japan, Singapore, and many European countries recovering from the ravages of the war have shifted Australia from its former high ranking with the Scandinavians to a much lower level. Between 1970 and 1981 Australia's rate of growth of per capita GDP ranked eighteenth out of the 24 OECD countries. The Australian Government is concerned that the low level of investment in the new high technology industries has left Australia languishing with a manufacturing base that is increasingly unable to compete on world markets and only survives behind high tariff walls. Until recently relatively higher inflation rates than trading partners further disadvantaged Australia on world markets. Changes in the future will see traditional manufacturing sectors significantly rationalised while the main export industries in

mining and agriculture become even more capital intensive and employing fewer people. As manufacturing has declined as a source of jobs, the service sector has expanded and the growth areas of the future appear to be in occupations such as the finance market, the processing of information, the media and leisure industries.

Other changes in the structure of employment in Australia have resulted in a decline in full-time job opportunities and an increase in part-time work but without the more favourable conditions attached to full-time employment, a decline in the participation rates of older workers and in particular older males, and high rates of unemployment particularly affecting young people. In the period August 1973 to August 1983, for example, unemployment rates leapt from 1.8 per cent to 9.9 per cent, with unemployment rates for people 15-19 increasing from 4.7 per cent to 22.6 per cent in the same period. (ABS, The Labour Force.)

These changes are the result of continuing restructuring of the economy, the spread of technological advances into the service sector and government fiscal policies which have been retractionary for the second half of the 1970s and only recently more expansionary.

Government policies are of course a major factor in determining the nature of the environment in which young people gain their independence. Apart from the economic influence of developments overseas, and of the workings of local markets, domestic policies shape the lives of families in many ways. In the area of general economic policies Australia has experienced a prolonged period of contractionary policies under a conservative government, the Liberal Party and National Party (LNP) Coalition, from 1975 to 1983, and a slightly more expansionary approach under a social democratic government, the Australian Labor Party (ALP), elected only in March 1983. The latter half of the 1970s saw Australia experience rising levels of unemployment, high levels of

inflation and, toward the end of the period, high interest rates. Drought affected many export industries and rural economies. Government policies during this time concentrated on maintaining low levels of government spending and discouragement of wage growth. Difficulties were experienced in containing government spending as outlays on income support programs, all financed from revenue and not based on employer or employee contribution, increased as the numbers of unemployed, single parent families and the aged all grew. While levels of support were not very high, especially for the unemployed, the impact of these increased costs was felt in the areas of public sector employment and on the provision of services.

Young people in particular were to be denied access to work in the public sector as most jobs lost were at the lower levels of the public service. Expenditure on important services such as health, education, housing and the development of urban infrastructure was considerably reduced. Consequently work opportunities in the private sector, largely integrated with government activity, were lost.

The change of government in 1983 has seen a moderation in the approaches of the previous eight years. Spending has been increased in areas such as housing and education although public sector employment has not markedly increased. Changes to health arrangements have provided more universal cover but on a compulsory contribution basis. Levels of income support have been increased slightly but attempts made to reduce the universality of cover to retired people especially those of adequate private means. Extensive job creation schemes have been introduced but more as a strategy to ameliorate the impact of unemployment on the long-term unemployed rather than to provide permanent jobs which it is hoped will be created in the private sector as it recovers from recession and becomes more competitive in a restructured form.

New policies that specifically address the needs of young people have been developed recently and will be discussed in more detail later in the paper. Over the decade to 1984 youth policies have focussed largely on the problem of unemployment and the main approach throughout the 1970s was to attempt to improve the accessibility of youth to the labour market through wage subsidisation, encouragement of trade training, enhancement of personal presentation and community based psychological support. This emphasis has shifted in recent times with the virtual collapse of the youth labour market over the 1982-83 period. Attention is now being paid to the education sector and proposals are being considered to improve the system of income supports to young people.

In mapping broader social changes affecting youth the changing nature of families and family formation must be regarded as one of the most important influences. There are many definite trends in Australia that parallel experience in other countries.

- INSERT TABLE 1 HERE -

People are marrying later, postponing the birth of children until material security is established within marriage and limiting the size of families to no more than two children. Increasing numbers of couples are remaining childless, more young people are living in de facto relationships, divorce is occurring earlier in marriages and more couples are divorcing including those who remarry. Behaviour and attitudes regarding marriage and family are undergoing significant change. Young people are likely to live together before marriage or at least to attempt to establish sexual and personal affinity. It is expected that both men and women should work at least until the couple regards itself as financially secure. It is expected that women will re-enter the workforce once a short period of childrearing is completed and increasingly it is expected that men should more equally share the responsibilities of childrearing and domestic tasks.

What is certain about the nature of marriage and family is that it is an institution in great flux. Many young people may never be personally affected by divorce, remarriage and the formation of new families with step-parents, step-siblings and half siblings. Nevertheless nearly all will know people who are and will be aware of the extensive public debate and concern about these changes and therefore their own views and value positions cannot help but be influenced by the extent and rapidity of current events.

The place of young people in Australia is described as follows. According to the most recent collection of census material, in 1981, young people aged 15-24 years numbered 2.5 million and comprised 17.2 per cent of the total population. This proportion has remained about the same over the decade to 1981 (ABS Census of Population and Housing, 1971, 1981). Young people aged 15-19 years comprised 50.2 per cent of the youth population, numbering 1.3 million people. Of the 15-24 year olds, in 1983 36 per cent were involved in education, 45 per cent were employed and 11 per cent were unemployed.

Young peoples' access to income is a critical factor in determining their well being. Tables 2 and 3 show the cumulative proportions of young people with incomes equal to or less than various benchmarks. These are, in 1981 dollar terms, the Tertiary Education Assistance Scheme (TEAS) allowance for those living away from home, the Unemployment Benefit (UB), the Henderson poverty line figure assuming a youth lives with two others and shares a third of housing costs, and the average weekly earnings figure for all males. Table 2 shows that for those unemployed, between 71 per cent and 90 per cent received incomes equal to or less than the level of unemployment benefits and between 73 per cent and 93 per cent were below the poverty line, 15-18 year olds being the worst off.

- INSERT TABLE 2 HERE -

Table 3 shows that for those in the 'workforce', which includes the unemployed, nearly 40 per cent of 15-18 year old females and nearly 30 per cent of 15-18 year old males are below the poverty line, that female incomes are invariably lower than those of males, and that virtually no youth receive incomes greater than average weekly earnings.

- INSERT TABLE 3 HERE -

The Achievement of Competence:

The notion of 'the competent self' as an individual sense of control, efficacy, purpose is an important qualifier to the somewhat deterministic overtones of structured opportunities to gain the required equipment for competence as an adult.

The 'competent self' refers to the emergence of selfhood in social interaction. It involves the 'subjective' side of reality, the internalization of a symbolic universe via social feedback from significant others, the major 'interpreters' of reality. This internalization involves the learning of cultural rules by means of both role-playing and role-taking, the absorption of society's 'master symbols' (individualism, the work ethic, freedom, the importance of motherhood and the family, etc. versus collectivism, or some other set of cultural values) and the development of particular goals, values, 'in-order-to' motives (Schutz, 1967). Clearly, this too will reflect in large part the socially structured differences between groups (economic, religious, ethnic, status, family groups, etc.) in their values, life choices and life styles, and in that sense is part of the cultural reproduction process (Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). However, we do not regard it as a deterministic process.

It is not deterministic, for a variety of reasons, and youth policies must take cognizance of these

- . the individual is, from birth, active in interaction

with the environment, actively selecting, testing, rejecting, demanding and questioning

- . this basic and intrinsic motivation towards competence is sustained by the experience of acting effectively on one's environment, by the sense of control that results from achieving one's own goals (White, 1960)
- . while the experience of success and the encouragement of intrinsic motivation (by solving one's own problems) varies from child to child and family to family, every individual will achieve some sense of efficacy in some arena of life. So while one group (e.g. Aborigines) may be socially defined by some as incompetent they do have skills which are, and which they see as, intrinsically rewarding. So we cannot assume that youth who 'fail' by society's standards necessarily feel incompetent, though the likelihood is higher
- . Continued and repeated experiences of failure or social rejection of the skills one has, may build into a 'vicious circle of incompetence' (Smith, 1969) just as success will breed a 'benign circle of competence'
- . the individuals denied social rewards or recognition may seek their intrinsic motivational bases elsewhere (leisure, home, friends, anti-social behaviour). In every case, their motives must be taken into account
- . self-esteem can be sustained as an inner sense of worth, in rejection of (or in addition to) the 'self-concept' which is a socially shared view of the individual's worth
- . in a society which stresses the value of individual self-fulfilment, achievement, exploration and assertion (Chester's (1981) notion of 'optionality' as the essence of modernity) it becomes almost deviant not to want to

make active and individualistic choices about life chances and careers. Thus the usual 'life cycle' theoretical view of 'the right time' (Levinson, 1978) may be increasingly inappropriate in explaining the progression of youth from family dependence, through the gateways of education and occupational choice to independent adulthood

- . further, in a society where parents are both unqualified to and unsure about commenting on the future, their power (and that of teachers) to determine the life choices of youth are reduced. Youth rejection of adult control reflects not only their realization that adult competence and power is questionable, but also the withdrawal of adults from their 'legitimate right' to control youth decisions. It may be in part a rejection by adults of youth, a resentment of their optimism and of their objectively wider choice of possible futures. (Edgar, 1980)

Notwithstanding the above, the basis of young peoples' self-esteem, their sense of 'the competent self' is their success or otherwise in achieving and demonstrating the necessary 'equipment for competence'.

The major 'tasks' of growing up are two:

- (i) to 'terminate' pre-adulthood, and thus go through separations and terminations from parents, peers, school, childhood roles, activities and interests;
- (ii) to 'initiate', to begin early adulthood, to explore, keep open options, test choices and start to create an adult-independent stable life structure.

Socially, 'success' in attaining adulthood in our culture is defined/measured in terms of:

- (i) educational success (i.e. both in achieving the credentials set by society and in learning basic and advanced cognitive/practical skills);
- (ii) success in 'work' (i.e. achieving the marks of social success in socially ascribed tasks which make one physically and financially self-supporting);
- (iii) success in 'love' (i.e. in forming mature personal relationships outside the family of origin).

There is an obvious danger here, in that 'success' is a value judgement and social definitions change through time and vary across groups. There is, of necessity, a whole range of conflicting value systems which define success and failure differently. For example, it is acceptable for a male to stay 'single' longer than a female; self-sufficiency, subsistence living, opting out of 'the system' are desirable goals for some; education and income levels seen as essential for successful living vary by social, ethnic, status and religious group. But there is a 'dominant' culture which says 'success' means passing HSC or trade school or university; getting a secure job rather than being unemployed; getting married and having children rather than alley-cattin' around or being self-indulgent. That dominant culture sets the timing (Plath's (1980) 'arcs') for key choice-points to 'prove' success or failure. Variations from the majority pathway cannot all be labelled failures, but keeping pace with or walking out of step with the majority need to be distinguished in some way. It is our contention that the 'pathways' are becoming more uncertain and more unequal and that policies for youth need to take more account of these divergences.

Educational Success or Failure:

The educational system, in advanced societies at least, is the

major 'gateway' to achieving independence via the existing (and changing) opportunity structure.

While the family's role in early childhood is crucial (especially in relation to language skills) specific skills for competent role performance (reading, writing, maths., specialist studies, the 'hidden curriculum' of conformity, time schedules, performance tests, etc.) are the prerogative of schools and tertiary educational institutions.

In Australia the education system has acted to ensure that existing socio-economic divisions within the community are maintained. In a recent study of the family backgrounds of students entering higher education since the 1940s it was concluded that a social reproduction mechanism has persisted in which higher education has served to maintain access to occupational privileges already concentrated among professional and managerial groupings (Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983).

- INSERT TABLE 4 HERE -

Access to higher education is achieved via a highly stratified secondary education system. Children from professional and managerial backgrounds gain entrance to universities and colleges in numbers far greater than the proportions their families represent in the community. Many of these attend high fee paying independent schools, access to which is severely restricted by ability to pay and cultural background. Participation in full-time schooling pretty well translates directly into success or otherwise in occupational terms. Those who leave school at the earliest ages are those most prone to unemployment and to work in the secondary labour market, work characterised by unpleasant conditions, low pay, little security and limited future options. In 1982 those who did not attend to the highest level of education available to them experienced an unemployment rate twice as high as that experienced by those who attended to the final year of schooling, 8.7 per cent compared to 4.2 per

cent (ABS Labour force and educational attainment, Feb. 1982). Those who leave at the earliest ages are not only more likely to experience unemployment but become increasingly at risk as they get older. With limited education, job opportunities become scarcer with age as employers can pay lower wages to young people. The unemployment rate for 18 year olds who have left school early was 11.8 per cent in 1982 compared with 8 per cent for those early leavers aged 15 years. The results of a longitudinal study of a representative sample of youth through the 1970s showed that each extra year of schooling decreased by one month the time it took to find a job after leaving school, decreased the probability of ever having been unemployed and decreased total unemployment by one and three quarter months, on average. According to the authors of the report,

'each extra year that early school leavers spend in school increases their chances of finding a job quickly and increases the status of their job while at the same time reducing the likelihood and length of unemployment. (Williams, Clancy, Batten and Girling-Butcher, 1980 : 95)

For some this relationship has been interpreted quite simply as the key to overcoming problems of persistent social inequality and of youth unemployment. The answer, they say, is to keep all young people at school until year 12 or about age 18. Those who seek such simplistic solutions rarely examine the complex of factors which underlie the straightforward relationship between school attendance and occupational success. Current government policies appear to have their genesis, at least in part, in the naive assumption that merely by increasing participation in education many problems of youth will be solved.

Much has been made of Australia's low rates of retention to the end of secondary education. Crude figures of about 36 per cent have been canvassed and unfavourably compared with nations with retention rates of 80 per cent such as Japan and the USA. Again some caution with such rough comparisons is required as more

thorough analysis of Australia's retention rates shows a figure of over 70 per cent of young people participating in formal post-secondary education (Brewster, Riggs and Ey, 1984:33; Ministerial Review of Post Compulsory Schooling, 1984). The lower figure relates to secondary schooling only, whereas the higher one accounts for post-compulsory education in the technical (poly-technic) area and occupation-specific training such as nursing. Such more realistic statistical pictures should provide little cause for complacency, however. There are still important issues to be faced in the structure of Australian education including the unhappy and destructive experience it often is for many youngsters, its persistent ability to maintain class structures and its lack of relevance to many identifiable groups of youth including Aborigines, those from several non-Anglo ethnic backgrounds, young people in isolated areas and females in general.

Many factors have been identified as contributing to differential experiences of schooling. A recent review of literature (Blakers, 1984) listed many factors as potentially having some part to play in the varying experience of success in secondary education and consequent retention rates. These include:

- . the competitive, academic orientation of schools;
- . the lack of provision for disadvantaged groups such as Aborigines, non-English speaking youth, females generally, etc.;
- . financial considerations including costs of education and the availability or otherwise of financial assistance;
- . the attractions of having a job;
- . the availability of apprenticeships and trade training; and
- . the levels of youth unemployment.

There are many unanswered questions raised by the above comprehensive listing of factors potentially influencing the decisions young people make to stay at school. They all have implications for policies aimed at providing a more equitable and relevant nexus between education and society than the present system provides. It is important that the many young people who have inadequate opportunities through the education system to develop 'equipment for competence' be given a greater chance to do so.

As yet it is not clear what the relationship is between labour market conditions and educational participation. It looks as though the 1970s may have been a transition period between the buoyant and optimistic era of the 'long boom' and the drastically changed world of the 1980s and beyond. In the former period education could be seen as an engine to social mobility and as long as jobs were readily available no concern needed to be given to taking a job at the earliest opportunity. Nevertheless the educational experience of many during this time was alienating and irrelevant and contributed to the low levels of income received by the early leavers of those times. This alienation was echoed in research in the mid 1970s which consistently showed young people as requiring more of education than a ticket to a good job. The values they expressed then were for more emphasis on personal and social development, a better relationship with teachers and a chance to develop responsibility in decision making (Wright and Headlam, 1976; Stroobant, 1978; Edgar, 1979; Office of Youth Affairs, 1979; Poole, 1981.) More recent surveys have shown that education is now regarded as mainly instrumental, as a means to occupational success or security. (Ainley, Batten and Miller, 1984) This marks a return to earlier attitudes and poses dilemmas for those attempting to provide an educational environment that caters to all young people and not only to those who will be selected out to take the richest prizes in the occupational race. A renewed conservatism thrives in curriculum design, in discipline policies and in assessment procedures being sought by groups of parents,

their concern becoming evident in the ever growing popularity of private schools among the middle classes.

On the other hand the 1970s research shows that while young peoples' commitment to the value of work is strong and no weaker than that of previous generations, the nature of that commitment is qualitatively different. Youth are seeking personal fulfilment and satisfaction from the jobs they are to undertake in the future. They have an interest in deriving a sense of pride and achievement in their efforts at work. (Pryor cited in Shears, Stevens and Lokan, 1979 : 80-81) If these are still the values being pursued by young people then what is demanded of education is the provision of opportunities to achieve a satisfying niche in the adult world. If this is so the requirements of reform measures in schools will be away from narrow academic offerings and toward experiences that will adequately equip youth for fulfilling adulthood.

Nor is the relationship between financial considerations and educational participation clear. Studies cast doubt on the importance of having financial support on decisions to pursue higher education (Beswick, Hayden and Schofield, 1983). Where parental emotional support and encouragement are high it is argued that the lack of adequate income support will not deter further study. Where such encouragement is lacking, then lack of finance might mitigate against longer stays in education. Such discussions, however, focus on a stage of education that thousands of young people never reach, having left school between 15 and 17 years. Many of these might never have pondered the equations of income foregone, allowance required and costs incurred as their experience of school and those of their parents might not have predisposed them to consider staying beyond the age legally required.

Nor is it clear how the aspirations of females in general and those from cultural backgrounds that do not support improved opportunities for young females in particular, can be achieved

within the structures of today's systems. Any more than it is clear how members of severely disadvantaged groups such as Aborigines can hope in this generation to see the investment of the immense resources required to provide them with opportunities to redress the social imbalance that weighs so heavily against them.

Opportunities to develop the skills and abilities to negotiate the new world of the 1980s and the twenty-first century, the 'equipment for competence', are firstly experienced in the family setting and shortly after, in the context of schooling. The interaction between the two will be critical for the life chances of all young people. For many the values of the home and those of the school are in harmony, they reinforce one another, experiences in school are supported and built on at home and vice versa. For these youth the benign circle of competence has begun. It has probably been supported by policies that favoured a family form which enabled easy access to pre-schooling, financial recompense for a mother at home, and not for a family seeking adequate child care or one in which the only parent could not find work or was struggling on low levels of benefits. The dissonance between other families and schools can activate the vicious cycle of incompetence and structures and practices that deny some families successful access to education as one of the spheres for developing 'equipment for competence', lead to a compounding of family-based inequities in the social distribution of competence/incompetence, knowledge/ignorance, power/powerlessness. (Edgar, 1980)

As mentioned earlier in the paper, leaving school early translates into marginal status in the labour force. Those who thereby miss out on the fruits of successfully completed education come predominantly from families of low socio-economic status. Numerous studies have confirmed this reality (Behrens, 1978; Rosier, 1978; Sturman, 1979; Poole, 1981). School participation rates are most sensitive to family income (Chapman and Thompson, 1981; Miller, 1982)). In turn family income is

related to the occupational status of the father (Williams and others, 1980). Other factors that are associated with income and occupational status and which influence the likelihood of a young person staying at school are the value given to education by the parents, parents' job aspirations for their children and the teenagers' own aspirations and expectations regarding school and work (Poole, 1978). Blakers has summarised the research literature in this area as follows:

on the whole those who complete their schooling are students who come from socially, educationally and economically advantaged families; who achieve well at school; whom the competitive school processes suit; who are encouraged by parents and teachers to continue their education; who have or develop confidence in their own capacities; who value education partly for its interest but basically for the occupational and social rewards it is likely to bring. Those from lower socio-economic groups who stay at school are generally those whose parents regard schooling and educational qualification as important and who encourage their children to be hardworking and competitive. Those who give up schooling, particularly in the early years of secondary schooling are likely to be not only socially and economically disadvantaged but also educationally low achievers (Blakers, 1983 : 38).

Occupational Success or Failure:

The second sphere where the skills necessary for competent adulthood will be learned is in the world of work. Until the mid 1970s little academic attention was paid to the nature of the youth labour market. As unemployment generally, and youth unemployment in particular, grew throughout the latter half of that decade more effort was made to discern the characteristics of the world of work for young people. Many gaps still exist in the research into that area yet some revealing findings have

begun to emerge. The youth labour market has been described as 'complex and dynamic' (Stricker, 1983).

The youth labour market provides limited choice to entrants. Available jobs are concentrated into a narrower range of occupations than those for older workers. In the early 1970s over 60 per cent of male youth worked in only six minor occupation groups and by 1976 the concentration was even greater. For young females, in 1976 78.8 per cent were also employed in only six minor occupation groups. (Department of Industry & Commerce, 1981) The industries that largely employ young people are generally in decline with five of the ten main industries employing male youth-and the two main female youth-intensive industries experiencing overall declines in levels of full-time employment in the decade to 1981. For young males there was an increase in their share of jobs in light of these ten areas leading to the conclusion that these youth have increased their share of full-time employment in those industries which are in relative or absolute decline (Department of Education and Youth Affairs, 1983 : 87). For female youth the situation is worse as their share of employment in the two main industries in which they work, finance and investment and retail trade, fell as did overall employment in both areas. As Ferman (1983) points out, whereas jobs demanding little skill or education were once the 'portals into the world of work', new technology will require formal training and only low-paying service jobs will be available for disadvantaged youth. The need for mathematics, science and engineering in the new 'unmanned factory' will certainly restrict the opportunity structure for women, potentially wiping out the gains made in equality over the last decade.

In addition to a narrow segregation of youth into specific occupational areas, further segmentation has occurred over the last fifteen years. Full-time employment has declined dramatically, a trend which has been paralleled by a strong growth in part-time work. The annual growth rate of part-time

work was 5.8 per cent between 1973 and 1980 while full-time employment grew by only 0.4 per cent over this time (Stricker and Sheehan, 1981 : 27). The growth in part-time employment has coincided with the expansion of service occupations in such areas as finance and insurance, clerical work, leisure industries and community services. The trend to part-time work has particularly affected young people leading to the emergence of a dual labour market, 'one mainly providing small amounts of spare time employment and the other dealing with full-time work and the establishment of life-time working patterns by young people, and characterised by very high rates of recorded unemployment (Stricker and Sheehan, 1981 : 175) The full-time labour market has been characterised by a steady decline. The number of 15-19 year olds holding full-time jobs fell from 615 000 in 1966 to about 507 000 in 1981 while at the same time the relevant population grew by more than 230 000. The result was that the proportion of young people in full-time work has fallen from 59.2 per cent in 1966 to 40 per cent in 1981 (Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission, 1982 : 21). This fall was particularly severe among young females. In 1966 57.1 per cent of teenage females held full-time jobs compared with 61.3 per cent of teenage males. By 1981 only 34.5 per cent of young females were employed full-time compared with 45.3 per cent for males. It is onto this diminishing full-time labour market that young people who leave school early go.

The growth area in youth employment, the part-time labour market, is marked by the dominance of students. Stricker and Sheehan estimate that 'two-thirds of teenagers who work part-time or seek part-time work are full-time school students and most of the growth in the teenage part-time labour force has been among school students (Stricker and Sheehan, 1981, quoted in Blakers, 1984 : 66). Part-time employment among school students increased by 143 per cent between August 1974 and August 1979 while the corresponding rate for non-students was only 4 per cent. The proportion of full-time teenage students in the labour force rose from 5 per cent in 1971 to 27 per cent in 1981, the proportion of

the teenage part-time labour market comprising students was nearly 75 per cent in 1981 and in the decade to 1981 students comprised 71 per cent of the growth in part-time workers. These figures are reflected in the Hancock and Burke survey of disadvantaged youth where 27.4 per cent of the students in the sample derived a proportion of their income from wages (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 159). As most of the jobs in this sector pay very low wages no young person could live on the return from only one such situation. A study of youth in South Australia showed that nearly 70 per cent of those employed part-time earned less than \$25 per week (O'Neil and Bosio, quoted in Blakers, 1984 : 71). Consequently part-time employment cannot provide a secure foundation upon which young people who have left school can build independent and competent adult lives.

As mentioned earlier in the paper the aspect of youth employment trends that has received most attention has been that of unemployment. Along with the overall rate of unemployment the level of youth unemployment rose dramatically in the mid 1970s. For thirty years to 1973-74 the annual average unemployment rate in Australia was 1.9 per cent. The first break from this pattern appeared in the second half of 1974 when, in a twelve month period, the unemployment rate leapt by approximately 3 percentage points. Unemployment remained high, and increased further in 1978-79 and 1982-83. During 1982-83 levels of unemployment were 4 to 5 percentage points higher than in 1981. Youth unemployment rates for much of this period have been between 2 and 3 times those of the overall workforce, being 12.9 per cent in August 1975 when the rate for all ages was 4.5 per cent and 22.6 per cent compared to 9.9 per cent in August 1983 (ABS Labour Force 6203.0). During 1982-83 the youth labour market deteriorated even further with the number of males 15-19 employed full-time falling from 318 800 in February 1982 to 244 000 in February 1984; a fall of 23 per cent. The number of young females with full-time jobs also declined over this period from 217 800 to 185 800.

With traditionally higher rates of unemployment, young people have generally comprised about one-third of all those unemployed. In February 1984 youth aged 15-19 years comprised 28 per cent of the total unemployed. (ABS Labour Force, Feb. 1984; There is also evidence to suggest that the experience of unemployment tends to be concentrated among particular groups of families. The chances of young people being unemployed are increased if one of their parents is unemployed and increased again if both are unemployed. The unemployment rate for young people living with both parents was 24.4 per cent in families where the father was unemployed compared with 9.4 per cent in families where the father was employed. Unemployment rates among young people were similarly higher among families where the mother was unemployed (18.3 per cent compared with 9.3 per cent). This effect is even greater for young females (Cass, 1981).

Much of the picture of youth unemployment has been derived from cross-sectional analysis of large data collections. Research into the dynamics of the labour market provides a more detailed understanding of the problem. Stricker notes that research on labour flow patterns for young people generates two main findings:

- . a great deal of present high unemployment is explained by very high turnover rates among young people; and
- . much of youth unemployment is concentrated in a small group who experience serious and protracted difficulties in the labour market (Stricker, 1983 : 72)

Stricker presents data indicating that the majority of young people experiencing unemployment are out of work for short periods yet the relatively small proportion who are unemployed for long periods is responsible for a disproportionate share of total weeks of unemployment. Stricker concludes that 'the

critical problem of youth unemployment' is one of extensive unemployment amongst a small group of people, rather than simply a matter of high rates of job turnover' (Stricker, 1983 : 83). He also notes that little is known in Australia about the personal characteristics of such young people.

Another group of young people about which little is known is a group referred to as 'fringe youth' by Sweet (Sweet, 1984 : 77). These are the young people who are not counted as being either in full-time work, or full-time education, or as unemployed by the Australian Bureau of Statistics. They number almost as many as the officially classified unemployed, totalling 96 100 in July 1982 as compared with 98 000 out of work. Sweet suggests that almost nothing is known about this group although he suggests that about two-thirds are females. As to their living circumstances he says:

we do not know whether this fringe group who have fallen into a statistical black hole are rural youth, live on outer urban fringes, or are surviving in inner city squats. Are they mostly the children of migrants? And how many exist on supporting parents' benefits, without building up work experience or training to give them a stake in the future?

To the young people who leave school at an early age and attempt to find a niche in a restricted, segmented, secondary labour market; to those who are doubly disadvantaged because of where they live, their ethnic background, their gender, their families' experience of unemployment and education; to those hidden unemployed either languishing at school or adrift somewhere in the community we must add these minority groups, the fringe youth. Many so-called fringe youth will be typified by many or all of the above characteristics. Their chances of developing the equipment for competence, of becoming autonomous adults will be as severely limited as is imaginable. It is primarily to these groups that efforts will need to be directed and policies

developed to go some way to meeting the needs generated by changing social and family structures.

Success in Personal Relationships and the Achievement of Adult Competence:

Perhaps the most important (but the least accessible to policy) aspect of gaining adult independence is the achievement of success or failure in personal relationships. It has been argued elsewhere that interpersonal or social competence is the most crucial factor in developing 'control of one's environment'. (Foote, 1955; Baumrind, 1978) Interpersonal competence involves language and interpretive skills, the ability to 'read' the signals in social encounters, the ability to present the self in a favourable or at least socially acceptable light, the capacity to assert, compromise and negotiate one's place in the world. Employers' complaints about youth job interview skills are just one reflection of this.

The more important aspect of interpersonal competence in relation to adulthood is of course that of forming satisfactory adult sexual (usually heterosexual) relationships.

While space does not permit to develop the point fully here, we would hold that growing up involves a series of self-other negotiations and a series of 'identity breaks'. The child develops an identity at home which has to be renegotiated at school. The adolescent grows beyond his/her parents' knowledge of them and another identity break occurs. Peers, friends, workmates affirm and confirm one's new identities better than can one's parents - they accept as normal the new self one tries to negotiate.

So finding an adult partner is part of that 'separation' process. We have grown, developed, changed to the point where old social bonds no longer work sufficiently well for us to feel accepted, or in control of our own identity. With parents, we are still a

child, a son, a daughter. Some parents manage to change and keep up with their children, so they never 'lose' the bonds and the family 'stays together'. But there must be some form of physical and psychological 'separation' from parents in order for the individual to assert competent adult selfhood.

Several propositions can be made then about this aspect of 'leaving home'.

Family instability (marriage breakdown, parental mobility and unemployment, death, conflict, etc.) will crucially affect young people's self-esteem and sense of efficacy in dealing with other people, and in the timing of their leaving home. In the IFS national Family Formation Study, those who had more than one father when growing up had a significantly ($p < .0001$) lower sense of power score than those whose families remained intact. As will be shown in the next section, the IFS data on youth leaving home also support this view. Young people whose parents' marriage relationship was poor, and those who felt not close to their parents were more likely to leave home early and to enter de facto arrangements or to live alone. The Institute's 'Children in Families' study, reported at this conference by Ochiltree & Amato, (1984) also shows a significant relationship between conflict in the home (whether 'intact' or not) and lower self-esteem on the part of young adolescents.

Those who leave home and form other relationships early will not necessarily have high levels of self-esteem, and this is borne out by our data. Using a 'sense of power' scale to measure personal efficacy, scores are high for those males who leave before age 18, and for those who leave after age 22; sense of power is lower for those leaving between 19-21 years of age, suggesting a curvilinear relationship. This does not hold for females however, who in general score lower on sense of power than males.

We would argue further, that changing attitudes to sex and marriage mean a non-linear progress from family of origin to family of procreation, the emergent norm now being singlehood or informal partnerships. In our Family Formation Study of 18-34 year olds, only 8 per cent did not expect that they would ever marry, but 83 per cent of the unmarried men and 66 per cent of the women said they would like to be financially secure and settled in their job before marrying. Only 40 per cent of all respondents agreed that married people were more likely to be happy and 41 per cent agreed 'there are few happy marriages these days'. As McDonald (1984) puts it:

'There was consequently strong support for strategies which would minimise the risks of marrying the wrong person: 79 per cent agreed that people should take at least a year to get to know one another before marrying; 78 per cent said that it was alright to live together without planning to get married; 63 per cent said that couples should make sure that they are sexually compatible before marrying. Evidently high levels of economic insecurity and the demonstration effect of a high divorce rate have made young people extremely tentative about marriage. They speak with two voices. They do not agree that single people are lonely or that single people miss having close relationships while at the same time they strongly agree (85 per cent) that marriage provides love, warmth and affection. Thus it could be said with only slight exaggeration that the adjectives ambivalent, uncertain, apprehensive, equivocal, confused and inconsistent apply in the attitudes towards marriage of many young people. Therefore, although most young people will say that they expect to marry, their level of confidence about marriage is low. This casts doubt on the likelihood of a marriage boom in the near future.'

These levels of ambiguity about their future interpersonal relationships perhaps reflect significant shifts in values as well as economic constraints on getting married. We would suggest in fact that getting married is no longer the gateway to independent adult sexual relationships, so more complex tests of 'competence' in interpersonal relationships are required. The following Figure 2 indicates the proportions of each age group in our sample who have achieved the major 'transition events'. The younger ones may well achieve them in later years, but other data suggest otherwise.

- FIGURE 2 IN HERE -

When we look at the respondents' experience of sexual relationships by age groups, it is clear that the younger cohorts achieve sexual experience much earlier than did those born in the 1950s.

- INSERT TABLES 5 & 6 HERE -

When we look also at the data on values in relation to marriage, cohabitation and the single life, we see much more 'liberal' attitudes on the part of those already in informal cohabitation than those who are married.

- INSERT TABLE 7 HERE -

These differences vary significantly according to levels of education, religiosity, ethnicity and parental occupation, with the younger cohorts overridingly less traditional across all these variables. (See also the paper prepared by Glezer, (1984), for this conference)

- INSERT TABLE 8 HERE -

Clearly, then, in a context of later marriage, delayed child-bearing, more voluntary childlessness, increasing marital

breakdown and divorce, and a shift towards personal choice of the forms of sexual relationship, young people today face a very different chance of achieving 'success' in this arena. The pathway to adult sexual relationships is no longer coincident with marriage. Youth can control pregnancy, via contraception, and abortion (Siedlecky, 1979), can explore options, can make their own choices with less adult interference. But this very optionality demands greater 'competence' than before; it presumes preparedness for mature sexual relationships and the ability to make sensible judgements. Given the failure of most parents and schools to 'teach' anything about human relationships, and the lack of any studies documenting whether or not such courses do in fact make any difference (See, however the Goldmans' (1982) cross-national study on sexual understanding in young children) we can only speculate that youth face a more complex and tenuous chance of achieving 'success in love' than ever before, just as they face uncertainty in achieving competence in school and at work.

Changing Patterns of Leaving Home in Australia:

Leaving the parental home is an important phase in a young person's life and is a critical one in the process of entering independent adulthood. As part of its Family Formation Study the Australian Institute of Family Studies collected extensive data on the experiences of 2500 people aged 18 to 34 years selected as part of a national representative sample in 1981. The process of leaving home was included in the data collection and has only recently been analysed in detail. Some of the preliminary findings are reported here and provide a revealing picture of the changing behaviour of young people as they begin to break at least their physical ties with their families of origin.

What has emerged at the beginning of the 1980s in Australia, is a new stage in transition to young adulthood. This has been described as 'a stage of independence between living with the

parents and becoming married to begin a new family'. (Young, 1984 : 54) As this new stage is associated with reasons other than marriage which are characterised by less permanent commitments and living arrangements, the possibility of returning to the parental home before a final departure is increased.

Using survival analysis, Young found that the median age at leaving was 20.7 years for males compared with 19.5 years for females (Young, 1984 : 58). The corresponding values from data collected by the same researcher in 1971 were 23.8 years for males and 21.5 years for females. The leaving home process is characterised by periods of returning to the parental home, leaving, returning and leaving again. According to the age of respondents at the time of the IFS survey, at the youngest ages 18-19 years, the largest group consists of those who have never left home, followed by smaller groups who have left and never returned, and who have left once and returned. By ages 25-29 and 30-34 years almost the entire population consists of two groups, those who have left and never returned and those who have left at least twice and are still away from home. This evidence suggests that the major part of this movement is completed by age 25 years. At each age group more females than males have ever left home and the proportion of the total who are now at home is higher for males than females. Males are also more likely to return home than females. Apart from experience at ages under 16 years, females leave sooner than males, and by age 20 years less than one-third of females have never left home compared with one-half of males. In all, about 50 per cent of males ever return home compared with 40 per cent of females.

As to the reasons young people first left home, Young confined her analysis to those who had mostly all left for good, those aged 26 years and older. This was to eliminate any bias that could occur because some of the sample had not yet left home and others had not returned home. For this group marriage was the main reason for first leaving home among 31 per cent of males and

45 per cent of females (Young, 1984 : 59ff). Next in importance for males were independence (18 per cent), job opportunity (12 per cent), travel (7 per cent) and study and armed forces (each with 6 per cent). Among females, the next most important reasons after marriage were independence (10 per cent), and study, job and conflict (each with 9 per cent). Overall, higher proportions of females than males left home for the first time for reasons of marriage, study and conflict, and lower proportions of females than males left for independence, a job opportunity or to travel. The dramatic difference in leaving home behaviour is revealed when the corresponding values for data collected in 1971 are compared with the 1981 results. In 1971 around 70 per cent of males and 80 per cent of females left home to get married.

The change in the reasons for leaving home over the decade 1971 to 1981 may be more clearly seen by comparing the reasons for leaving given by different groups who left at the same age, one group in the early 1970s and the other at the beginning of the 1980s. For example, by comparing the reasons given by those who left before age 18 around 1970-71 and those who left before age 18 around 1980-81, we may see the extent to which changes have occurred. Table 9 shows the reasons for first leaving home of those aged 20-24 years at the time of the IFS survey in 1981. This group were aged 17-23 years in 1970.

- INSERT TABLE 9 HERE -

Apart from the very young group marriage was the main reason for first leaving home during this period. For those who left at less than 18 years, finding and taking a job was the most important reason, while marriage and conflict were other main factors associated with young females leaving at this age.

Table 10 shows the reasons for first leaving home of those aged 17-22 years at the time of the IFS survey in 1981. Comparing Table 10 with Table 9 it can be seen that

- . independence is a far more important reason for first leaving home in 1981 than in 1970, for all the group but particularly for females where it is now the most important reason by far for those leaving at under 18 and has nearly doubled in importance for those leaving at 19-22 years;
- . vocational reasons, while still important for all the group, have reduced in proportion, possibly reflecting a reduction in opportunities particularly for the youngest group;
- . conflict has increased dramatically for all the group, especially for males and for those leaving before age 18 most recently;
- . marriage has decreased as a reason for first leaving so that it ranks quite low for the early leavers, has been more than halved for males leaving at ages 19-22 years and has been reduced by nearly 30 per cent for females leaving at those ages;
- . travel, while the privilege of only a small group in 1970, is a far less popular reason for leaving in 1981, perhaps again reflecting much more restricted opportunities for both work and accumulating savings.

- INSERT TABLE 10 HERE -

The study found that, overall, among the group aged 26 years or more the most common residence arrangement when first leaving home was with a legal partner (33 per cent of males and 47 per cent of females) followed by friends (20 per cent of males and 17 per cent of females) (Young, 1984 : 61-62). The trend toward independence as the main reason for first leaving home is associated with arranging accommodation with friends. As

Table 11 shows, among the group most likely to leave home for reasons other than marriage, the under 18s, living with friends was the main arrangement for all but those who left home in the early 1970s. By the early 1980s it was clearly the main preference for these early leavers and was an important option for those leaving at years 19-21 at this time.

- INSERT TABLE 11 HERE -

Leaving school early is usually associated with leaving home at a young age. When reasons for leaving home are considered, those who leave school at older ages are less likely to leave for marriage and are more likely to leave to be independent than those who leave at earlier ages. Young sharply contrasts the high proportion of early school leavers who are now leaving for independence with the situation in 1971 when she says that independence was common only among those with higher levels of schooling (Young, 1984 : 67). She also contrasts the high levels of early school leavers who are now leaving home for a job with the situation in 1971. In 1981 it was found that there was an inverse relationship between the age of leaving school and the proportion seeking a job. Leaving home because of conflict is also more associated with early school leaving age, more so for females.

Our Family Formation data also reveal much about youth-parent relationships and the process of leaving home. Parents are not necessarily upset when their offspring leave home. Overall, 83 per cent were positive or neutral, and only a third of those whose children left for reasons of conflict were negative about the move. However, they are more likely to be opposed when their young go to live alone, or to live with a de facto partner or leave for reasons of independence. Ironically, those who leave home with positive parental reactions are less likely to return than those whose parents were negative. The quality of the parents' marriage also relates to patterns of leaving home. Those young people who felt their parents should have shown more

affection for one another were more likely to leave home at a younger age and for reasons of conflict. Using a scale developed by Glezer from items on their attitudes to living with parents, Young found those with negative feelings were more likely to leave earlier, never to return or to return only to leave again, to live alone after leaving, and to leave for reasons of conflict or to get married. We also find, using this 'family atmosphere' scale, that a good family atmosphere is significantly and positively related to the young persons' self-esteem and sense of power. On another scale of 'closeness to parents' those not close left for conflict and marriage reasons and were less likely to return. And on a 'traditional family attitudes' scale, the more traditionally oriented youth were likely to leave home later, for marriage more than for any other reasons. Using a discriminant function analysis to summarize these various measures, Young found youth more likely to leave home early if they were

- . the eldest child
- . unhappy with living at home
- . unhappy with their parents' relationship
- . from families where the mother worked a lot
- . not close to their parents
- . brought up by more than one father or mother.

Adding to this picture of background family factors influencing the personal relationships formed by youth on leaving home, Khoo (1984) looked at those currently living in *de facto* marriages. Australia's cohabiting population is as yet small (about 60 000 unmarried couples, or 3 per cent of all persons aged 15 and over in 1982) so we are perhaps just at the beginning of a transition some European countries have already been through. However, in our sample, 20 per cent of all 18-34 year olds had at some time been in an informal marriage, a likely underestimate because the question was biased against identifying short-term cohabitation.

For the whole sample 77.7 per cent believed it was acceptable to live together without planning to marry and 44.4 per cent believed that a trial marriage was a good idea.

Those currently living in a de facto situation were mostly never marrieds, less likely to have a tertiary education (though de facto women were better qualified than married women), less likely to be religious, more likely to be unemployed, working part-time on low incomes, and to have changed jobs frequently, and more likely to have left home early because of conflict and/or in order to be independent from their family. They report having been close to neither of their parents, to have felt more restricted and less comfortable living at home and to come from more 'liberal' families. Khoo suggests that these young people, while they do expect to get married after this 'trial' period, are economically insecure, dubious about the benefits of being married and more disillusioned about their parents' marriage. In other words, they reflect the uncertainty of the times facing youth in the 1980s.

Leaving home at a young age also appears to be an important factor in the likelihood that a young person will return home. At the youngest ages of leaving home almost two-thirds of males and about one-half of females will return, whereas the proportions of those remaining away from home are the highest for those leaving at ages 22-24 years, where only 20 per cent return. Males return more than females at all ages. The most common reason for returning home for both males and females was 'convenience'. Reasons of finance and loneliness or illness also featured prominently. Financial and personal problems, such as loneliness or illness, were associated with first leaving home for reasons of independence and conflict. (Young, 1984 : 70)

Young concludes on a note of concern that with a trend toward younger leaving for reasons such as independence and conflict, the emerging more drawn out process of leaving, returning and

leaving again will become more prevalent. She notes that with wider options of leaving home for reasons other than marriage more choices must be faced by young people in this transition stage. The outcome of these choices will determine the length of the transition for both the young person and their parents.

The above analysis of the IFS Family Formation study was based on a representative Australian sample and shows that for those at very young ages much of the leaving home experience is problematic. Those who left at around 16 years were likely to have left school early, to have left home for reasons of conflict, were likely to return home because of financial and personal problems, and were likely to finally leave for reasons similar to their initial departure. This sub-group of youth is one with special difficulties and some of their characteristics have been identified in more detail in a recent study of disadvantaged youth with accommodation problems. Hancock and Burke interviewed about 300 youth in urban areas in Australia and others who had been living in emergency youth shelter accommodation.

More details of this study will be described later in the paper when policies regarding accommodation needs are discussed. At this stage it is of interest to note the many similar characteristics of this specific group that were identified in the IFS study. Hancock and Burke report that on arrival at youth shelters 44 per cent had experienced family conflict and 30 per cent household breakdown (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 17). Of those in various situations living with parents, with relatives, with friends or partners, 'living rough' or in hostels - but with accommodation problems, the majority named family conflict/dispute or violence, or factors emanating from parents' separation or re-marriage as their main reasons for leaving home (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 19). Over half were under 17 years and nearly 70 per cent were unemployed. Nearly 40 per cent whose previous living situation was the family home had come from sole parent or de facto/remarried family situations compared with 26

per cent from two parent families. The IFS survey showed that by age 17 years only 26 per cent of those from homes where both natural parents were present had left home for the first time compared with 45 per cent of those where some other parental arrangement prevailed.

The extended transition period was particularly evident among this group of young people. Twenty per cent currently living at home had at some stage lived away and had moved back, often because they had no alternatives (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 169). Some had returned and left several times usually because of the same conflicts that precipitated that initial departure. Forty six per cent of the urban group gave conflict as their main reason for leaving and 15 per cent cited conflict with step-parents in remarried situations.

Of the very young leavers many had unrealistic hopes given the level of their resources. Hancock and Burke report that youth workers indicate that very young people usually list independent living as their most preferred option, usually meaning freedom from adult interference and rules, usually sharing accommodation with friends. The judgement made is that many such youth need supervision and assistance as they do not have the social maturity or the experience to succeed at independent living (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 118-126). For the rest, young people exhibit little control in their living situations many of them being forced to move from place to place, trying to reform groups that break up and struggling to meet financial burdens. Of those living independently in the Hancock and Burke study 66 per cent were dissatisfied with their current situation and intended to move.

The young people included in this study were characterised by the social disadvantages they had to contend with. Nearly all had to survive on low incomes, even if they were employed. Many had been away from the family home for years. Those who were very young were judged by youth workers to be in need of supervision

of some sort. The older ones, with some experience behind them, were generally regarded as independent. The solutions to their problems did not lie in returning, at least on a long-term basis, to their family of origin. They have to be regarded as adult members of society in their own right. The levels of competence they had developed, especially difficult against the situations they faced, nevertheless marked them as independent individuals.

Conclusion and Policy Implications:

In order to become independent, fully functioning adults young people need to be able to develop a sense of autonomy, of control over their affairs, to be able to take on responsibilities and have opportunities for personal growth, mutual exchanges of obligation and caring. The context for developing the skills necessary to successfully cope with the demands of adulthood and to become 'competent selves' is crucial to the outcome for each individual. The discussion in this paper has sought to demonstrate that the critical contexts, those associated with education, with the workplace, and within the relationships of the family, are all in a state of flux. The environment in which young people must now strive for their independence is characterised by confusion and uncertainty. For many it is likely to be one of considerable hardship, while for others, their families seem to be shoring up their future and attempting to secure for their children, and probably for themselves, whatever advantage can be gleaned from the turbulent arrangements at hand.

The differences in the climate for planning for adulthood between the beginning of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s have been seen by examining the circumstances faced by the cohorts of 17-22 year olds leaving home at those different times in the IFS Family Formation survey, and by examining their leaving home behaviour. In the early 1970s prospects for the future looked both predictable and bright. Two decades of full employment had been experienced, constant economic growth was still regarded as

normal and as posing no great difficulties and the road to this reasonably benign future was clearly seen to be via higher levels of education. It was about this time that educational participation rates for males were at their highest. Young people becoming independent at this time could look forward to an easy entrance into the world of work, could be confident of secure employment ahead along with increasing incomes and a stable path through marriage, childrearing and home ownership. Their leaving home behaviour confirms this pattern. Some even embarked on extended travels.

In 1981 circumstances were radically different from those of a decade before. Unemployment, especially among youth, was at record levels and the economic and employment futures were uncertain at best, bleak at worst. The education system, the shining hope for many a decade previously, was now the subject of constant attack and reforms were being proposed from all sides. Some said that education for all meant expanding non-academic offerings while others argued that the lowering of academic standards and the abandoning of traditional values were causing unemployment and a drop in Australia's economic performance. Young people, especially males, were leaving school at earlier ages in great numbers. Generally, economic prospects were uncertain and young people reflected this lack of confidence in the future by marrying in fewer numbers, by postponing marriages, by postponing the birth of children and by dissolving marriages in greater numbers and after shorter periods. (McDonald, 1984; Carmichael, 1984)

Nevertheless in 1981 young people were leaving home earlier than previously and while not moving into the traditional pattern of marriage and family as readily as earlier generations, were nevertheless expressing a desire to be independent of their families of origin. This emergent transition period has become one that lacks the certainty of young adulthood under earlier circumstances. There is less certainty about regular income and

the future of work prospects. There is less certainty about the worth of or rewards from prolonged education. There is less certainty about the nature of the relationships young people have emerged from, in their families of origin, and less certainty about the relationships they might embark upon, perhaps in families of their own creation. This uncertainty and conflict is perhaps reflected in the frequent returning to the parental home discussed earlier in the paper. It is also possibly more concentrated among certain groups of youth than among others. For those young people from families with assured and substantial economic resources, where the values of home, school and work place are harmoniously interlocked and mutually reinforcing and rewarding, the future might not be so uncertain. The perception of the advantages flowing to this group via its access to higher education and the professional and managerial occupational opportunities that follow might explain the press for places at prestigious non-government schools and the consequent segregation of a disadvantaged government school system catering for increased numbers of youth denied a place in a dwindling job market and a privileged sector destined to pluck the more sought after fruits of the current political economy in Australia at present. For those young people who leave school, and consequently home, at very early ages, the current environment of uncertainty has materialised as life spent in demoralising and degrading jobs, on inadequate levels of government benefits, and moving from living place to living place with no security, let alone hope for the future.

It is this environment of uncertainty and lack of opportunity for many that public policies must address. Currently governments are attempting to develop approaches in the areas of employment and training, education, income support and accommodation.

From the mid 1970s to only recently government approaches to the problems facing youth were largely dominated by labour market concerns. Approaches included wage subsidies to employers, training allowances for apprenticeships and attempts to improve

the job-seeking and presentation behaviour of youth. While inquiries and official pronouncements admonished the education system to provide more relevant experiences for young people, in reality for every one dollar spent on education programs, six dollars were spent on labour market programs (Freeland, 1983). Even as late as 1979 with the introduction of a School to Work Transition program, the then Commonwealth Government was emphasising preparation for work as the major component, with an emphasis on trade training, pre-vocational and pre-apprenticeship courses, and vocational guidance and job-seeking skills. The current government's emphasis now appears to be away from labour market approaches and toward a greater role for education. It has been suggested that the reason for this is a growing recognition that youth unemployment is not a temporary phenomenon but a result of permanently changed labour market structures. Consequently the strategy now is not to stimulate demand for youth or improve the quality of labour supply, but to reduce the supply of labour by achieving a permanent increase in education participation rates (Sweet, 1984). This intention was signalled at the beginning of the Labour Government's current term of office by shifting the responsibility for youth policy development from the Department of Employment to that of Education.

Nonetheless there are many thousands of youth currently in the labour market for whom traditional educational offerings are meaningless and the only policy response so far to their continuing needs has been to expand short-term work opportunities through job creation programs. Nowhere has it been suggested that these are regarded as anything but stop gap measures, the hope for this group of disadvantaged youth lying optimistically in the hope of future economic recovery and improved work opportunities in the private sector. That this hope is a forlorn one is indicated by the likelihood that the type of jobs generated in a resurgent economy partly based on new technology will not be available to unskilled youth who also have little prospect of developing the abilities required for an expanded

service sector. Perhaps a future emphasis on mature age entry to technical and further education (TAFE) courses designed for providing this class of displaced worker with a relevant training for a changed labour market would be a sensible policy direction to take.

Most emphasis recently has been placed on the education sector. The government has instituted what is called its Participation and Equity Program (PEP). The main thrust of this program, according to the Department of Education and Youth Affairs is

directed towards bringing about wide-ranging changes in schools which will enable them to give all students, and especially those from a disadvantaged background, a rewarding, useful education through to the end of secondary schooling. The program will be directed particularly to secondary schools with low retention rates and will seek to foster more equal outcomes of schooling. Thus the new program will have the twin objectives of increasing participation in education and of introducing greater equity in our overall provision for young people. (Department of Education and Youth Affairs, 1983 : 3)

In order to increase both participation and equity the operation of the Program will concentrate on the following main areas which are nevertheless regarded as interdependent:

- . curriculum
- . assessment, accreditation and credentialling
- . teacher/student/parent interaction
- . teacher renewal and support
- . school structure and organisation
- . post-school links
- . groups with specific needs
- . public support of education (Commonwealth Schools Commission, 1984 : 21)

These areas of concern pay a great deal of attention to some of the factors that have been seen to inhibit both participation in schools and equitable outcomes of attendance. An underlying thrust is to change the purpose of schooling and the perception of that purpose by the community. The purpose up till now has been largely to sort young people out into the social and status strata they were to occupy in adult life. While this worked well some attention was paid to the intrinsic rewards of personal development that could be achieved through education but not to the extent that the main purpose was lost sight of. While lip service has been paid to the ideal of egalitarianism over the years, the structural processes that have persisted made sure that existing stratifications were unaltered. Now no useful function is to be served in tipping 70-80 per cent of young people out into a society that has no useful purpose to put them to. Schools must now serve a new purpose of occupying many more young people until an adult place is available for them in the world outside. If this new function can serve some of the lost purposes of old, to do with personal and social development of individuals, with the growth of cultural and critical understanding and with the development of skills to produce useful new knowledge, if it can assist those who are disadvantaged by virtue of their class, gender, ethnic background or disability, then it will be an exciting time and an exacting task.

There are numerous obstacles to those outcomes being achieved, however. Increased participation it seems is not a problem at present, as floods of young people who would otherwise have left schools are now returning. The problem has become what to do with them and how to cope with their needs? The old academic orientation, once the agent of many a student's departure, must now be overhauled if it is not to become the altar on which many schools' internal harmony is to be sacrificed. The question is can schools change to develop more flexible structures, more relevant curricula and more responsible relationship structures

to cater for the vastly different and varying abilities and needs of their new clientele? Given the notoriously slow pace of change in schools and the current paucity of resources to assist in such change, substantial doubt must exist as to the capacity for change, at least within a decade. And if change occurs and the masses of hitherto independent youth, away from the juvenile environments of schools, can now be integrated into less academic learning institutions, what of the demands of the group that have been traditionally rewarded by the system? Will this group turn to alternative educational structures to ensure their continued access to the elite occupations and if they do, how will future community attitudes regard such a dual system?

In recent years a feature of the concern with the youth employment situation was to pay more attention to the relationship between schools and the world outside especially that of work. If the current policy direction abandons the broader working community as a sphere of relevance to young people, an even longer period of enforced childhood might be imposed on future generations. Since Coleman criticised the creation of teenagerhood two decades ago, (Coleman, 1961) moves to make the world at large a more relevant learning environment have improved the capacity of young people to develop their skills of competence. It is to be hoped that the notion that young people no longer have a place in the labour market does not extend to the view that lengthened schooling must be divorced from other social activities including the workplace. Proposals for allowing combinations of part-time work and part-time study and for siting learning opportunities within the community and not exclusively within schools should not be lost as PEP develops. Entire communities could become integrated into the educational program of a young person. The existing institutions such as schools, technical colleges, universities, etc. could become part of the educational inventory available to students, along with shops, offices, workshops, parks, libraries, welfare services, etc. Community-based educational brokers/advisors/mentors similar to those proposed by Illich (Illich, 1973) could

be assigned to assist students of any age over 15, to design a (Ministerial Review of Post Compulsory Schooling, 1984; Edgar, 1984). One solution may be to give young people after age 15 a 6 year 'certificate of entitlement', an 'education upgrade voucher' (EUV) to be used at institutions of their own choice. This would produce a healthy competition for enrolment; and mean that young people could 'cash in' their vouchers when motivated to do so. 'Dropping out' would not doom them to incompetence and they could 'drop back in' when they needed an 'education upgrade'. It would also force the breaking of the lock-step, lock-out mentality of our education system. Courses would comprise units, interchangeable rather than in sequence, which students could choose and build upon as they wished. The six year 'education upgrade voucher' would entitle everyone to a fixed number of senior secondary and tertiary units, to be taken whenever in the life cycle individuals chose. This approach might also encourage new view of 'getting your qualifications', of 'being qualified' and a greater involvement of parents (who might themselves be cashing in the EUV) in the education choices of their children. In this way combinations of work, study and community service could be undertaken in ways that would suit most people, including older folk who need retraining or further education.

A crucial part of such schemes is, of course, the income support policies that would underpin them. At present government concern is focussed on the morass of assistance schemes that exist for young people according to their age, their activity and their family status. Some payments are made to the parents, some to the young person; some are means tested, some are not; some are tested against parents' income and some against the individual's

income. The rates of payment vary considerably but most are very low. Currently pressure is being applied to rationalise the system so that

- . income support arrangements should be simple with a minimum number of separate payments providing a consistent and easily understandable as well as equitable structure;
- . adequate financial support is available for all young people in need including those who are unable to engage in employment, education or training;
- . particular attention is paid to the needs of disadvantaged groups - it should provide incentives for young people to participate in a comprehensive range of improved opportunities in education, training and employment;
- . levels of income support and the method of payment should recognise the growth in independence and self determination of young people as they move into adulthood and employment, while recognising the prime responsibility of parents for the support of younger people (Office of Youth Affairs and Social Welfare Policy Secretariat, 1984 : 13).

Apart from the very real cost constraints being faced in achieving a task of this dimension, numerous other difficulties confront the development of a rationalised youth income support policy. Principal among these are the competing demands of providing an adequate level of assistance, but to those in greatest need within the context of cost limitations. In addition the question of dependency is a difficult one to resolve as is that relating to the (dis)incentive effects associated with youth allowances. The level of assistance should be adequate to support a young person in their current activity. Short of paying all youth not currently employed an allowance, some determination must be made of other sources of support available

to young people. If parents are able and willing to support their children in education or training programs it is not unreasonable to expect them to do so. Unfortunately many are not able to provide assistance, and there are some who are able but not willing, particularly in the case of some young females in tertiary education (Beswick and others, 1983). If allowances were to be paid only on the basis of the individual's income an inequitable situation arises between young people from low income families living alone or with their parents and those with well-off parents who provide substantial support.

A related issue is that of dependency. Some allowances assume parental support, for example, between ages 16 and 18 young unemployed people receive a lower benefit than those over 18. Nevertheless eligibility for the benefit is only tested on the individual's income assuming some degree of independence from parents. Conversely allowances for tertiary students are means-tested on parental income unless the student lives away from home. Some assistance for secondary students is paid directly to the family as is the universal family allowance payable to the mother of a dependent student until age 24 if still living at home. Some proposals for reform have suggested a phasing in of an independent supporting allowance assuming that from age 16 to 21 the process of becoming independent is a gradual one. Others have suggested that living away from home allowances should apply regardless of age and be extended to 16-18 year old unemployed youth who now receive the lowest level of support.

The problem of incentives arises with differential payments for different activities, for example, education or unemployment, and for different household statuses, for example, living alone or with parents. The extent to which additional income is allowed to be earned while not affecting the levels of allowances also has an effect on the seeking of part-time work while either

unemployed or studying. Some fears have been expressed that living away from home allowances will encourage young people to leave home earlier.

If account is taken of the trends in leaving home discussed earlier, three factors are of relevance to these issues. First, young people have been leaving home earlier than in previous decades, especially those who leave school early. As this group is likely to come from lower income families with little commitment to the values of schooling, is most likely to be severely affected by low levels of income, and is more likely to be away from home than employed youth, there seems to be little point in not extending a living away from home allowance to them and in not lifting the level of their assistance to those aged 18. Second, as young people increasingly leave home at around 18-19 years for reasons mainly to do with independence and the evidence shows that parents are usually supportive of this move, there is little evidence that payment of a living away from home allowance to this group would act as an extra incentive for a move that is likely to occur anyway. Thirdly, it has been shown that the extended returning home behaviour of these groups is partially associated with financial difficulties, again providing support for the payment of extra allowances to those living independently of parents. Such a payment would remove a prolonged extra commitment for parents and perhaps reduce some of the conflict that is also associated with early leaving and frequent returning. The added impetus to independent responsibility on the part of the young person can only add to his or her ability to develop skills for competence.

Apart from those who live independently of their parents, who have extra commitments regardless of the existence or not of parental support, there appears to be merit in the notion of phasing an allowance over the years 16 to 19. (Beswick and others, 1983)

By age 20 years most young people have either established their independence or are engaged in some form of education or training. Those who are still at home could receive an allowance tested against their income only, while those living away from their parents would receive the living away from home allowance. Some cost savings could be made by progressively transferring family allowances to the student as the level of independence was presumed to increase. A rough rule of thumb might be as follows:

Age of Student	Education Allowance Paid to Student	Allowance Paid to Family
16	25%	75%
17	50%	50%
18	75%	25%
19	100%	Nil

Whatever the arrangement it will be important to allow young people to move from one circumstance to another with some flexibility. Consequently disincentives to take part-time work while either studying or unemployed, or to undertake part-time study while unemployed or working should be reduced. The objective here should be to reintroduce a high degree of certainty and confidence in the options facing a young person. If rigidities or traps are created in the allowance system which lock people into situations with little opportunity to change course, the uncertainty and lack of confidence in the future currently evident in the spheres of work and education will not be reduced. As indicated earlier, an Education Upgrade Voucher with a concomitant freeing up of the lock-step sequential course structures of higher schools and colleges would facilitate this greater flexibility.

One area of policy receiving little attention is that of youth accommodation. In their study of disadvantaged youth Hancock and Burke (1983) found that only 64 per cent of the students lived

with their parents, while 46 per cent of employed youth were still in the family home and only 38 per cent of unemployed youth had not moved out of home (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 159). The unemployed youth mainly depended on government benefits for their income while a third of even the employed youth earned less than \$100 per week. A majority of young people living independently were dissatisfied with their accommodation because of substandard conditions and/or high costs. Young people frequently move and the study concludes that their reasons usually involved 'coercion or conflict rather than choice' (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 171). Accommodation needs for young people depend in part upon three overlapping criteria, according to Hancock and Burke:

- . age and social maturity
 - the needs of younger, less mature youth, straight from home, with little experience of independent living, are different from older youth more likely to have established their ability to survive and cope independently;
- . previous contact with welfare authorities
 - many young users of emergency shelters have had a history of State care or institutional living and a past family history not conducive to harmonious living in a communal situation. These youth need welfare support services in addition to access to low-cost housing;
- . gender
 - young females are vulnerable to sexual exploitation and girls under 16 are at risk of institutionalization for moral protection. They are more disadvantaged economically compared with males in terms of their higher rates of unemployment compared with males.

The report makes recommendations which relate to three basic aspects of youth's housing needs:

- . increases in the supply of low cost rental accommodation accessible to youth and youth's access to public rental housing through specific youth housing programs;
- . increases in youth's ability to pay for rental accommodation (through increases in pensions and benefits and rent subsidies, bond and rent assistance);
- . targeted youth accommodation programs to increase housing access and quality for 'disadvantaged' and 'homeless' youth and preventative strategies which broaden and cheapen rental housing for youth such as students, country and interstate youth, youth on low incomes and youth presently living at home with their parents (Hancock and Burke, 1983 : 309).

Policies which enable youth to establish a more settled pattern of independent living after leaving the parental home are required. The pattern of frequent returning home and leaving again is problematic for both parents and young people. As much of this behaviour stems from inadequate and costly accommodation, recommendations such as those made above deserve careful consideration by policy makers.

In summary, the context for gaining independence has changed in recent years so that opportunities for young people to develop 'equipment for competence' are now characterised by uncertainty, a lack of confidence and limited choice of future options. Developments in the areas of the education system, the workplace and in family relationships all reflect these characteristics. Policies for the immediate future should strive to reduce these levels of uncertainty and provide a basis for confident planning for future lives. It is impractical to yearn for past or passing structures in order to re-establish a context for developing

competence based on security, certainty or stability. If the essence of modernity is 'optionality' what must be aimed for in the development of policy responses are structures not characterised by stratification and rigidity but by confidence and hope embodying alternatives with clear futures and a support system to facilitate experimentation and selection of appropriate choices.

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FIGURE 1: COMPETENCE MODEL OF YOUTH TRANSITION TO ADULT INDEPENDENCE




Figure 2: Proportions in each age group who have achieved the transition events, completion of education, financial independence, left home, and marriage. (From Young, 1984)




TABLE 1: THE CHANGING NATURE OF FAMILY FORMATION
AUSTRALIA - 1976-1981

	1976	1981
MEDIAN AGE AT MARRIAGE		
BRIDEGROOMS	23.6	24.4
BRIDES	21.2	22.1
MEDIAN AGE AT FIRST BIRTH	24.2	25.3
TOTAL FERTILITY RATE	2.06	1.94
CHILDLESSNESS RATE FOR MARRIAGES < 5 YRS IN DURATION (per 1000 marriages)	252 (1965-1970 cohort)	329 (1970-1974 cohort)
DE FACTO COUPLES AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL COUPLES	2.6	4.7
PERCENTAGE MARRIAGES DIVORCING WITHIN 5 YRS	15.5	20.8
CRUDE DIVORCE RATE (per 10 000 population)	10	28
WOMEN'S WORKFORCE PARTICIPATION Married couples & dependent children (full & part-time work)	41.0 (1974)	43.0 (1982)

TABLE 2: INCOMES OF UNEMPLOYED YOUTH 1981

(for those with Incomes up to \$26,000) - per cent of group

Income p. wk \$	15-18 years		19-21 years		22-24 years	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Income & TEAS	n.a.	n.a.	81.5	87.0	69.4	90.0
Income & U.B.	81.5	80.5	82.2	87.6	71.1	90.1
Income & Poverty line	93.0	93.0	83.1	88.8	73.5	90.2
Income & A.W.E.	100.0	100.0	99.9	100.0	99.9	100.0

Source: ABS, Census of population and housing, 1981
 Catalogue No. 2168.0

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TABLE 3: INCOMES OF YOUTH IN THE WORK FORCE (INCLUDES UNEMPLOYED) 1981 (for those with Incomes up to \$26,000) - per cent of group

Income p. wk \$	15-18 years		19-21 years		22-24 years	
	Males	Females	Males	Females	Males	Females
Income $\leq$ TEAS	n.a.	n.a.	12.5	16.5	7.4	12.7
Income $\leq$ U.B.	22.0	31.6	13.0	17.0	8.0	13.2
Income $\leq$ Poverty line	27.0	38.0	14.0	18.3	8.9	14.5
Income $\leq$ A.W.E.	99.8	100.0	97.0	98.8	87.7	94.3

Source: ABS, Census of population and housing, 1981
Catalogue No. 2168.0

**TABLE 4: FATHERS' OCCUPATIONS OF FULL-TIME HIGHER EDUCATION
STUDENTS, 1974 Percentages**

OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY	UNIVERSITY	CAE N=521	MALES 45-54 (1971 CENSUS)
Professional/technical	32.6	26.1	7.5
Administrative	19.9	18.2	12.4
Clerical	4.9	5.2	6.8
Sales	5.4	5.4	5.6
Farming/mining	7.2	9.3	10.9
Communication/transport	3.8	5.2	7.6
Tradesmen/labourers	13.7	18.0	39.9
Service, sport and recreation	3.0	1.9	4.3
Armed forces	0.6	0.8	0.6
Not in workforce and/or no information	9.0	10.0	4.4

Source: cited in Anderson and Vervoorn, 1983 : 146

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TABLE 5: FIRST REPORT OF CASUAL SEX BY AGE RESP.

AGE REPORTED	AGE GROUP AT TIME OF INTERVIEW				N
	17-19	20-22	23-27	28-34	
12-14	21.4%	11.6	13.5	8.7	74
15-17	46.4	42.6	34.2	34.2	226
18	32.1	25.6	31.6	22.1	160
EARLY 20's	-	20.2	14.8	22.5	101
LATE 20's	-	-	5.8	9.1	30
30's	-	-	-	3.5	8

**TABLE 6: FIRST REPORT OF ONE SERIOUS SEXUAL INVOLVEMENT BY
AGE**

AGE REPORTED	AGE GROUP AT TIME OF INTERVIEW				N
	17-19	20-22	23-27	28-34	
12-14	10.2%	7.4	3.6	2.5	82
15-17	49.1	27.7	28.8	17.3	476
18	40.1	37.3	26.3	24.9	547
EARLY 20's	0.6	27.7	34.0	35.9	591
LATE 20's	-	-	7.3	14.9	173
30's	-	-	-	4.4	40

1909

TABLE 7: ATTITUDES TO MARRIAGE (IFS FAMILY FORMATION STUDY,
1981/82) BY MARITAL STATUS

STATEMENT	MARITAL STATUS		
	LIVING TOGETHER		MARRIED
	NEVER MARRIED	EVER MARRIED	
	Percentage agreeing with statement		
1. A woman is only fulfilled when she becomes a mother.	M	24.7	55.9
	F	21.8	29.4
2. Marriage provides love, warmth and happiness.	M	61.6	50.0
	F	59.5	54.8
3. Married people are happier than those who go through life without marrying.	M	23.3	36.8
	F	18.9	33.6
4. Marriage is not important but being in a close relationship is.	M	71.0	79.1
	F	81.6	70.1
5. Marriage is for life.	M	59.4	47.9
	F	63.8	43.7
6. It is good to have a trial marriage.	M	82.6	87.9
	F	81.8	86.0
7. Being single provides fewer worries or responsibilities.	M	58.8	86.6
	F	56.7	49.0

TABLE 8: ATTITUDES TO MARRIAGE, BY AGE GROUP

STATEMENT	AGE OF RESPONDENT (YEARS)			
		17-22	23-27	28-34
		Percentage agreeing with statement		
1. A woman is only fulfilled when she becomes a mother.	M	19.9	22.5	26.5
	F	22.5	25.4	29.9
2. Marriage provides love, warmth and happiness.	M	86.9	82.5	89.2
	F	84.8	83.3	84.5
3. Married people are happier than those who go through life without marrying.	M	46.7	45.9	49.2
	F	33.0	30.9	36.6
4. Marriage is not important but being in a close relationship is.	M	61.0	52.2	41.6
	F	53.5	43.3	37.2
5. Marriage is for life.	M	76.8	78.7	72.2
	F	78.8	76.3	67.9
6. It is good to have a trial marriage.	M	38.4	37.2	44.0
	F	43.7	51.2	51.0
7. Being single provides fewer worries or responsibilities.	M	79.5	72.2	73.3
	F	61.5	57.2	58.5
8. It is alright to live together without planning to get married.	M	79.1	82.1	81.2
	F	74.6	79.2	73.9

**TABLE 9: REASONS FOR FIRST LEAVING HOME (OF THOSE WHO HAVE EVER LEFT)
OF THOSE AGED 28-34 YEARS IN 1981 - Per cent of group**

Age first left home	<18		19-21		22+	
Reason for leaving	M N=135	F N=275	M N=129	F N=261	M N=116	F N=88
1. Independence	20.7	13.8	24.0	12.6	25.9	17.0
2. Vocational	50.4	32.7	17.8	10.3	9.5	5.7
3. Conflict	8.1	16.4	4.7	5.4	4.3	2.3
4. Marriage	2.2	25.8	40.3	62.5	52.6	67.0
5. Travel	7.4	3.3	7.0	5.0	1.7	6.8
6. Other, D.K.	11.1	8.0	6.2	4.2	6.0	1.1
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: IFS Family Formation Study, 1981

**TABLE 10: REASONS FOR FIRST LEAVING HOME (OF THOSE WHO HAVE
EVER LEFT) OF THOSE AGED 17-22 YEARS IN 1981**
Per cent of group

Age first left home	< 18						19-22	
Age in 1981	17-19		20-22		Total 17-22		19-22	
Reason for leaving	M N=50	F N=54	M N=65	F N=117	M N=115	F N=171	M N=51	F N=68
1. Independence	30.0	27.5	33.8	32.5	32.2	31.0	37.3	22.1
2. Vocational	30.0	27.8	35.4	25.6	33.0	26.3	13.7	13.3
3. Conflict	24.0	25.9	10.8	17.9	16.5	20.5	15.7	11.8
4. Marriage	2.0	11.1	1.5	8.5	1.7	9.4	13.7	44.1
5. Travel	0	0	9.2	4.3	5.2	2.9	3.9	2.9
6. Other, D.K.	14.0	7.4	9.2	11.1	11.3	9.9	15.7	5.9
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: IPS Family Formation Study, 1981

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TABLE 11: LIVING ARRANGEMENTS UPON FIRST LEAVING HOME (OF THOSE WHO
HAVE EVER LEFT) PER CENT OF GROUP

AGE FIRST LEFT HOME	UNDER 18				19-21			22+	
AGE WHEN INTERVIEWED IN 1981	17-19	20-22	23-27	28-34	20-22	23-27	28-34	23-27	28-34
LIVING ARRANGEMENTS	N=104	N=182	N=291	N=409	N=10	N=230	N=388	N=53	N=204
1. Alone	5.8	7.1	9.6	6.8	12.1	9.1	5.7	6.5	11.8
2. Legal partner	7.7	8.2	14.4	18.1	31.8	37.4	55.7	57.6	60.8
3. De facto partner	6.7	11.0	6.2	2.0	6.5	7.4	1.8	6.5	4.9
4. Friends	39.4	35.7	21.6	15.6	26.2	30.0	15.2	20.4	11.8
5. Relatives	20.2	9.9	14.8	14.7	7.5	5.7	6.2	5.4	5.4
6. Boarding school	4.8	7.1	8.9	12.0	2.8	0.4	1.5	1.1	0.5
7. Boarding house	1.0	1.1	2.7	4.4	0	1.7	2.3	0	0
8. Other	14.4	19.9	21.8	26.4	13.1	8.3	11.6	2.5	4.8
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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